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If the Albufera is not cared for it will disappear, but its disappearance will not cause 
anything else to happen. There will not be any geological cataclysm; nor any sort of 
catastrophe, or anything like that. Moreover, the physical destiny of the Albufera is that it 
will disappear. The lake, abandoned to itself, with no sort of attacks upon it or any efforts 
to care for it, is irretrievably condemned to disappearance. But this is the fate of any 
historical or artistic monument. Every building, for example, is condemned to 
disappearance, just as the construction of extinguished civilizations disappeared, and just 
as little by little the castles, chapels and monasteries lost in the Spanish geography are 
disappearing, important victims of carelessness, theft, and hooliganism. 
Restoration work is undertaken in order to alleviate this inexorable fate as much as 
possible. This is why any monument or work of economic or cultural interest is object of 
a permanent guarding and conservation that will allow such legacies of our parents to 
pass to our children. There is no explanation, then, for the abandonment and pillage that 
an area of scenic and cultural interest such as the Albufera has undergone. We have a 
responsibility to our descendants that this patrimony is not lost; that the cultural wealth of 
the Albufera, in the broadest sense of the word, passes intact to the generations to come. 
 
from José Manuel Benet Granell, “La Albufera de Valencia: Datos para una 
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Introduction. Sedimentary Histories of a Valencian Landscape 
 
Hidden among the shells, plant matter, stones and soil on the floor of a lake are the 
stories of fishermen, farmers, philosophers, and politicians. While every physical environment 
bears some mark of contemporary human actions, the strata of a lakebed preserve the evidence of 
successive social, economic, and physical changes over time, each layer gradually buried under 
new deposits washed in from the surrounding countryside. Deep below the surface, the remains 
of marine barnacles and oysters provide records of a primeval connection between the lake and 
the sea. Atop them, freshwater mussel shells tumbled among river-smoothed pebbles signal a 
shift in the ecosystem, an influx of new streams and canals brought about by an era of river 
diversion and irrigation. A layer of silt suggests sudden deforestation upstream, perhaps caused 
by fire or the abandonment of agricultural lands. The thick carpet of muck found in urban duck 
ponds and bucolic watering holes alike indicates a surplus of phosphorous and nitrogen carried in 
by surface runoff, creating an oxygen-starved environment where not even the bacteria necessary 
for decomposition can survive. Wood planks, cartridge shells, fishhooks, and discarded bottles 
embedded in the mud all suggest the use of the lake for recreation, construction, and economic 
survival. And above it all, the water, opaque or transparent, sterile or teeming with life, shimmers 
in the sun and shields these histories from view. 
Atop these physical layers lie other, metaphorical strata, laid down by visitors to the lakes 
who infuse the landscape with meanings built on memory, myth, and tradition. Our experiences 
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of nature are defined not only by materiality, but also by the cultural associations we ascribe to 
specific places and types of landscape. The fishermen, farmers, philosophers and politicians 
whose actions have contributed to the sediments on a lake floor may share certain memories of a 
landscape, but they are just as likely to differ in their understandings of what that landscape 
means. Where one visitor sees a carefully managed rice paddy, another finds underutilized real 
estate, and still another delights in a thriving wetland. The distance between such visions, 
combined with the biological and geological constraints of the landscape, creates a space for 
social and ideological conflict.1  
The sedimentary layers, both real and imagined, in lakes around the world emanate not 
only from local land use, markets, technologies, hydraulic management, and cultural practices, 
but also from the larger processes that shape those local trends, and have their roots in global 
trade agreements, social movements, and political changes. Layers of connections between the 
biological world and the human, the local and the global, go into the creation of every new 
stratum. Soil and fertilizers wash down canals from freshly tilled fields, the product of 
agricultural practices made possible through funds from a transnational subsidy program. Fed by 
the nutrients in the soil, algae blooms proliferate and starve out other species when the lake’s 
historical source of clean, fresh water dries up under the combined pressures of global climate 
change and nationwide hydraulic demand. Lakebed strata are some of the many physical traces 
left by these complex interscalar interactions. 
 “Sedimentary history” is both a metaphor and a literal reality. This dissertation dives 
beneath the ripples and excavates some of the strata, following the sediments back to their 
sources to reveal the relationship between the material environment and the myriad human 
                                                
1 The evocative image of layers of landscapes infused with meaning by memory, myth, and tradition has been 
borrowed from Simon Schama, Landscape and Memory (Vintage: 1996). 
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decisions that have influenced its development. Its focus is the ongoing physical transformation 
of the area surrounding the Albufera, a large, shallow lagoon on the Spanish Mediterranean coast 
just south of the city of Valencia; the social, economic, and cultural factors that have contributed 
to that transformation; and the ways in which the shifting landscape has given rise to new uses 
and new relationships between local people and their environment. The area, whose very 
emergence as a cohesive region lies at the heart of this study, today plays an important role 
within the Valencian imagination as a site of unparalleled biodiversity and picturesque 
landscapes, as the origin of iconic foods and traditions, and as a significant source of pride and 
prestige for regional people (Figure 1). My basic argument is that the history of a specific place, 
including both its material characteristics and the role it occupies in the lives and ideas of its 
inhabitants, must be understood as a product of the confluence of multiple scales. 
Figure 1: Situating a transnational microhistory 
The Autonomous Community of Valencia is outlined in red, and the Albufera Natural Park is outlined in green. The 
city of Valencia and its large international port are visible immediately north of the park. 
     
The Albufera’s recent history provides an entrée to the story of Spanish “modernization” 
and the attendant changes in popular attitudes towards nature, productivity, and the state. 
“Modernization” can mean different things to different people, and concepts of modernity in 
Spain shifted significantly over the course of the twentieth century. From the anti-clericalism of 
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prewar intellectuals, to the industrial productivism of the Franco regime, to the post-materialism 
of the 1970s and beyond, however, Spanish modernity has always been measured in comparative, 
transnational terms. Politicians and philosophers throughout the century defined modernity and 
“backwardness” not by internal criteria but by the relative position of Spain vis-à-vis its 
international peers, specifically the industrialized nations of the West. Spain’s many divergences 
from the paths of development observed in England, the United States, France, and Germany – 
the “failure” of its nineteenth-century Liberal revolution, the persistence of a predominantly 
agricultural economy, the “superstitious” culture dominated by clerics and monarchists – were 
understood as deficiencies that kept the country from resuming its rightful place among the 
world powers. Spanish modernization, then, has been generally understood as a national 
progression away from these sins of the past and towards an imagined European economic and 
cultural norm. Many commentators have used the term interchangeably with “Europeanization.” 
That progression has been measured by at least two different standards over the period 
covered in this dissertation. For most of the century, philosophers and politicians alike saw 
industrialization and mechanization as the hallmarks of modernity. Some went further, 
describing a change in the modes of production as merely a first step that would produce further 
improvements in quality of life, education, and political participation, but under the dictatorship 
of Francisco Franco y Bahamonde, economic growth often came at the expense of these other 
hallmarks of “modern” Western societies. Indeed, one of the great ironies of the Franco era was 
the regime’s emphasis on modernizing the economy even as the anti-democratic dictatorship 
itself stood out as an anachronistic holdover among the nation-states of Western Europe. By 
1970, however, the yardstick for Spanish modernity began to shift away from Franco’s obsession 
with economic growth and towards ideological and political convergence with Western trends. 
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Reformers within the government loosened restrictions on public morality and expanded civil 
rights, and the final years of the dictatorship saw a blossoming of countercultural movements and 
intellectual trends that mirrored those of England, France, and the United States. With the return 
of democracy, local and regional governments scrambled to adopt progressive reforms that 
brought their legal regimes into line with those of their European neighbors, while the national 
government renewed its emphasis on diplomatic relations around the world. No single event was 
more successful in convincing Spaniards and foreigners alike of the country’s “modernity” than 
the country’s accession to the European Union in 1986, which marked a decisive end to the 
country’s exclusion from political and diplomatic networks and signaled the acceptance by the 
new government of fundamental changes in social policy.  
The process of Spanish modernization, then, entailed a wide range of physical, 
demographic, and ideological changes that had ramifications not only on the national scale but 
also in the lives and surroundings of individuals. Many of those changes can be traced through 
the transformations of Spanish landscapes and people’s understandings of those landscapes over 
time. The Albufera, one of the most ecologically and sociologically diverse regions of Spain, 
offers a unique opportunity for an in-depth study of how the process of modernization affected a 
wide range of people and places. Its landscapes include one of the last undeveloped beaches on 
the western Mediterranean, a lake that is both the drainage point for major urban and industrial 
areas and an internationally protected wetland habitat, industrial zones and municipalities, major 
tourist resorts, and a large expanse of privately-owned fields and farms that have been known for 
their fertility for more than a thousand years. The people occupying these spaces have similarly 
diverse lifestyles and ideas, often defined by their relationship to the land itself: fishermen, 
scientists, novelists, rice farmers, politicians, and activists. Their divergent experiences of trends 
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such as urbanization, environmental engineering, conservation, and mechanization provide a 
complex and nuanced portrait of modernization in Spanish society.  
This is not to say, however, that Valencia is somehow “typically” Spanish, and indeed a 
secondary focus of this dissertation is the way that the environment has helped to shape 
distinctive Valencian identities that diverge sharply from those of the nation as a whole. While 
regionalist movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia have long taken center stage in the 
international press, similar movements exist in regions around Spain based on claims of unified 
historical or cultural identities. With the institutionalization of the central government’s 
weakness and the political primacy of the seventeen “Autonomous Communities” during the 
transition to democracy, these regional identities and political entities have taken an increasingly 
important role in both local politics and in negotiations at the level of the European Union. These 
regional identities are just as fractured and problematic as national ones, with sharp internal 
disagreements over questions as fundamental as language and their relationship with the Spanish 
state. Regionalist movements in Valencia, for instance, range from a conservative, folkloric 
vision of the medieval Kingdom of Valencia to a progressive anti-centralism that identifies more 
closely with neighboring Catalonia and distant Brussels than with Castile. Valencians on all sides 
of the political spectrum have used various combinations of Valencian regionalism along with 
tools and ideas of transnationalism to advocate for political and social changes. 
While the identities and experiences described in this dissertation are, therefore, uniquely 
Valencian, they are nonetheless closely tied to a larger national story of environmental change in 
the twentieth century. Where regional identities such as those found in Spain emphasize the 
constructed nature of the state itself, national boundaries and institutions are real in meaningful 
ways, both produced by and acting upon external processes. Legislation, economics, and ideas 
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propagated by the nation-state can produce concrete results in individual lives and specific 
environments. Ideas and laws emanating from Madrid fundamentally shaped the boundaries 
within which Valencian actors can operate. The expansion of tourism along the Mediterranean 
coast, the causes and consequences of Spain’s accession to the European Union, and the rise of 
hydraulic engineering, while examined here primarily in the Valencian context, can only be 
understood within a framework that takes into account the national and transnational policies and 
events that shaped them. We must look, in other words, not only at the sediments themselves as 
they settled on the floor of the Albufera, but also at the streams and gullies that brought them to 
the lake, and at the fields and hills from whence they came. 
This multiscalar view, in turn, raises larger questions about international environmental 
governance and the ways that local cultural, material, and historical traits can shape the 
implementation of policies developed in distant legislative arenas. This is not simply a case of 
the classic “implementation gap” between a prescribed action and the extent to which it is carried 
out on the ground, but rather points to the impossibility of prescribing solutions to global 
environmental problems from afar via universalizing policies that fail to take local and historical 
specificity into account.2 The view from Valencia is a view from the bottom, from the rice fields 
and beaches where policies on conservation and the economy play out, rather than the 
boardrooms and parliamentary halls where the policies are designed. A local history allows us to 
consider how various ideologies of domination, from Francoist control to EU law, have been 
interpreted and resisted on the ground. In the rural environments on the outskirts of the city, we 
                                                
2 A survey of the problems associated with national-level implementation of European environmental policy in the 
late twentieth century is Implementing EU Environmental Policy: New Directions and Old Problems (Issues in 
Environmental Politics), ed. Christopher Knill and Andrea Lenschow (Manchester University Press, 2000). For an 
up-to-date analysis of existing implementation gaps and their economic implications, see European Commission 
Directorate-General Environment. The costs of not implementing the environmental acquis. Report 




see how people engaged concretely with their environments, how contradictory policies were 
reconciled by those responsible for their implementation, and how people integrated local and 
personal experience with new ideas imposed from outside. Listening to a septuagenarian farmer 
describe his latest eco-tourism holiday, riding in a dilapidated motorboat with biologists tasked 
with holding back the forces of erosion, or shopping in the city market at harvest time for a kilo 
of the best oranges I’ve ever tasted for a paltry thirty cents, those policies gain an immediacy and 
a personal importance impossible to glean from the halls of power where they were produced. 
This dissertation, therefore, maps the differences in the way policies are set forth in 
Madrid or Brussels and the way they are experienced in rural Valencia, as well as variations 
between urban and rural people’s understandings of global and national events. In the process, it 
challenges notions of national uniformity—whether explicit or unstated—underlying some 
recent work, which have little place in a country as culturally diverse and politically 
decentralized as contemporary Spain.3 More broadly, it contributes to understandings of the 
complicated relationships between the local and the global, contextualizing local events within 
broader patterns of exchange, teasing out connections between individuals and locations in 
disparate locations around the world, and seeking large-scale perspectives on small-scale 
occurrences. This approach was inspired in part by Donald Wright’s classic world-systems 
analysis The World and a Very Small Place in Africa, which detailed the ways in which global 
economic networks linked the peripheral region of the Gambia to the rest of the world.4 As in the 
Gambia, this study’s close focus on a little-known landscape in a region of secondary cultural 
                                                
3 The best-known integration of Spain into broader European narratives is Sebastian Balfour’s and Paul Preston’s 
edited volume, Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century (Routledge, 1999). Their work is severely 
limited, however, by its exclusive focus on international political relations and to a lesser extent economic history, 
which excludes the intellectual, interpersonal, social, and environmental networks of which Spain was also a part. It 
also remains firmly within the nation-state construct, looking at Spain as a whole without much attention to regional 
differences, local specificity, or transboundary processes. 
4 Wright 15-16. 
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and economic importance, chosen in part for its very obscurity and apparent isolation from the 
national and global cores, enables the connections between the local and the transnational or 
global to stand out in sharp relief. Unlike Wright’s study, however, this dissertation is less 
concerned with the incorporation of Spain into a unified global economic system than with the 
complex and overlapping currents of commercial, ideological, physical and political exchange 
that played a role in the Spanish experience of modernization. Changes in the Valencian 
environment over the twentieth century emerged in large part from the pressures of international 
markets, embargoes, and subsidies as Spain became an integral part of the global economy, but 
they also came from shifts in regional identity, countercultural ideologies, and the biophysical 
constraints of the landscapes themselves. Thus the collapse of the Albufera’s millenarian eel 
fishery can be understood as part of an Atlantic-wide decline in freshwater eel stocks; local 
hunting regulations are shown to be an outgrowth of European environmental movements of the 
late-twentieth century; and the falling incomes of a handful of traditional rice farmers are seen to 
derive from the vagaries of international markets and policies set on distant shores. 
 
By contextualizing a single Spanish region within larger networks and emphasizing the 
cultural and social aspects to environmental change, this dissertation diverges from the approach 
chosen by most Spanish environmental historians. In keeping with the post-Franco tendency of 
the intellectual left towards extreme decentralization and suspicion of the central state, most 
scholars today limit their inquiries to the regions in which their universities are located, 
especially Catalonia and the Basque Country, but also including Galicia, Andalucia, Aragon, and 
other Autonomous Communities. By and large, such studies fail to address issues of 
transnational and transregional influence, and even of nationally coordinated trends and policies. 
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Moreover, many of these scholars work as part of interdisciplinary teams researching physical 
ecology and “social metabolism,” a Marxist conception of energy flows and waste production 
closely related to Malthusian notions of limited resources and to political interests in 
environmental justice.5 Members of history faculties around the country describe themselves as 
scientists and economists, and see their objective as providing hard data that could be of use to 
European policymakers in dealing with Spanish environmental and agricultural issues. As such, 
they tend to ignore social or cultural questions about the ways in which landscapes and ideas of 
nature have been constructed over the years. 
Iberian environmental history remains a field in its infancy, with surprisingly little 
published since the Association of Contemporary History opened the discussion with a 1993 
volume dedicated to “History and Ecology.”6 The only monograph-length study published to 
date, Jesús Alonso Millán’s Una Tierra Abierta, is a purely descriptive history offering a general 
reconstruction of changes in the Iberian landscape over the course of its human habitation.7 An 
eclectic collection of essays published under the title Naturaleza Transformada in 2001, while 
showcasing the work of many of the preeminent Spanish environmental historians, reveals some 
of the weaknesses of the field. Most of the essays display a relentlessly regional focus and 
descriptive style that limits their utility to scholars working outside of Spain.8 While a few 
                                                
5 For a general overview of the state of the field, see Antonio Ortega Santos, “Agroecosystems, Peasants, and 
Conflicts: Environmental History in Spain at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century,” Global Environment 4 
(2009). For prominent examples of the “social metabolism” approach to Spanish environmental history, see Enric 
Tello, J. Marull, J. Pino and M.J. Cordobilla, “Social metabolism, landscape change and land-use planning in the 
Barcelona Metropolitan Region”, Land Use Policy, 27 (2010): 497-510; Joan Martinez-Alier, Giorgos Kallis, Sandra 
Veuthey, Mariana Walter, Leah Temper, “Social Metabolism, Ecological Distribution Conflicts, and Valuation 
Languages,” Ecological Economics (2010). 
6 Historia e Ecologia (Ayer), ed. Manuel Gonzalez de Molina and Juan Martinez Alier (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 1993). 
7 Jesús Alonso Millán, Una Tierra Abierta: Materiales para una Historia Ecológica de España (Madrid, Compañía 
Literaria 1995). 
8 Naturaleza Transformada: Estudios de Historia Ambiental en España, ed. Manuel González de Molina and Joan 
Martínez Alier (Barcelona: Icaria 2001). 
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approach their subjects from a national perspective, their brevity translates into sweepingly 
cursory treatments of such enormous topics as “the modernization of Spanish agriculture” or 
“energy transition and mining expansion in Spain” in thirty-page articles or chapters.9 
For historical work on environmental social movements, on the impacts of environmental 
change on everyday life, and on the diverse and changing conceptions of landscape across the 
Iberian Peninsula, we must look to scholars working outside of Spain. Most notably, the 
historical geographer Erik Swyngedouw, whose work helped inspire the present study, is in the 
midst of a significant project dealing with hydraulic policy and construction during the twentieth 
century and its role in political and social changes during the Franco and pre-Franco eras.10 Lino 
Camprubi’s manuscript-in-progress, researched as a dissertation at the University of California-
Los Angeles, is fundamentally concerned with the development of scientific knowledge under 
the Franco regime but also addresses the role of environmental engineering on political and 
social thought during the dictatorship.11 And Pablo Corral Broto, a student at the School for 
Advanced Studies in Social Sciences in Paris, is developing some of the first scholarly work on 
the Spanish environmental justice movements, albeit focused principally on Aragon.12 In other 
fields, the sociologist and political scientist Susana Aguilar Fernández has conducted the only 
comprehensive scholarly survey of Spanish environmentalism within the context of the European 
                                                
9 José Manuel Naredo, “La modernización de la agricultural española y sus repercusiones ecológicas,” in Naturaleza 
Transformada, 55; Andrés Sánchez Picón, “Transición energética y expansión minera en España,” in Naturaleza 
Transformada, 265. 
10 Erik Swyngedouw, “TechnoNatural Revolutions - the Scalar Politics of Franco’s Hydro-Social Dream for Spain 
1939-1975,” Transactions, Institute of British Geographers 32 (2007); and Erik Swyngedouw, “Producing Nature, 
Scaling Environment: Water, Networks, and Territories in Fascist Spain,” Leviathan Undone? Towards a Political 
Economy of Scale, ed. Keil R. and Mahon R, 121-139 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009) 
11 Lino Camprubi, The Engineers’ ‘Redemption of Spain’: Science, Technology, and the Making of the Francoist 
Landscape (1939-19959) (working title), 2012. 
12 Pablo Corral Broto, “Sobreviviendo al desarrollismo. Las desigualdades ambientales y la protesta social durante el 




Union, while the environmental journalist Joaquín Fernández has made a valuable contribution 
with his narratives of the principle events and people in the Spanish environmental movement.13 
This dissertation, then, offers an historical and ethnographic intervention in the field, and is 
unique in its emphasis on global methodologies. 
 
The transnational networks that exerted the strongest influence over Valencians’ 
experiences in the late twentieth century were those of Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, 
the United States. But while the process and divergent understandings of “Europeanization” are a 
significant focus of this dissertation, its relevance is not limited to the European context. 
Tensions between local, regional, national, and transnational identities such as those observed in 
Valencia play important roles in the political paths of many regions around the world, as well as 
in the increasingly post-national European Union. Spain is one of many places, most of them 
outside of Western Europe, where economic development and the environmental devastation of 
modernity outpaced social and political reforms. 
Spain has long occupied a peripheral position in European and global historical narratives. 
The refrain that “Africa begins at the Pyrenees” (often falsely credited to Alexander Dumas) 
arose in the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, when French intellectuals 
characterized Spanish uprisings as the rejection of liberal progress by a nation of superstitious, 
uneducated peasants. Such stereotypes fit seamlessly with widespread acceptance of an older 
Black Legend built on Spain’s supposed history of religious fanaticism and cultural 
backwardness. Spain’s apparent divergence from northern European experiences of nation-
                                                
13 Susana Aguilar Fernández, El Reto del Medio Ambiente: Conflictos e Intereses en la Política Medioambiental 




building during the nineteenth century, and its perceived lack of industrialization, compounded a 
sense both at home and abroad that following a sixteenth-century Golden Age the country had 
fallen into a period of decline (or “decadence,” to use the preferred term of Spanish historians), 
leaving it far behind the rest of the continent in terms of economic and intellectual development 
by the turn of the twentieth century. Spain’s more recent political and economic peculiarities, 
namely the early loss of its overseas empire, the advent of an extended isolationist dictatorship, 
and its exclusion from continental wars and alliances of the twentieth century, obviously 
diverged in important ways from the modern history of the northwestern European core. 
While it is true that the defeat of Spain’s liberal reform movement during the nineteenth 
century set the country on a different path from many of its neighbors, this does not mean that 
contemporary Spanish history falls entirely outside of European narratives. Superficial 
differences, both real and imagined, have masked strong parallels between Spanish experiences 
of modernity and those of the rest of Europe. The top-down perspective of diplomatic and 
economic history, stressing treaties, gross national product, and foreign aid packages, 
simultaneously positions Spain as a country cousin to the more prominent central and northern 
nations and obscures more pervasive symmetries between everyday life in modern Spain and 
elsewhere in the Western world. Conversely, looking at the history of modern Spain through the 
lens of its environment can reveal surprising similarities between Spanish ideology and practice 
and those of other modern states. Such patterns include increased public and private investment 
in major industrial and development projects; the transformation of national and local economies 
from agriculture, to industry, to service; and the emergence of various discourses on 
conservation and ecology. In these important ways the Spanish experience as a whole differed 
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little from those well documented in other national contexts, even as significant local cultural, 
physical, and economic characteristics contributed to substantial regional variations. 
This study thus walks a fine line between highlighting the ways in which Spain forms a 
part of European and transnational narratives and the ways in which it diverges from those 
narratives. It is to some extent the very uniqueness of the Spanish experience of modernity, in 
particular its relative economic isolation, lack of central national identity, antidemocratic 
political structures, and relatively late industrial development, make it much more than a case 
study of trends that have been documented elsewhere. Rather, the Spanish case is one of 
immensely complex regional relationships, distinctively Mediterranean physical conditions, and 
a deeply conflicted relationship with the European core. 
Most scholars today correctly reject arguments about general Spanish “backwardness,” 
but it is undeniable that the Franco regime’s policies delayed the adoption of western cultural 
trends and technologies and placed Spain on a different trajectory than its northern neighbors. 
Specifically, when compared to most of the rest of Europe, the economic and demographic 
hallmarks of modernization arrived later and contrasted more sharply with the cultural and 
political status quo. To some extent, this is a matter of degree: European historians routinely 
describe postwar development on the continent as a sudden and massive acceleration of 
processes that had been underway for more than a century. But whereas most of Europe 
benefitted from transnational cooperation and vibrant intellectual exchange after 1945, Spain’s 
almost complete exclusion from postwar reconstruction projects, its diplomatic and economic 
isolation, and the internal suppression of intellectual exchange and civil society significantly 
impeded Spain’s ability to benefit from the technologies and ideas of the rest of the continent. 
Even when reformist ministers at last achieved a gradual “apertura” (opening) to the West in the 
 
 15 
late 1950s, the dictatorship kept a tight rein on the social and cultural trends that had 
accompanied economic expansion elsewhere. While labor movements, youth activism, and other 
forms of civil society sought and achieved reforms in the United States, Germany, Britain, 
France, and elsewhere, in Spain the same problems of modernity – from a lack of urban 
infrastructure, to workers’ rights, to environmental devastation – went essentially unaddressed 
under the socially repressive Franco regime. As late as 1963, amidst massive international 
condemnation, the state tortured and executed the Communist leader Julián Grimau for alleged 
war crimes committed nearly thirty years earlier. Such actions clashed sharply with the country’s 
efforts to recast itself as a fully modern state. 
The tensions between Spain’s modern economic system and its conservative or even 
regressive social and legal structures were never fully resolved, despite gradual reform in 
Franco’s final years and the highly controversial inauguration of a constitutional monarchy after 
his death in 1975. Like the postwar France described by Michael Bess, Spanish society after 
Franco was “caught between the lure of technology, progress, and abundance on the one hand, 
and, on the other, the gnawing fear of losing contact with the natural world, of drifting insensibly 
out of touch with its most cherished heritage and traditions.”14 A long tradition of aggressively 
developmentalist policies intersected awkwardly with the widespread but poorly-defined desire 
to bring national policies and cultures into line with those of Western Europe, creating strange 
amalgams of postmaterialist cultural values and rampant capitalist development in laws and 
practices around the country. Successive governments negotiated international treaties, joined 
global trade and defense agreements, and advocated in diverse venues for their own visions of a 
unified Europe. Less than thirty years after the end of the dictatorship, the country was a full 
                                                
14 Michael Bess, The Light-Green Society: Ecology and Technological Modernity in France, 1960-2000 (University 
of Chicago Press, 2003): 4. 
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member of the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the World Trade 
Organization, and a signatory to dozens of transnational conventions; it had a modern, highly 
educated population working primarily in information and service industries; and it stood as a 
major force to be reckoned with in European and global economies, as more recent 
developments (such as the economic crisis underway as I write this dissertation) make clear. But 
it retained physical, ideological and legal holdovers from the Franco and pre-Franco eras that 
continued to conflict with its new modern identity. National economic and social patterns in the 
twenty-first century, from agricultural policy to social mobilization, are characterized by internal 
contradictions, both legal and social, that are the legacy of Spain’s abrupt and fractured entry to 
transnational networks.15 
 
It has become common practice among environmental historians to emphasize the place 
of the environment, and specific nonhumans within that environment, as actively contributing to 
historical networks. Analysis that focuses exclusively on human intent – political, cultural, 
economic, and social – and leaves out the relevance of materiality and the biophysical nature of 
the environment, is inherently incomplete. Instead, expanding historical inquiries to include 
nonhuman actors reveals new connections and causalities. While their behaviors may not 
constitute “agency” as defined with regard to intent, nonhuman actors are clearly significant 
factors that demonstrably complicate, and may even derail, the most careful technocratic policies 
and calculations. Far from being mere subjects of regulation and human actions, nonhumans 
actively contribute to shaping the political and social reality of the Albufera. 
                                                
15 See e.g Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Innovation and Technological Enthusiasm, 1870-
1970 (New York: Viking, 1989): 443; Tony Judt, Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944-1956 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992): chapter 10. 
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In the case of environmental management, the behaviors of nonhumans routinely create 
problems and complications for human actors. Nature and the physical world “push back” 
against human interventions, throwing wrenches in the works of carefully planned technological 
projects. Frequently, politicians and engineers react to these problems with new techno-fixes or 
adjustments to the original policy to overcome such complications, resulting in endless revisions 
and re-engineering. Even at the best of times, such revisions may address one problem while 
creating another. More frequently, inadequate, incomplete, and unsettled science leads to 
unintended policy consequences. Such has been the case with the Albufera and with the Júcar 
River basin as a whole, where hydraulic infrastructure projects throughout the twentieth century 
backfired on their planners, making resources more scarce and less reliable, with disastrous 
consequences for humans and habitats alike. 
Moreover, because nonhuman organisms have no regard for political boundaries, 
refocusing a historical inquiry to include nonhumans requires us to recalibrate or expand the 
geographical scope of that inquiry. Some, like migratory birds or eels, physically move between 
countries or continents; others, like blue-green algae, are individually stationary but profoundly 
affected by—and in some cases also shape—transnational phenomena such as technological 
exchange, agricultural subsidies and markets, and water flows. Following the science and stories 
of the nonhumans that appear in any given historical moment, then, can pull historical inquiry 
out of the local-only level and reveal the larger-scale forces that have helped to shape 
microhistorical events. Such perspectives not only add to our understandings of events but in 
some cases may radically change them. For instance, when we shift the focus from human 
stakeholders to the water itself, what appears at first a simple issue of local resource use becomes 
a story of global climate change and a half-century of overextraction from peninsular aquifers. 
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While nonhumans play central roles in the events surrounding the Albufera, however, 
human actors remain the focus of my inquiry. In oral histories and ethnographic work conducted 
in the Autonomous Community of Valencia between 2010 and 2012, the interaction of rural and 
urban people in the rice fields, on the beaches, and in the streets emerged as a central theme 
affecting regional identity, landscape creation and use, and claims to natural and financial 
resources vis-à-vis outsiders. In multiple visits to Valencia during this period, I attended 
meetings for environmental nonprofit groups, rode along with park managers on their inspections, 
toured rice fields and warehouses with farmers, and crept through wildlife reserves with 
ornithologists to watch nesting waterfowl. The men and women I met, whether after tracking 
them down from archival sources or via introductions from other interviewees, were eager to 
share both their specialized technical knowledge and their personal experiences, and more often 
than not my planned formal interviews evolved into multi-day visits and lengthy field trips into 
the lands surrounding the Albufera. Over time, through the dusty documents I unearthed in their 
offices and barns and through their own recollections and introductions, a central cast of 
characters emerged, composed of a handful of influential farmers, scientists, and activists who 
had been involved in the local landscape more or less continuously for more than thirty years. 
Those characters, and the shifting relationships between them, form the heart of this dissertation. 
Since the Middle Ages, Valencia has enjoyed a reputation as the most fertile agricultural 
area on the Iberian peninsula, the product of centuries of hydraulic transformations by local 
farmers and landowners who profited from irrigation techniques first introduced by the Moors 
more than twelve centuries ago. The irrigated Valencian landscape played a central role in 
regional and, at times, national identity. However, at least since the start of the twentieth century 
Valencia has also seen a series of social conflicts arising from the underlying tension between 
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rural and urban people, each side laying claim to Valencian authenticity and the associated right 
to manage these iconic agricultural landscapes. 
Tracey Heatherington’s recent ethnography of Sardinian shepherds caught in global 
environmental debates provides a framework within which to understand these conflicts.16 Her 
work on rural people struggling to define regional authenticity both within and in opposition to 
global currents of conservation and modernity offers strong parallels to the experiences of 
Valencian rice farmers. While the farmers in the lands around the Albufera routinely asserted 
claims to the landscape derived from tradition, economic productivity, and generational roots in 
the land, their opponents’ appeals to modern, “European” values of ecological conservation, 
aesthetics, and outdoor recreation gained momentum following Franco’s death. The farmers’ 
battles over land use with middle-class urbanites, European regulators, and scientific 
conservationists may, in this context, be understood as a form of resistance to globalization. As 
such, the events surrounding the Albufera are both representative of a wider southern-European 
experience and a unique series of events shaped by the specific local circumstances of Valencia. 
The scientists, activists, politicians, lobbyists, and farmers with whom I spoke lent not 
merely depth and nuance to archival and published materials, but at times proffered entirely new 
interpretations of the events and issues underlying this project. In the chapters that follow, I 
probe in detail the discrete—and contending—narratives that resulted, lodged in these different 
source frames. Many of the foundational events described in this dissertation occurred during the 
era of censorship and political infighting of the late Franco era, and I have made significant use 
of oral histories to provide context and explanations for the frequently contradictory reports 
found in official archives and press clippings. As described in Chapter Four, for instance, 
                                                
16 Tracey Heatherington, Wild Sardinia: Indigeneity and the Global Dreamtimes of Environmentalism (University of 
Washington Press, 2010). 
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members of the press were themselves at the forefront of a campaign opposing city policy 
between 1970 and 1974, such that print sources from the period offered a very different picture 
of events than that gained from interviews with the journalists who created those sources. The 
process of comparing the two types of sources provided new insights into the nature of popular 
political activism in the early 1970s. 
Conducting research on the basis of official government archives prepared under a 
dictatorship—or by the democratic administration that immediately succeeds that dictatorship—
is a risky proposition. Again, interviews with people involved in land use policy during the 
1970s and 1980s served to triangulate among these contending political perspectives, and to fill 
in the necessary gaps and clarify discrepancies in the written records. Oral histories have their 
own complications, of course, and can likewise not simply be accepted at face value. Because of 
the well-documented potential for inaccuracies, willful or otherwise, as well as misstatements, 
personal agendas, memory issues, and other lacunae that may impede oral sources, I have also 
always attempted to verify individual accounts of events in which my informants participated. In 
most cases, however, I rely heavily on such first-person narratives where I can—and where they 
seem credible—as a primary means of understanding the diversity of experiences in the events I 
depict. 
 
This dissertation begins with a focused look at Valencia and its landscapes, laying the 
first layers of sediments upon which later developments settle. The story of the Albufera’s 
transformations begins several millennia ago, with the lake’s initial formation and the natural 
processes that led to the deposition of its first sedimentary layers. Chapter One introduces the 
reader to the shifting landscapes of the Albufera and to some of the many efforts to define, 
 
 21 
protect, and control its identity throughout its history. The chapter covers the period from the 
lake’s formation through its conversion to freshwater by medieval and early modern irrigation 
initiatives, to its purchase by the City of Valencia as a public park in 1911, and the concurrent 
social and cultural developments that gave the area special meaning to local people. This story is 
closely related to ongoing changes in Valencian society and in Spanish society, through profound 
transitions of political and cultural hegemony with immediate impacts on the physical landscape. 
Chapter Two shows how the anthropogenic landscape of the Valencian hinterland not 
only served as the central feature of regional identity but also how this idealized vision of the 
Valencian countryside (along with areas of similar irrigation and land management) provided an 
archetype against which national progress and decline were measured. The Spanish landscape, 
and in particular its aridity or irrigation, formed a central component of early twentieth-century 
notions of economic and spiritual health. In the aftermath of the “Disaster of 1898,” in which 
Spain lost its last overseas colonies to the United States, political reformers advocated the large-
scale transformation of the Spanish landscape on the model of the Mediterranean irrigated zones 
as a panacea for a range of ills. Following the Spanish Civil War, these policies were 
implemented in slightly altered form by the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, contributing to 
massive social upheaval and environmental devastation across the country.  
Chapter Three describes the rise of various new strains of thought regarding the natural 
world that emerged from the demographic and physical changes of the early Franco era. The first, 
derived from prewar conservationism, arose among field biologists and other natural scientists 
who sought to protect nature for educational and aesthetic purposes. Their carefully apolitical 
stance enabled them to obtain limited victories throughout the Franco regime, but eventually 
alienated them from an urban, explicitly Marxist “environmental” movement that understood 
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nature conservation as a key factor in human well being. This latter group of activists, which 
drew their inspiration from grassroots social justice groups, regional identity movements, and 
countercultural tactics and ideas sweeping Europe, would prove particularly suited to the chaotic 
era surrounding the end of the dictatorship. 
Chapter Four returns to Valencia as a case study of the intersections between 
conservation, environmentalism, and progressive politics amidst the relentless drive towards 
modernization in the late Franco era. It describes the turn to tourism by members of the Franco 
administration and the impacts of this decision on Spanish landscapes and demographics, taking 
as its case study efforts by the City of Valencia to develop a massive tourism complex on the 
shores of the Albufera. Those efforts were met by a press campaign, led by a combination of 
scientists, journalists, and urban planners, which used the local landscapes as both metaphor of 
Francoist oppression and as a battleground for a diverse countercultural agenda. Currents of pro-
democracy activism, global counterculturalism, scientific ecology, and Valencian regionalism 
overlapped and intersected in a campaign that participants described as “a symbol of the fight for 
the working people’s right to relax.” 
The second half of the dissertation turns to issues of transnational governance in the post-
Franco era, while remaining focused on the Valencian region. The Dehesa controversy devolved 
into an era of generalized progressive activism in the months surrounding Franco’s death in 1975, 
and Chapter Five picks up in the aftermath of this sea change in Spanish politics, when 
progressive politicians and activists took the helm of Valencian government and imposed a new, 
aggressively urban vision of the region’s future in its laws and practices. Over the following 
fifteen years, scientific conservationists with a strong regionalist political identity marshaled a 
peculiar mix of political connections, international influence, and socioeconomic privilege in the 
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service of protecting and reconstructing specific local landscapes. This chapter deals with the 
earliest major victory by this group of activists, the declaration of the Albufera Natural Park in 
1986. 
Chapters Six and Seven explore the complicated relationship between the park and the 
more than 8,000 rice farming families whose lands lay within the newly defined ecosystem, and 
who saw the park’s declaration as an attack on their property rights, their livelihoods, and their 
integrity as the traditional caretakers of local agricultural lands. The ensuing conflict pitted 
competing visions of Valencian authenticity against each other, within the context of Spain’s 
rapid ratification of European legal norms. Although adamantly opposed to globalization in the 
context of increased environmental regulation, competition from abroad, and collapsing price 
protections, farmers nevertheless relied heavily on international subsidy programs (themselves a 
product of transnational policies on agriculture and the environment) for economic survival. 
Over the course of the park’s first decade, while Valencian and European environmental policy 
remained trapped in a centralized top-down model, ideas about the role of agriculture in 
contemporary European society shifted to accommodate a more active role for the Albufera’s 
farmers in the management of the park. This change offered both economic and ideological 
incentives for farmers to redefine themselves as conservationists “with common sense.” 
Chapter Eight adds a final, crucial layer to this sedimentary history: the water itself. The 
national hydraulic policies and reliance on large-scale irrigation described in Chapter Two, 
applied across the peninsula on the model of Valencian agriculture throughout the twentieth 
century, led to a range of social and physical complications. After 1960, with the development of 
new groundwater extraction techniques and the dramatic expansion of irrigation in neighboring 
La Mancha, those policies gained new relevance in the lives of Valencian farmers and the 
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multitude of species that depended on the Albufera’s health for their survival. In addition to 
national hydraulic politics, global factors from agricultural subsidy programs to climate change 
played crucial roles in the flow of water across Valencian rice fields. This chapter’s attention to 
water expands the focus of inquiry well beyond the immediate factors commonly blamed for the 
area’s continued agricultural troubles, and helps explain why local policies failed to alleviate the 





Chapter One. Building a Spanish Landscape 
 
Diós creó el país y el agricultor ribereño la huerta. 
God made the country and the riverside farmers made the Huerta.1 
 
Through sedimentation, erosion, life and death, the physical world is in a constant state of 
transformation.2 Millennia ago, ocean currents and runoff from inland forests and hills carved 
out a large inland lagoon on the Iberian coast of the Mediterranean Sea, between the mouths of 
the Júcar and Turia rivers. Over time, a low sandbar formed and grew to more than a kilometer 
across, separating the lagoon from the sea and allowing the water to grow brackish as it was 
diluted by rain and underground springs. Sediments from streams and gullies settled on the floor 
atop the shells of sea creatures and sand, reducing the lagoon’s depth and circumference. Aquatic 
plants took root, breaking the surface to form dense islands of brush called matas and providing 
protection and food for plankton, crustaceans, and fish, which in turn became prey to wading 
birds and other land animals, including the small groups of humans who came to hunt, fish, and 
forage from nearby settlements.3 On the sandbar, winds formed a line of sand dunes just above 
                                                
1 Miguel Gual Camarena, Estudio Histórico-Geográfico sobre la Acequia Real del Júcar (Valencia: Instituto de 
Geografia de la Institución Alfonso el Magnánimo, 1979), 9. 
2 This understanding of constant natural flux is, of course, a distinctly twenty-first-century way of viewing the 
environment, and stands in stark contrast to twentieth-century notions of “natural balance” and climax ecology. 
3 Francisco J. Collado Rosigue, “Water management at the Albufera in Valencia” (paper presented at the European 




the waterline, lightly anchored by creeping plants and sea grasses, which formed a barrier to salt 
and sand and protected the lake beyond. Behind the dunes lay slightly depressed, seasonally 
marshy areas called malladas, lined with impermeable, highly saline soils that harbored a unique 
and extremely fragile set of specially adapted organisms including marshgrass, iris, and French 
Tamarisk. About fifty meters inland the winds built up a second, lower, and less continuous line 
of dunes, anchored in place with a mix of low vegetation and trees including juniper, dwarf fan 
palms, oaks, myrtle, and Aleppo pines. 
By the first century BCE, Roman colonists had joined native Iberians at the site they 
called Valentia Edetanorum, a strategically placed coastal city located on a bend in the Turia 
River just north of the lagoon. With the exception of a small salt industry established on the 
eastern shore, fears of malaria kept large-scale settlement away despite the area’s exceptional 
fishing and hunting. Greek and Roman geographers noted the lagoon for its size, clarity, and 
abundance of life.4 Fourth-century traveller Rufius Festus Avienius, impressed with the wealth of 
shellfish and other sea life he found there, named it “the oysters’ lagoon.” 
Landscape can be understood, in one sense, as a layered structure of material features 
created by historical processes. These physical, material changes in the land create a concrete set 
of relationships between people and the land that influence social actions and thought in myriad 
ways, both overt and subtle. Over the past two millennia, human actions both accelerated and 
qualitatively altered the ongoing physical transformation of Iberian terrain such that if Avienius 
arrived today on the banks of the Turia he would be hard-pressed to recognize his surroundings. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Marseille-Barcelona, July 2-6, 2007), accessed May 13, 2013, http://www.medcities.org/docs/135%20a%20-
%20LA%20GESTI%C3%93N%20DEL%20AGUA%20EN%20LA%20ALBUFERA%20-
%20VALENCIA__EN_%20_2_.pdf. 
4 Strabo, Geography, Book III Chapter 4 Section 6, describes “a lagoon of salt-water four hundred stadia [seventy-
four kilometers] in circuit,” and Pliny referred to the “Estanque Ameno” or “Pleasant Lake” to the south of the city. 
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Technological innovations, demographic changes, and regional trade from the medieval period to 
the present day brought new conditions and new means of exploitation to the lake, transforming 
both its utility and its role in the Valencian imagination. El Saler, a modest tourist town today, 
stands a few kilometers from the former site of the salt flats from which the area derives its name. 
The lagoon, now known as the Albufera de Valencia, has been a private hunting reserve, a 
source of irrigation water, a subsistence fishing ground, a source of farmlands, and a public park. 
Where marine life once filled a seemingly endless expanse of shallow salt water, villages, rice 
fields and orange groves now stretch to the horizon, surrounding a heavily polluted freshwater 
lake less than a quarter of its original size. Local populations have adapted, resisted, emigrated, 
and immigrated in response to the lagoon’s repeated transformations, even as their actions have 
contributed to the ongoing physical changes around them. 
But a second understanding of landscape is that of a cultural and political construction, 
derived from ways of seeing and perceiving the physical world and heavily influenced by social 
factors. In this sense, too, the Valencian terrain has shifted radically over the centuries, and most 
especially over the past hundred years. Old Valentia Edetanorum has grown into Valencia, the 
third-largest city in Spain, a center of international commerce and tourism, where the self-image 
of residents vacillates between nostalgia for their agrarian past and pride for their progressive 
European present. Individuals and groups in and around the city have developed widely 
divergent senses of the landscape and their place within it, and have made their perceptions 
known in political and cultural debates with far-reaching implications. 
This chapter details some of the major physical changes in the landscape prior to the 
Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and foreshadows the ways that those changes are reflected in 
contemporary debates about Valencian identity. The events described here took place centuries 
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or decades before those of the rest of the dissertation and provide essential background for its 
wider arguments about landscape transformation, regional identity, and the role of Valencia in 
global politics. The earlier production of the multilayered Valencian landscape is, to follow the 
dominant metaphor, a base layer of sediments upon which later strata will settle. This chapter, 
then, traces the physical creation of agricultural lands around the city up to the early twentieth 
century via a combination of natural and social forces. It describes the central role played by 
these newly-created landscapes in the formation of Valencian identity at the turn of the century, 
and emphasizes the way that urban people tended to idealize and naturalize those landscapes as 
part of their regional heritage, even when doing so meant imposing material hardships on their 
rural neighbors. This latter argument reflects the ongoing tension between competing claims to 
Valencian identity, and between urban and rural people that also informed later conflicts over the 
same landscape. 
 
Contemporary Valencia can be roughly summarized in two iconic vistas. The first is that 
of white-sand beaches beside tranquil aquamarine waters, teeming with tourists and lined with 
hotels, paella restaurants, and high-rise apartment buildings. The second is that of the 
agricultural abundance of L’Horta (in the Valencian language, a dialect of Catalan) or the Huerta 
(Castilian), which roughly translates to “The Vegetable Garden.” While the first vista is a 
product of the uncontrolled development boom of the late Franco era (around 1960-1975), the 
latter has symbolized the essence of Valencia for centuries. Popular and historic portrayals 
describe the Huerta as filled with trees laden with fruit and dotted with steep-roofed rural 
dwellings (barracas) rising from lush green fields, populated by hard-working farmers who sold 
their wares in markets overflowing with local produce. A romantic interpretation of Valencian 
 
 29 
history attributes this bucolic idyll to the serendipitous coincidence of fertile soil, a mild and 
sunny climate, and an industrious peasantry.5 In reality, the Huerta is just as much a product of 
human labor as the nearby hotels and high-rises. 
The Huerta is above all a product of centuries of hydraulic engineering and land 
transformation carried out by individual farmers, large landowners, and various governments 
throughout the ages. Taken as a whole, Spain is not an especially arid country, although drought 
and the threat of drought feature prominently in the historical Spanish imagination. The national 
average rainfall is only slightly below the European mean, and the amount of rain per capita is 
actually above the Western European average.6 But regional and seasonal climate variations 
across the peninsula render notions of average rainfall and aridity meaningless, and annual 
figures disguise major seasonal fluctuations in frequency and intensity of precipitation. In the 
southeast, in particular, long periods of dry heat can be interrupted by torrential deluges that 
batter crops and erode soil in the best of circumstances, and which not infrequently create major 
floods that destroy bridges, dams, and forests and leave a sea of mud in their wake. In the 
aftermath of one such flood in the twentieth century, Valencian singer Raimon wrote that “in my 
country, the rain does not know how to fall: it either rains too little or it rains too much. If it rains 
too little it is a drought, if it rains too much it is a catastrophe.”7 
Taming the peninsula’s capricious rainfall to prevent such catastrophes and to ensure 
stable water supplies for agriculture has been a central concern of Iberian governments 
                                                
5 Josep Vicent Boira Maiques, La Ciudad de Valencia y su Imagen Pública (Universitat de Valencia, 1992), 57. 
6 There have always been major technical and human problems with the gathering of meteorological data, magnified 
a thousandfold in the aggregate by differences in equipment, technique, diligence, and accuracy of measurements 
taken in various monitoring stations. Data collection in 20th century Spain occurred through hundreds of local 
monitoring stations throughout the country, but these stations were not distributed evenly throughout the country. 
Complete monitoring stations, recording variables including barometric pressure, rainfall, humidity, and temperature 
existed primarily in the provincial capitals, but in addition the Northeast was studded with hundreds of smaller 
stations with more limited monitoring capacities, specifically rainfall. Ministerio del Aire 1942ix and Map 1.  
7 Raimon, Al meu país la pluja, 1983. 
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throughout two thousand years of recorded history. Water management played a pivotal role in 
the lives and cultures of Celto-Iberians, Romans, Visigoths, Muslims, and Catholic peasants. 
Successive rulers erected towering aqueducts; dug labyrinthine canals and irrigation channels; 
dammed, diverted, and straightened rivers; drained wetlands; and reshaped coastlines. Nowhere 
were the impacts of such projects more transformative than in the Valencian Huerta, where 
hydraulic projects contributed to the production of extraordinary agricultural yields in the midst 
of one of the driest regions in all of Europe. 
The first extensively irrigated area on the Iberian Peninsula, the Huerta was initially 
created by Valencia’s Moorish rulers in the Middle Ages, who constructed eight major canals 
bringing water from the Turia river into the fields immediately surrounding the city, including 
the land northwest of the lagoon which they named the Albufera (“little sea”). News of the 
astonishing increases in the land’s productivity spread far and wide, prompting King Jaume I of 
Aragon to call it “the best land, and the most beautiful in the world,”8 as he set out to retake 
Valencia from the Moors. He succeeded in this endeavor in 1238, and by 1305 the city had 
become the capitol of the new Kingdom of Valencia, a subject realm of the Crown of Aragon. 
The Kingdom opened its borders to Christian settlers eager for new lands who came principally 
from Catalonia and brought with them their language.9 
Valencia’s Christian rulers and noble landowners expanded upon the foundations laid by 
their predecessors, commissioning new canals that carried the Turia’s water to fields as far as 
twenty kilometers away. Simultaneously, Jaume I ordered construction of what would become 
the Royal Canal of the Júcar, leading north from the Júcar River into the fields of the Ribera 
                                                
8 David L. Prytherch, “Elegy to an iconographic place: reconstructing the regionalism/landscape dialectic in L’Horta 
de València,” Cultural Geographies 16 (2009): 64, note 54. 
9 Ferran Archilés and Manuel Martí, “Ethnicity, region and nation: Valencian identity and the Spanish nation-state,” 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 24 (2001): 779-797. 
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Baixa (lower riverside) to the southeast of the Albufera and just south of the Huerta itself (Figure 
2).10 By the late fifteenth century, visitors routinely described the fields of Valencia as an 
agricultural Arcadia, “extraordinarily fertile with olives, pomegranates, lemons, citrons, and 
other fruit trees,” while the fields were “cut and traversed by streams and canals that maintain the 
fertility of the land.”11 
Figure 2: Early irrigation projects in Valencia. 
This map shows the contemporary Autonomous Community of Valencia, which is roughly contiguous with the 
medieval Kingdom of Valencia. The Huerta (blue) and Ribera Baixa (red) regions were the site of the earliest and 
most extensive irrigation projects on the peninsula. The Ribera Alta (green) was the beneficiary of some of the early 
Franco-era projects, notably the Júcar-Turia canal. The Albufera Lake is colored white, in the center of the irrigated 
areas. 
 
Water made all this possible. Irrigation enabled farmers in the Horta and the Ribera Baixa 
to produce two or even three harvests a year of high-value fruits, vegetables, and nuts, many of 
them transplanted from the Middle East, and this agricultural wealth brought prosperity to local 
landowners and to the city.12 Outside the range of the canals, a sparser population of farmers 
                                                
10 Guy Lemeunier, “Hidráulica Agrícola en la España Mediterránea, S. XVI-XVIII: La Formación de los Regadíos 
Clásicos,” in El Agua en la Historia de España, ed. Carlos Barciela López and Joaquín Melgarejo Moreno 
(Universidad de Alicante, 2000), 56. 
11 Boira Maiques, La Ciudad de Valencia, 74, citing Münzer, 1494 (GM 1952, 1: 341); Jouvin, 1672 (GM 1959, II: 
829); and Silhuette, 1720-30 (GM 1962, III: 327). 
12 Twiss 1775 (Ribbans, 1955); Laborde 182680; and Gil Polo, 16th century (Guarnr, 1974: 320), all cited in Boira 
Maiques, La Ciudad de Valencia, 58-59 and 74. 
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continued to grow traditional Mediterranean crops of grain, grapes, and olives, always at the 
mercy of climatological caprice, or harnessed nearby secondary water sources such as streams, 
shallow wells, and springs.13  
Throughout more than seven centuries of agricultural expansion, however, concerns 
about the health risks associated with marshy ground kept most Valencians away from the 
Albufera itself. At the time of the Reconquest, Jaume I granted exclusive fishing rights to a few 
hundred souls at the tiny hamlet of El Palmar, an island near the eastern shore, who braved the 
soggy isolation and malarial fevers and ferried their catches across the lake to sell in city 
markets.14 Admiring the wealth of birds, boar, and other game species on the forested sandbar, 
Jaume also claimed the Albufera and its immediate surroundings as royal property, giving rise to 
the sandbar’s moniker of La Dehesa or La Devesa (etymologically derived both from the 
Castilian word for “pastureland” and an old Valencian word for “protected”) of El Saler (named 
for the ancient salt flats). The king and his successors to the title would leave behind only a few 
guards to protect their property, and for centuries the lake and the Dehesa were subject not only 
to occasional royal hunts but to steady, albeit small-scale, poaching, fishing, and wood-gathering 
from the settlers at El Palmar.15 
To the west of the lake, too, the land lay largely unpopulated throughout the Middle Ages. 
Close to the shore, the ground was too swampy to grow most crops, and fears of malaria led 
Spain’s rulers to outlaw rice cultivation, which thrived in such conditions, for several centuries.16 
But events outside of the lake’s immediate surroundings worked significant changes on the 
                                                
13 Lemeunier, “Hidráulica Agrícola,” 71. 
14 Carles Sanchis Ibor, Regadiu i Canvi Ambiental a L’Albufera de València (Universitat de València, 2001). 
15 See, eg, Bautista Garrea, “Denuncia contra Francisco Fontaine, su hijo, y un criado, sobre cazar pájaros sin 
licencia en la Albufera,” 1780, Bailia AA 2000, ARV. 
16 It is unclear to what extent this prohibition in fact prevented the spread of malaria. Rice farming’s repeated 
flooding and draining of fields would have reduced the overall mosquito population, but the need to work in flooded 
fields, where insects swarmed, would have certainly placed the individual farmers at higher risk. 
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ecosystem. With the construction of the Royal Canal of the Júcar and other canals in the Ribera 
Baixa in the fifteenth century, fresh water had begun to flow steadily through the fields south and 
west of the lake, down drainage ditches into the Albufera. This new input diluted the Albufera’s 
brackish water, slowly forcing out salt-water organisms and replacing them with fresh. 
The El Palmar fishermen complained these changes had dramatically diminished their 
returns, and the Spanish Crown, which received a portion of their catch as payment for their use 
of the lake, was not pleased. But the distant king proved powerless against enthusiastic support 
for irrigation by Valencian nobles, merchants, and laborers who benefitted from increased crop 
production. In 1639, King Philip IV’s local representative wrote disapprovingly that “the 
Albufera was full of fresh water, and so many reeds that you can sail upon it only with difficulty, 
and such a lack of fish that one suspects that there will be no one who will wish to rent it.” A few 
decades later the salt industry, long in decline, collapsed completely, and the royal agent 
despaired that “the lake is lost, as there is neither the abundance of fish that there was, nor are 
those that remain of such good quality, as they are fresh water fish.”17 Indeed, the entire marine 
ecosystem, with the exception of anadromous species such as eels and sea bass, died off with this 
change, leaving a thick layer of barnacle and oyster shells on the lake floor to mark their 
passing.18 
The last vestiges of royal opposition to the freshwater conversion of the lake, moreover, 
evaporated in the face of significant demographic and political changes during the eighteenth 
century. Between about 1750 and 1880, the integration of peninsular markets via improved 
                                                
17 ACA, Consell d’Aragó, Secretria de València, llig. 791, f. 46/1. Quartiella-Roman (1989218), quoted in Sanchis 
Ibor, Regadiu i Canvi Ambiental, 122. 
18 Rafael Pellicer Esteve, “La Obra de Regadio Más Importante de España,” Agricultura Valenciana: Boletín 
Informativo de la Asociación Valenciana de Agricultores, October-December 1984; J.M. Soria and E. Vicente, 
“Estudio de los aportes hídricos al parque natural de la Albufera de Valencia,” Limnetica 21 (2002): 113. 
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transportation networks and liberal economic policies freed farmers from the need for local self-
sufficiency and enabled them to specialize in the crops best suited to local land, climate, and 
market conditions.19 The sharp rise in prices that attended these changes made it increasingly 
profitable for farmers to cultivate marginal and previously unproductive lands, and especially 
favored the high productivity of irrigated croplands.20  
Valencian landowners on higher ground irrigated new fields of high-value fruits and 
vegetables by extending existing canals, including the Royal Canal of the Júcar, but dedicated 
the many local marshes to rice cultivation. Rice, a high-yield, low-effort crop, thrived in 
waterlogged lands not already under cultivation, and swamps and wetlands, tamed with a system 
of low mud dikes and drainage canals, proved ideal semi-natural rice paddies. A single hectare 
could yield thousands of kilos of rice with relatively little effort, and with the addition of 
adequate fertilizers the land could support a winter crop as well. Such practices quickly made 
rice a staple of the local diet, while surpluses sold on regional, national, and international 
markets.21 Because of the relatively low cost of “reclaiming” marginal lands, rice cultivation 
appealed to landless peasants and small farmers as well as large entrepreneurs, and served as a 
supplemental source of income for laborers and fishermen. 
The largest concentration of rice cultivation in Valencia centered on the Albufera. At first 
illicitly and later via sanctioned land purchases, capitalists and aristocrats ate away at the 
Crown’s property, hiring local laborers to build surrounding dikes and canals to drain parcels on 
the banks of the lake. The resulting enclosures, called tancats, could be easily flooded with 
lakewater and drained by gravity via a system of canals and sluicegates that took advantage of 
                                                
19 James Simpson, Spanish Agriculture: The Long Siesta, 1765-1965 (Cambridge University Press, 1995), ch. 4. 
20 Simpson, Spanish Agriculture, 85. 
21 Lemeunier, “Hidráulica Agrícola,” 86. 
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the slight incline of the land towards the deepest point of the Albufera (Figure 3).22 Royal 
representatives, realizing both that the practice could not be stopped and that sales of lakeshore 
lands offered a significant new source of income, conducted a thorough survey of the lake’s 
borders in 1761 and began selling lands within that border to would-be rice farmers. 
Figure 3: Tancat construction in the early twentieth century.23 
In the foreground is the fishing hamlet of El Palmar. Earthen dikes form the square outline in the center-right of the 
photo, which when completed would enclose the portion of the lake to be drained and planted with rice. 
 
Over the following 150 years, the area of rice cultivation in Valencia more than doubled, 
while the area of open water in the Albufera shrank by 64%, from almost 14,000 hectares 
(34,595 acres) at the time of the census of 1761 to just under 5,100 hectares (12,602 acres) in 
1898 (Figure 4).24 By way of comparison, over the nearly fourteen hundred years between 
Avienus’s visit and the census, the lake had lost about 16,000 hectares of its surface area to 
sedimentation, accelerated by the proliferation of canals carrying vast amounts of soil into the 
                                                
22 Ricardo Sanmartín Arce, La Albufera y sus Hombres (Madrid: Akal/Universitaria 1982), 30-31. 
23 Photo from OTDA. 




water. In other words, tancat construction reduced the lake’s size five times faster than 
sedimentation alone. Where once a vast lagoon had stretched as far as the eye could see, by the 
turn of the twentieth century Valencian novelist Vicent Blasco Ibañez wrote that “the immense 
plain of the rice-fields merge[d] into the horizon, blending with the distant mountains…vast 
fields of liquid mud mottled with bronze stalks.”25 
Figure 4: Changing perimeter of the Albufera lake, 1761-1970.26 
 
In economic terms, what happened in Valencia was almost unique in Iberia. In all of 
Spain, the only significant increases in per-hectare and per-capita agricultural productivity during 
the nineteenth century occurred along the Mediterranean coast, in the irrigated regions of 
Catalonia, Murcia, and especially Valencia.27 The particular land-use patterns of farming in the 
                                                
25 Vicente Blasco Ibáñez, Cañas y Barro, 1902. 
26 Map by V.M. Rosselló, “Los ríos Júcar y Turia en la génesis de la Albufera de Valencia,” Cuadernos de 
Geografia 11 (1972): 7-25. 
27 James Simpson has shown that Spanish agriculture as a whole did not become more efficient in terms of either 
per-capita or per-hectare production over the course of the nineteenth century, although by cultivating new lands the 
agricultural sector did expand enough to keep pace with population growth. Simpson, Spanish Agriculture, ch. 4. 
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Horta and Ribera regions, the relatively unfertile soil reclaimed from the lake, and the scarcity of 
domestic livestock for manure production meant that Valencian rice farmers also adopted the use 
of imported guano and chemical fertilizers more than half a century before their use became 
prevalent elsewhere, placing them among the earliest adopters in all of Europe.28 As a result of 
such innovations, the productivity of Valencian rice fields rose from three thousand kilos per 
hectare in 1770 to six thousand kilos per hectare at the turn of the twentieth century. By then, 
Valencian farmers produced an average of 7,200 kilos of rice per hectare, making Spain’s rice 
productivity the highest in the world.29 
As the importance of rice farming to both local and national economies grew, the El 
Palmar fishing community that had plied the lake’s waters since the Reconquest found itself 
suddenly displaced (Figure 5). At the farmers’ request, the state built heavy metal sluicegates 
across three manmade canals that connected the lake to the sea. The sluicegates permitted the 
farmers to regulate the lake’s water level in accordance with the optimum growing conditions of 
their own short-grained rice crops. They frequently closed the gates at critical moments for fish 
migrations, keeping fish out of the lake where once they had entered at will, and fish scattered 
through the flooded rice fields, making fishing far more difficult. Local biologist Luís Pardo 
estimated that between 1900 and 1920, which already represented a significant decline from the 
peak of the fishing industry some centuries earlier, the annual fish catch from the lake fell from 
                                                
28 Because of the high value of irrigated land, in the intensively cultivated areas of Valencia there was nowhere left 
for livestock to graze, making manure scarce. In 1844 farmers in Valencia began importing guano from abroad, 
which significantly increased yields in the rice fields. They rose still more sharply after 1880, when Valencian 
orange and rice farmers became the first on the peninsula to switch to chemical fertilizers. This transition was not 
unproblematic, and many farmers complained of stagnant or falling yields before discovering the appropriate 
balance of chemicals for local conditions. Simpson, Spanish Agriculture, ch. 5 and 6. 
29 Simpson, Spanish Agriculture, 137. 
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175,200 kg to 78,800 kg while the number of fishermen remained basically stable.30 Blasco 
Ibañez’s evocative 1902 novel detailing the struggles of fishermen to come to terms with this 
new reality, Reeds and Mud (Cañas y Barro), describes Tío Paloma, an elderly El Palmar 
fisherman, observing the steady construction of new dikes and pumps in the tancats with 
resignation and distaste. “It would be a miracle,” thinks Tío Paloma, “if all the fish didn’t take to 
the sea, disgusted by such innovations. They were going to cultivate everywhere; they were 
shoveling dirt and more dirt into the lake. As few years as yet remained to him, he would live to 
see the last eel, having no room in which to move, wriggle her tail…and disappear into the 
sea.”31 
Figure 5: Rice farmers and fishermen working in the Albufera in the prewar years.32 
  
While the fishermen represented a vanishing remnant of a millenarian tradition, however, 
Blasco Ibañez and others saw clearly that the future of the Albufera lay in rice farming. Unlike 
the many travelogues throughout the centuries that had depicted the region’s “natural fertility,” 
Blasco Ibañez’s novels emphasized the centrality of backbreaking labor by generations of 
farmers to Valencian prosperity, and the extent to which that labor instilled a profound sense of 
                                                
30 Luis Pardo, La Albufera de Valencia: Estudio Limnográfico, Biológico, Económico y Antropológico, Vol. II 
(Madrid: Instituto Forestal de Investigaciones y Experiencias 1942), 181. 
31 Blasco Ibáñez, Vicente. Cañas y Barro, 1902. 
32 Photos from AVA and OTDA. 
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connection to the land in rural people. In 1898, he described a fictional farmer looking out at his 
fields and reflecting that “all the blood of his grandfathers was there. Five or six generations of 
Barrets had passed their lives working the same land, turning the land, medicating its inner being 
with strong manure, watching that its vital juices would not wane, caressing and brushing with 
hoe and ploughshare those clumps of earth, each of which had been irrigated with the sweat and 
blood of the family.”33 In Reeds and Mud, Blasco Ibañez’s protagonist works tirelessly building 
a tancat on the banks of the lake in the hopes that it will help him “pull his family out of its 
miserable prostration,” only to end by burying the body of his only child in the mud, a 
profoundly symbolic gesture of both the generational roots and the failure of the Spanish 
peasantry’s dreams of social mobility.34 
While the dwindling population of active fishermen in El Palmar continued to take 
enormous pride in their status as the historical users of the lake, it did not take long for rice 
farming to become naturalized as a “traditional” activity in the lands surrounding the Albufera. 
Rice farmers’ prestige rose in tandem with the Horta’s general fame for agricultural production, 
and under the State’s supportive guidance in the late nineteenth century the major rice villages 
around the Albufera – Sueca, Sollana, Alfafar, and others – became populous and wealthy (  
                                                
33 Blasco Ibañez, La Barraca (1898). 
34 Cañas y Barro P. 39 
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Figure 6). By the turn of the century, rice farming was one of the most emblematic 
occupations in the Valencian region. Urbanites from Valencia and farther abroad hired local 
fishermen to take them out in flat-bottomed punts and sailboats to hunt or to admire the colorful 
sunsets, picturesque barracas, and waving green plants, and to enjoy rustic meals of all i pebre 
(eel with paprika) or paella (made with local rice, snails, and marsh rats, or chicken, duck, and 
rabbit, for the squeamish), all cooked with crystalline water from the lake itself.  
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Figure 6: Rice-growing towns of the Horta and Ribera Baixa.35 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the rice fields had become a fundamental part of 
Valencia’s identity as the agricultural region par excellence of the Iberian Peninsula. The city’s 
rapid expansion, both demographic and geographic, attended a “Valencian Renaissance” 
featuring the cultural and literary exaltation of distinctive features of an asserted regional identity, 
similar to other regional movements occurring around the country. Although Valencian identity 
developed along several divergent paths simultaneously, the predominant strain among turn-of-
the-century intellectuals was espoused by Vicent Blasco Ibañez, who lent the movement his 
name. In contrast to more radical and less-popular separatist movements, Blasquismo defined 
Valencia as an integral part of Castilian Spain and depicted its unique history and traditions, 
from the glories of the Kingdom of Valencia to the marvelous fertility of the Horta, as “local 
color” fully compatible with the region’s participation in the Spanish state. In addition to urban 
                                                
35 This map reflects the 1911 purchase of the Dehesa and the lake by the city of Valencia. El Palmar and El Saler are 
technically part of that purchase, and are not independent municipalities. 
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intellectuals, Blasquismo also attracted members of the rural right wing, who saw the 
maintenance of open connections with neighboring provinces as essential to the free trade of 
agricultural produce.36 
Though the Huerta and other irrigated lands occupied far less space in Valencia than dry 
or urban areas, the imagery of Valencia that attended this renaissance celebrated irrigated 
agriculture above all other symbols of the region. The cultural historians Ferrán Archilés and 
Manuel Martí have noted that the graphic representation of Valencia itself “was always in the 
form of a woman dressed in regional costume…invariably offering fruit.”37 That regional 
costume, consisting of silk hoop skirts embroidered with flowers and topped with lace-edged 
aprons and elaborate hair ornaments, was itself a fictionalized adaptation of “the attire of the 
well-to-do countrywomen of the end of the eighteenth century,” and featured prominently in 
urban festivals throughout the year.38 Modernist buildings and monumental architecture, 
including a new train station (1906-1917), Central Market (1910-1928), and Columbus Market 
(1914-1917), featured endless decorative details invoking the Horta’s bounty, from mosaics of 
                                                
36 The most significant nationalist alternative to Blasquismo was a pan-Catalan identity that saw Valencia, Catalonia, 
and the Balearic Islands as part of a single historical and linguistic entity with a united culture distinct from that of 
Castilian Spain, referred to by Valencian historians as “Valencianisme Polític.” The first pan-Catalan groups in 
Valencia appeared in 1907, supported largely by urban industrialists and some members of the urban lower-middle 
class who favored protectionist policies. Still another strain of Valencianism was a separatist movement, which 
produced the 1918 “Valencian Declaration” calling for a separate Valencian state. Archilés and Martí, “Ethnicity, 
region and nation,” 782; Joaquín Martín Cubas, “La polémica identidad de los valencianos: a proposito de las 
reformas de los Estatutos de Autonomía,” Working Paper 258 (Institut de Ciències Polítiques I Socials, 2007): 12; 
Alfons Cucó, El valencianismo político, 1874-1939 (Barcelona: 1974); Josep Martínez Serrano and Vicent Soler 
Marco, “L’anti-catalanisme al Pais Valencià,” L’Avenç 5 (1977): 24-30; Miguel-Angel Fabra i Sanch, “Cara i creu 
d’una burguesía: bloc català valencià o valendianisme des de Madrid,” L’Avenç 5 (1977): 31-36; Francesc Pérez 
Moragón, “El valencianisme i el fet dels Països Catalans (1900-1936),” L’Espill 19 (1983): 57-82; Angel Smith and 
Clare Mar-Molinero, “The Myths and Realities of Nation-Building in the Iberian Peninsula,” in Nationalism and the 
Nation in the Iberian Peninsula ed. Angel Smith & Clare Mar-Molinero (Oxford: Berg, 1996): 14-15. 
37 Archilés and Martí, “Ethnicity, region and nation,” 787. 
38 See e.g. Xavier Costa, “Festive Identity: Personal and Collective Identity in the Fire Carnival of the ‘Fallas’ 
(València, Spain),” Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation, and Culture, 8 (2002): 337. To this day 
thousands of Valencians commission custom-made gowns, which start at around €700, for use in local festivals 
throughout the year. 
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peasant farmers to bas-relief orange trees.39 Such celebration of the peasantry reflects 
commonalities with national traditions across the western world, especially prominent in turn-of-
the-century land reforms in Europe. Peasant farmers in Germany, England, and the United States, 
were widely described as the core of society; the heart of the country; the salt of the earth. Land 
reforms espoused by Blasco Ibañez and other Republicans, like those proposed around the same 
time in England and Germany, had as their goal the promotion of peasant production, which was 
understood as both morally better and more economically productive than other forms of 
agrarian production because of the peasants’ supposedly superior knowledge of and ties to the 
land.40 
The centrality of the peasantry to Valencian – and, indeed, Spanish – identity was further 
reinforced by two towering figures in art and literature, whose international popularity made 
them pivotal to outsiders’ perceptions not only of Valencia but also of Spain as a whole.41 
Alongside Blasco Ibañez’s unflinchingly grim portrayals of poverty and labor in the lands 
surrounding Valencia, the writer’s close friend, painter Joaquín Sorolla (1863-1923), offered a 
sunnier vision of peasant life. Primarily renowned for his treatment of light, his most popular 
works captured Valencians at the seaside or in the villages of the Huerta, and included subjects 
as disparate as middle-class women strolling with white parasols, fishermen and oxen pulling 
                                                
39 David L. Prytherch and Josep Vicent Boira Maiques, “City profile: Valencia,” Cities 26 (2009): 105. 
40 German ideas of peasantry and the virtues of yeoman farmers, for example, offer numerous parallels with the 
Valencian case. See, e.g., Anna Bramwell, Blood and Soil: Walther Darre and Hitler’s Green Party (Kensall Press, 
1985), Introduction. 
41 Both Blasco Ibañez and Sorrolla spent significant time outside of Spain, but returned frequently to the Spanish 
countryside and to Valencia in particular in their works. “Valencian identity is impossible without Sorolla and 
Blasco Ibañez,” write two of the region’s most prominent art historians. “Within the artistic outpourings of Europe’s 
fin de siècle, our painter and our writer invented Valencia, painted and wrote the idea in which all the rest of us 
submerged ourselves, defined Valencian identity in their paintings, in their novels, and created what would, without 
them, merely have been the eastern part of the Iberian peninsula.” Facundo Tomás and Felipe Garin, Sorolla: Vision 
of Spain; Hispanic Society of America collection (Exhibition Catalog from the Centro Cultural Bancaja, Valencia, 
2007), 11.  
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their boats from the sea, and children crippled by polio on an outing with a local priest. But when 
commissioned in 1911 by the Hispanic Society of America to create a set of murals depicting his 
country for permanent exhibit in New York (collectively known as the “Vision of Spain” or, as 
the artist himself later called them, the “Provinces of Spain”), Sorolla chose to represent Spain as 
a collection of disparate but unified regions, each symbolized by a vibrant peasantry. Over the 
next eight years, he created fourteen enormous canvases representing nine areas of Spain, each 
one depicting working people engaged in emblematic local activities surrounded by iconic 
landscapes and the tools of their artisanal trades. There was a “bread festival” in Castile; 
bullfighters in Seville; a fish market in Barcelona; and a group of happy Valencian peasants in 
the Horta. These paintings became popular abroad and, as their title suggests, helped influence 
the “Vision of Spain” held by a generation of foreigners. 
To a significant extent, the entire project represented not a realistic portrayal of Spanish 
life but rather a nostalgic effort to preserve local “traditions” that Sorolla, like many of his 
contemporaries, feared would be lost in the sea of homogeneity represented by industrial 
capitalism. Sorolla’s complaint that “Spain is losing its local color” (lo pintoresco) echoed the 
concerns of countless intellectuals of his era.42 Indeed, between 1910 and 1930, the percentage of 
the national population employed in agriculture had declined from 66% to 46%, and declines 
were even sharper in the Levante, giving Romantics like Sorolla good reason to lament the 
decline of rural traditions.43 To create his “Vision of Spain,” the artist spent weeks in each 
location carefully assembling suitable outfits and props, from skirts and handkerchiefs to 
brooches and hair combs, and struggled even in his native land of Valencia to find locations that 
                                                
42 Sorolla, quoted in Alejandro Perez Lugin, “La capa de Sorolla y la montera de Huntington,” Heraldo de Madrid, 
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Historia del Arte Hispánico, 2001), 395. 
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adequately captured the picturesque settings he wished to portray.44 As a result, Sorolla’s work 
for the Hispanic Society offered an idealized allegory of regional identity more than a faithful 
rendition of reality. 
His Valencian-themed panel, “Couples on Horseback,” offers a particularly noteworthy 
example of this phenomenon (Figure 7). It depicts a group of young revelers clad in “traditional” 
dress, some mounted on lavishly-decorated horses, others bearing heavy orange boughs, and one 
costumed patriarch carrying the flag of the Kingdom of Valencia. The group is passing a shrine 
to the Virgin de los Desamparados, the patroness of the city, which in reality stands atop a bridge 
leading north from the city over the River Turia. But Sorolla’s painting removes both statue and 
riders from this urban setting and places the shrine along a country road winding through rice 
fields and orange groves, with no sign of the bridge, the river, or the city.45 Sorolla painted this 
work in the winter of 1916, long after the orange harvest had ended and several months before 
the rice would begin to sprout, so although he painted the panel en plein air, the lush backdrop 
must have been done from memory rather than from life. The artist created a montage of the 
central symbols of Valencia – its patron saint, its traditional dress, its flag, and its most 
emblematic products – and set them within a fictionalized landscape representing the Horta.46 
Other panels from the series reflect similar modifications to real Spanish tableaus of the early 
twentieth century: rather than steam, sails powered Sorolla’s boats; no factories rose in the 
background; none of his laborers worked on the expanding railway system. The glories of Old 
Spain, from the castles and fortresses of the Middle Ages to the wonders of the Horta, were 
                                                
44 Pons-Sorolla, Joaquín Sorolla, 450-452; Michael Gormley, “Sorolla and the Hispanic Society of America,” 
American Artist (June 2012): 40-51, 47-48. 
45 Tomás and Garin, Sorolla, 411. 
46 Further emphasizing the ahistorical nature of the “traditions” Sorolla portrayed, oranges, undoubtedly the most 
iconic product of Valencia, had only come into widespread cultivation in the late nineteenth century. 
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uniformly depicted as residing in the countryside. Despite these glaring omissions, painter 
Manuel Gonzalez Martí described Sorolla’s finished product as portraying the country “just as it 
is, in the plain light of day, picturesque and smiling, but hard-working and progressive.”47 
Figure 7: Joaquín Sorolla, “Couples on Horseback (Valencia)”48 
 
As Sorolla found when searching for appropriate props, the romanticized “local color” of 
Spain was fading fast before the onslaught of “modernity,” in this case meaning the 
homogenizing influence of urban and industrial development and the spread of a general 
European culture that replaced older peasant traditions. Throughout the nineteenth century and 
into the twentieth, demographic movement across the country had been steadily in favor of 
urbanization. While Spain as a whole remained predominantly agricultural at the turn of the 
twentieth century, it is a mistake to conflate this with economic or cultural backwardness or to 
                                                
47 Manuel Gonzalez Martí, “Sorolla dignificador: Conclusión,” in Anunciador (Valencia, October 1914), cited in 
Facundo Tomás and Felipe Garin, Sorolla: Vision of Spain; Hispanic Society of America collection (Exhibition 
Catalog from the Centro Cultural Bancaja, Valencia, 2007), 51. 
48 From Visions of Spain, 1911-1919. 
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assume that other parts of Europe were radically more developed. Notions of European economic 
growth and urbanization during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, against which Spain has 
been unfavorably compared, have generally been rooted in concentrated regional development in 
places such as southern England and the Netherlands, but do not characterize a uniform 
continental economic trend.49 Recent work by David Ringrose has shown that nineteenth-century 
Spain experienced significant economic growth and prominent bourgeois societies in the 
Mediterranean cities, the Cantabrian coast, Madrid, and Seville, which were surrounded by large 
swaths of sparsely-populated agricultural land, a description that matches much of the rest of 
Europe at the same time.50 Combined with convincing evidence of land commodification and the 
erosion of feudal notions of agrarian society, such evidence significantly undermines any notions 
of homogenous Spanish agricultural or economic stagnation outside of the normal European 
range. The Valencia that Sorolla knew, then, was a land not only of irrigated farmlands, dry olive 
groves, and vineyards, but also of international trade ports and industrial cities.51 His paintings 
masked the real economic development underway within Spain, ignoring the smokestacks and 
cities that were filling the landscape and rhetorically elevating the role of the countryside just as 
nationwide population trends began to shift in favor of urbanization and industrialization.  
Sorolla’s nostalgia for picturesque, imagined peasant traditions was just one of several 
new ideas and cultural movements that accompanied this development. In particular, the growing 
middle class shared Sorolla’s nostalgia for their imagined rural past but increasingly agitated for 
                                                
49 See, for example, Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern 
World Economy (Princeton University Press, 2000), 1 and 7; Charles P. Kindleberger, Economic Growth in France 
and Britain, 1851-1950 (Stanford University Press, 1975). 
50 David Ringrose, Spain, Europe, and the “Spanish Miracle” 1700-1900 (Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
Other important works challenging the myth of the failure of Spanish liberalism is Santos Julia, “Anomalia, dolor y 
fracas de España,” Claves 66 (1996): 10-22; and Juan Pablo Fusi and Jordi Palafox, España, 1808-1996: El desafio 
de la modernidad (Madrid: Espasa, 1997). 
51 Archilés and Martí, “Ethnicity, region and nation,” 787. 
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concrete reforms to improve the quality of life in the cities. This trend paralleled the “City 
Beautiful” and “Garden City” movements in the United States and England, in which an 
increasingly affluent urban population came to prioritize aesthetic and recreational concerns, and 
seek spaces that were protected from the noise and grime of industrial development. The city 
parks and Modernist architecture of the Valencian Renaissance, along with parallel 
developments elsewhere in Spain and especially in Barcelona, were among the most obvious 
manifestations of this movement. 
Closely related to these urban movements, the desire to escape the chaos of city life and 
preserve remnants of countryside untouched by human labor also contributed to the declaration 
of the first national parks around the world. This trend began in the more heavily industrialized 
nations but quickly spread, starting with Yellowstone in 1872 and followed, over the following 
decades, by parks in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Europe. In Spain, Pedro Pidal, the 
Marquis of Villaviciosa and a passionate hunter and mountaineer, brought a parks law to the 
Spanish Senate in 1915 and engineered the protection of the mountainous National Parks of 
Covadonga (Picos de Europa) and Ordesa (Pyrenees) in 1917 and 1918, respectively.52 These 
two spectacular mountain regions, filled with lush forests, rugged vistas, and plentiful wildlife, 
embodied the Spanish version of what William Cronon has called “sublime landscapes” that 
were the early targets of conservation.53 
Some lexicographic clarification is necessary to distinguish between the various strains of 
thought about the natural world described in this dissertation. Environmental historians in the 
United States must use care when employing terms such as “conservation” and “preservation.” 
                                                
52 Fernández, El Ecologismo Español, 31-32. 
53 William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” in Uncommon Ground: 
Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, ed. William Cronon (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1995): 69-90. 
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While the former refers to a human-centered ideology based on the need to responsibly manage 
natural resources for human use, the latter indicates the scientific or Romantic interest in 
protecting nature from the invariably degrading interference of human activity. Conservationists 
favored tree farms and “sustainable forestry,” while preservationists fought for national parks 
and species preservation. The matter is further confused when, at mid-century, both groups 
began to be lumped together under the general name of “conservationism,” and then 
“environmentalism.” 
In the Spanish context, there is less ambiguity. While there is no direct Spanish corollary 
for the preservation/conservation dichotomy, I will refer to engineers, intellectuals, and 
politicians who espoused the expansion and use of natural resources without significant regard 
for sustainability as “developmentalists,” in keeping with the broader arc of the policies they 
endorsed. “Conservationists,” on the other hand, refers to the Romantic and scientific 
conservationists of the twentieth century, from advocates of the first national park in 1917, to 
their intellectual heirs in the scientific and activist communities of the rest of the century. Finally, 
“environmentalism” refers to the specific form of conservationism embraced by the generation of 
activists that came of age in the late 1960s, as described in Chapter Four, who understood the 
environment primarily as an important factor in human well-being. This generation was the first 
to self-identify their social movement as “environmentalism” (ecologismo) and themselves as 
“environmentalists” (ecologistas), and drew a sharp distinction between themselves and the more 
nature-centered “conservationists” who had previously dominated environmental debates. 
In urban Valencia the obvious target for those interested in conserving relatively “wild” 
landscapes was the Albufera. Though the lake and Dehesa had been subject to human use and 
modification for centuries and thus did not intuitively fit into the standard North American 
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understanding of “pristine” natural parks, advocates for their protection echoed Sorolla’s 
concerns about homogenization and described them as a place of long-standing traditions and 
natural beauty at risk of being overrun by urban and industrial development. The tranquil 
beaches, forests, and lake garnered widespread admiration on aesthetic grounds, with Blasco 
Ibañez describing the clarity of the lake’s water with awe, most notably in a nocturnal scene in 
which “the light penetrated to the bottom of the lake. There one could see the shell bed, the 
aquatic plants, a whole world of mystery, invisible during the day; the water was so transparent 
that the boat seemed to be floating in the air with no support whatever.” The Dehesa, meanwhile, 
was lush with “twisted, ageless pines” and inhabited by wild bulls, boar, deer, lizards, and 
smaller mammals.54 Hunters and birdwatchers alike, moreover, waxed rhapsodic over the 
immense avian population that nested around the lake and clamored for its protection.  
The primary threat facing this landscape, and the target of ire from urban park advocates 
and hunters alike, was the ongoing construction of tancats along the lakeshore, which continued 
to reduce the Albufera’s perimeter each year. While they rhetorically glorified farmers in art and 
literature, urban people objected to the material reality of agriculture in this context, interpreting 
it as an attack on the “natural” landscape even though the lake in its present form was itself a 
profoundly anthropogenic product of agricultural processes. In 1911, the city purchased the 
Albufera and its Dehesa from the national government in order “to construct a great natural park 
for the city, and block the depredations that threatened to make it vanish in a short time.”55 In 
addition to rescinding farmers’ claims on tancats built without explicit legal authority, the city 
                                                
54 Blasco Ibáñez, Cañas y Barro. 
55 Francisco de P. Momblanch, Historia de la Albufera de Valencia (Valencia: Archivo Municipal Excmo. 
Ayuntamiento de Valencia, 1960), 178.  
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council also swore “to conserve the forest of the Dehesa and the integrity of its soil, which 
cannot have any use or agricultural purpose other than woodland.”56 
While unconcerned about the Dehesa, for which they had little practical use, local rice 
farmers rightly saw themselves as the targets of the new restrictions on the lake. They objected 
strenuously, insisting that their “traditional” land use should trump new interests in landscape 
preservation and urban recreation, and stressing that their “patriotic goal of working to increase 
the national wealth and draining swampy ground” entitled them to legal ownership of their 
illegally-constructed tancats.57 Over a twenty-year period of negotiation and compromise that 
left no one entirely satisfied, the park advocates carried out the first stage of what would be a 
century-long struggle with rural people over their competing visions of Valencian identity and 
the future of the region. The result was legal protection for what remained of the lake, ensuring 
the El Palmar fishermen’s uninterrupted use of it for commercial purposes; limited hunting via 
permits sold by the city; and unrestricted use of the Dehesa for picnicking, strolling, and 
beachgoing for the urban public. 
This early controversy over the Albufera and its surroundings encapsulates the conflicted 
relationship between rural and urban people in Valencia at the turn of the century, which in turn 
highlights several of the internal contradictions of Spanish attitudes towards landscape and 
modernity. Landscape preservation was, from the start, inextricably tied to notions of Valencian 
identity, to nostalgic ideas about a folkloric rural past, and to concepts of wilderness and nature 
common to industrializing cultures across the Western hemisphere. Even while such notions 
elevated the “industrious peasant” in romantic ideology, however, they disguised and in some 
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cases hindered long-term processes of transformation, both physical and cultural, within that 
very peasantry. Agrarian landscapes created centuries or decades before, along with their 
idealized inhabitants, became naturalized as timeless identifiers of the region itself. Those 
landscapes, now valued for reasons other than their mere economic potential, necessitated 
protection from the people who had brought them into existence. Rural people were thus seen as 
somehow separate from both the ongoing modernization of the rest of the country and from the 
very transformations their labor had worked on the land. 
This paradox will be familiar to any scholar of postcolonial environmental history in 
Africa and, to a lesser extent, Southeast Asia, where local people were routinely forcibly 
removed from their lands in the interest of middle-class European values of aesthetics or science. 
Those protected landscapes, emptied of people or at least with human activities sharply curtailed 
to conform to notions of premodern “traditional uses,” frequently appear as the iconic images of 
the regions or countries themselves, despite their atypicality. Just so, the Albufera, the Dehesa, 
and its rice fields, along with the Huerta, remained central to the image of Valencia throughout 
the century. While the Valencian case in no way approaches the scale or violence of many of 
these later parks campaigns, and of course lacks the crucial racial component, it nonetheless 
shares the basic principle of limiting local people’s use and modification of their traditional lands 
in the interest of a romantic vision of tradition and nature. As elsewhere, the conflict between 
urban and rural values inherent in this process would play a central role in Valencians’ 





Chapter Two. National Regeneration and Valencian Irrigation 
 
Ironically, while nature protection efforts and economic pressures were forcing some 
Valencian farmers from their lands, on the national stage their efforts were celebrated by a 
generation of writers and politicians. In prose and, eventually, in law, reformers of the early 
twentieth century wrote admiringly of the way local people and rulers had transformed 
Valencian landscapes through rural engineering and infrastructure projects, and sought to impose 
similar changes on the rest of the nation. Specifically, they saw irrigation as the key to 
Valencia’s relative prosperity, and used them as a model for hydraulic policies that were applied 
throughout the national territory. In so doing, they laid the groundwork for a technocratic 
approach to social and economic policy that would prove fundamental to contemporary Spanish 
nature and society. Environmental management, and specifically the anthropogenic Valencian 
landscapes, played the central role in both rhetoric and practice for a national “regeneration” 
movement that would dominate Spanish politics for the rest of the century. 
 
 
The resurgence of regionalism taking place during the early twentieth century not only in 
Valencia but also in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, and elsewhere, was at least in part a 
reaction to widespread depression surrounding Spain’s national identity. Following the loss of 
the last overseas colonies in 1898, a generation of Spanish journalists, politicians, and writers 
devoted thousands of pages to lamenting the intellectual and economic stagnation that set Spain 
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apart from a rapidly modernizing and expanding Europe. Despite its lack of historical veracity, 
the predominant narrative among intellectuals held that the country’s “decadence” was rooted in 
the influence of foreign rulers and ideas, particularly the “failed monarchies” of the Habsburgs 
and Bourbons.1 The failure of the Spanish liberal revolution in the nineteenth century, ostensibly 
confounded by immutable clerical and monarchical tendencies, had enabled feudal structures to 
survive in the countryside, most obviously in the latifundia system of the south and west, 
creating a permanently dependent, ignorant peasantry, stubbornly resistant to change or 
technological improvements.2 
The man who gave the literary “Generation of 1898” its name was another Valencian, 
José Martínez Ruiz (1873-1967), better known by his pen name, Azorín.3 Unlike Blasco Ibañez 
and Sorolla, Azorín left Valencia for Madrid as a young man and wrote primarily about his 
travels in the Castilian core. Echoing the sentiments of many of his peers, he described Spain as 
“perhaps the most backwards nation in Europe,” suffering from centuries of “decadence” in the 
aftermath of a sixteenth-century Golden Age.4 In this myth of the Spanish past, an era of 
religious tolerance and economic and cultural growth had been brought to a close by a series of 
disasters emanating from the Church and the Monarchy, including the expulsion of the Jews, the 
rise of the Inquisition and persecution of conversos and moriscos, and the draining effect of the 
                                                
1 José Alvarez Junco, “The Formation of Spanish Identity and its Adaptation to the Age of Nations,” History and 
Memory 14 (Fall 2002): 32; Henry Kamen, Imagining Spain: Historical Myth and National Identity (Yale, 2008), 
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Kamen, Imagining Spain, 182. 
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4 Azorín, Buscapies (Madrid/Valencia, Arhimán, 1894). As described by Ringrose and others, Spain’s regional 
diversity of experiences with modernization was more typical of European states than contemporary reformers may 
have understood, but to the Generation of 98 and the Regenerationists the only question was how to raise Castile up 
to the standards of the Levantine regions. Ringrose, Spain, Europe, and the “Spanish Miracle.” 
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American colonies on Spanish manpower and energies. Centuries of religious persecution, 
ineffective land management, and political absolutism had left nothing but crumbling walls and 
dusty fields in the “once splendid, now depressed” Spanish cities.5 Indeed, literary descriptions 
of Castilian farmers working with the same tools and technologies first implemented by the 
Romans were only slightly hyperbolic. Azorín repeatedly despaired at what he saw as peasants’ 
obstinacy, which prevented them from adopting laborsaving, cost-effective new methods.6 
In contrast, the “Levante,” an intentionally apolitical term that referred to the geographic 
region of the old Kingdom of Valencia and sometimes understood to also encompass coastal 
areas of Murcia to the south and Catalonia to the north, offered would-be reformers an example 
of what Spain could be if it could only “push…forward into the mainstream of modern life.”7 
The stagnant Castilian core contrasted sharply with what Azorín and others saw as the 
progressive, modern cities and democratic, productive countryside of the Mediterranean coast. 
“What a difference,” Azorín wrote, “between these inactive villages of the Meseta and the 
laughing, lively towns of the Levante!...The Levante is a region that has developed and 
                                                
5 Azorín, Los Pueblos, La Andalucía Trágica, y otros artículos (1904-1905) (Madrid: Clasicos Castalia, 1973), 45 
(from the essay “La Decadencia”). 
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local traditions. In “La casa, la calle, y el camino,” he describes the wonders of modern conveniences including 
automobiles, elevators, telephones, housewares, and consumerism; in”Una Elegia” he describes industrially 
produced articles as “soulless” compared to those produced by hand; and in La Voluntad he laments the loss of “the 
old nationalities” and “their local color, clothing, customs, literature, art” as a result of industrialization and 
globalization. Azorín, Obras Completas II, La Voluntad (Madrid: Rafael Caro Raggio, 1919) and Azorín, Los 
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Catalonia, Valencia, and Murcia. Reference to the “Levante” therefore connotes a unified Spain as opposed to 
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progressed by its own internal vitality, while the Center remains fixed, monotonous, closed to 
progress, the same today as four centuries ago.”8 
This contrast, agreed Azorín’s peers, had emerged from the prevalent systems of land use 
in different regions of the country. Overwhelmingly, writers of the period conflated physical and 
historical processes and posited engineered environmental transformation as the key to Spain’s 
future. Thus, in the “dry center,” the persistence of traditional crops such as wheat and olives, 
which produced relatively little per hectare and thus required massive land holdings to turn a 
profit, contributed to the persistence of semi-feudal land use patterns. The latifundias 
underexploited labor and land resources and kept peasants in poverty and dependence. 
Conversely, the exceptional productivity of the irrigated Levante had enabled farmers to work 
small plots as independent landowners and still produce surplus crops for regional and 
international markets. Such circumstances translated directly into divergent moral and cultural 
standards among the masses of laborers in each region. In Azorín’s words, “Happy men who 
have water with which to irrigate their fields and intensively cultivate their lands, and easy 
communication and clean, comfortable houses, cannot think and feel the same as sad men who 
live on arid plains, without roads, without trees, without comfortable houses, without healthy and 
plentiful food.”9 
Regenerationist politicians and historians embraced the Generation of 1898’s rhetoric and 
ideas in their quest for a way to leave behind the stagnation and decline of the past. “Double-lock 
the tomb of The Cid,” advised the multitalented Aragonese politician, historian, economist, and 
                                                
8 José Martínez Ruiz (Azorín), Antonio Azorin (Madrid, Vda. de Rodríguez Serra, 1903), ch. 10. Such perceptions 
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lawyer Joaquín Costa, urging Spain to abandon its nostalgia for the Golden Age and to look 
instead towards material improvements for the future. To that end, the reformers promoted a new 
national vision that incorporated the color and local diversity of the regions, a unified nation-
state built around the Castilian core, and the universal education, technological developments, 
and democratic political structures of modern European states. 
In practical terms, these aspirations relied heavily on the lessons of the Levante. While 
the Romantic reformers of the City Beautiful and parks movements gravitated towards a new 
aesthetic appreciation of the nature they saw as increasingly imperiled by industrial progress, 
Costa’s Regenerationists focused on the more pragmatic need to protect those aspects of the 
environment that most directly impacted the quality of human life. Azorín’s emphasis on the 
landscape, and specifically on the differences between “dry” and irrigated Spain, would prove 
central to Regenerationist proposals for national renewal. Routinely, writers and reformers used 
the presence or absence of irrigation as a proxy for the cultural and social state of the land. “The 
countryside – the old countryside of Castile – is flat, empty, barren,”10 Azorín wrote, composed 
of “interminable dusty plains, desperate and sad, without a tree, without a house, without a pond, 
without a bird.”11  
“How is it possible to live in these dead, gloomy cities, and in these thirsty, exhausted 
fields? What initiatives, what energies, what strength, what boldness, what generous and 
large impulses can these limitless, desperate horizons, these barren, dusty, open lands 
suggest to the soul?...There are two things that are fundamental, essential, in the life of 
nations – trees and water – and it will not be possible to achieve a town’s regeneration 
without making those two things come into being there first.”12 
 
Costa, the undisputed leader of the Regenerationists, employed identical rhetoric to make a 
technocratic case for national renewal and “Europeanization,” associating the country’s 
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decadence with its physical conditions.13 He characterized the national struggle as an “internal 
war against drought, against the rugged character of the soil, the rigidity of the coasts, the 
intellectual backwardness of the people, the isolation from the European Centre, the absence of 
capital.”14 Only dramatic improvements in poverty rates and public education – “the pantry and 
the school,” in his formulation – would draw Spain out of the decadence of its past. By “the 
school,” Regenerationists meant not public education per se but rather specialized technical 
education that would enable peasants and farmers to adopt new tools, new crops, and new 
methods to maximize the potential of Spanish agriculture.15 The pantry, meanwhile, would be 
filled not only through this new knowledge but also through a vigorous national program of 
hydraulic and environmental engineering.16  
Regenerationist politicians described irrigation as a panacea that would exponentially 
increase agricultural production and land values, creating wealth and food self-sufficiency on 
both the local and national levels, which in turn would produce a new Spanish renaissance of 
cultural and economic renewal.17 Water was the blood of Spain, longing to feed the terrestrial 
body; the gold waiting to pay the people’s debts; the road leading economic emigrants back 
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14 Costa Martínez 1900. 
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home.18 “The water of the canals,” wrote Costa, “is wheat, it is milk, it is wool, it is fruit.”19 
Based on his observations in irrigated areas of Aragon and Murcia, he asserted that “in regions 
punished by drought, an irrigation canal provides the people with more liberty than a 
Constitution, no matter how democratic,” and predicted that a state-funded hydraulic 
infrastructure would democratize control over resources and undermine the latifundia system in 
the poorer interior regions of the peninsula.20 Newly fertile lands would attract internal 
colonization, reducing emigration, reversing urbanization, and increasing the national population, 
while the introduction of new crops (especially cotton, tobacco, and sugar beets) would support 
new national industries and improve the national balance of trade.21 Hydroelectric generation, 
meanwhile, would bring modern conveniences and progress, with all its attendant benefits for 
health, culture, and morality, to the masses.22 
To that end, Regenerationists called for the nationalization of peninsular water, carried 
out through the construction of canals, dams, reservoirs, aqueducts, and irrigation ditches “to 
restore great lakes, create real interior seas of fresh water, multiply vast marshes, erect many 
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great dams, and mine, exploit and withhold the drops of water that fall over the peninsula 
without returning, if possible, a single drop to the sea.”23 
The first National Hydraulic Plan (1902), designed and enacted by Regenerationist 
politicians, embodied many of these ideas, and in particular served as a crucial first step toward 
nationalizing hydraulic infrastructure.24 Embracing the simplistic assumption that the benefits of 
irrigation observed in a few small areas of the Levante could be reproduced anywhere, the Plan 
contained a list of 296 projects to be undertaken around the country, which would dramatically 
increase hydroelectric capacity and add almost 1.5 billion hectares (3.7 billion acres) of irrigated 
land. These projects promptly ran into problems, arising in equal parts from the plan’s 
fundamentally flawed initial assumption, a lack of funding to carry out its ambitious slate of 
projects, and the insufficiency of engineering and scientific expertise that went into its design. 
Costa’s greatest admirer and self-designated intellectual heir, a civil engineer from 
Madrid named Manuel Lorenzo Pardo, later wrote that the lack of comprehensive scientific 
oversight had made the 1902 Plan nothing more than “a catalog of canals and reservoirs, nearly 
all isolated, with no relationship between them even within a given river basin, some fully 
incompatible with each other owing to the almost complete coincidence of the areas of proposed 
benefit.”25 Dam and reservoir sites had been selected on the basis of a simple cost-benefit ratio, 
namely the cost of construction versus the area of land to benefit from irrigation, or as Pardo 
would memorably describe it, “a list of spots around the country where a dam might most easily 
                                                
23 Ricardo Macías Picavea, El Problema Nacional: Hechos, Causas, Remedios (Madrid, 1899), 318-20. For similar 
sentiments, see González Quijano, “Colonización interior”; Gómez González, Colonización; Ministerio de Fomento, 
“Real decreto disponiendo la formación de la Confederación Sindical Hidrológica de la cuenca del Ebro,” Gaceta de 
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24 Rafael Gasset, Plan Nacional de Obras Hidráulicas (Madrid: Ministerio de Agricultura, 1902). 
25 Manuel Lorenzo Pardo, Plan Nacional de Obras Hidráulicas, Vol. 1: Exposición General (Madrid, 1933), 19-20. 
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be erected across a river.”26 This criterion overlooked other factors, including meteorological, 
hydrological, and labor conditions, which had been crucial to the successful introduction of 
irrigated agriculture in the Levante.27 The majority of early investments under the Plan, for 
instance, went towards the expansion of hydraulic works in the Ebro River Basin, which yielded 
a significant expansion of the area of irrigated land but failed to raise the region’s productivity as 
much as the Regenerationists had hoped.28 Unlike the Horta, the Ebro region suffered from 
extreme droughts in the summer, leading to shortages of water that made cultivation of high-
value, irrigation-dependent crops such as fruit trees a risky business. In addition, such crops 
required large amounts of fertilizer, which exceeded the capacity of local livestock to provide 
and required significant capital outlays for the importation of guano or chemical fertilizers from 
abroad. In practice, despite state investment in dams and canals, local farmers played it safe by 
irrigating traditional dry-land crops such as wheat and olives, so that they obtained higher yields 
when water was available but did not risk disaster when it was not. From a purely economic 
standpoint, the state spent significantly more on the hydraulic infrastructure than it could ever 
gain by the increased production of low-value crops.29 Since improving the national balance of 
trade had been a central component of the Regenerationists’ hopes, by this measure the Plan was 
an abject failure. 
While it failed to transform the peninsula into a giant Horta, the 1902 Plan was a 
significant first step towards nationalizing and centralizing Spanish water policy, which was a 
                                                
26 Lorenzo Pardo, Plan Nacional, 20. The engineers responsible for the 1902 Plan freely admitted an almost total 
lack of scientific studies of the proposed prohects, and an overwhelming reliance on estimation and guesswork in 
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canales de riego y pantanos propuesto por la Inspección General de Trabajos hidráulicos,” Revista de Obras 
Públicas 51 (1903), 59. 
27 Lorenzo Pardo, Plan Nacional, 20; Nicolás Ortega Cantero, “El Plan Nacional de Obras Hidraulicas,” in Gil 
Olcina and Morales Gil, Hitos históricos, 342-43.  
28 Lorenzo Pardo, Plan Nacional, 36. 
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secondary interest of Regenerationist reformers eager for national renewal. Beginning in the 
1920s under the nationalist dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923-1930), Lorenzo Pardo 
undertook a comprehensive reform of this policy informed by his extensive scientific research 
and surveys on hydrology and irrigation. Adhering closely to the guidelines set forth by Costa, 
whom he dubbed the “prophet of the true theory of his country’s riches,” Pardo implemented 
major changes in the structure of Spanish water management with the goal of creating a truly 
national, centralized system capable of scientifically informed policymaking that would increase 
national income and production.30 The core of his policies revolved around Costa’s idea of a 
peninsular “hydraulic imbalance” that led to the uneven distribution of water in the different 
regions of the country, and in particular the relatively low water resources in sunny, mild areas 
with preexisting cultures of irrigated agriculture, such as Valencia and Murcia. Whereas the 1902 
Plan had contemplated the indiscriminate capture of water wherever it was found, Pardo’s 
studies suggested that the national interest could best be served by carefully reserving the 
peninsula’s hydraulic resources for the areas where they could be most efficiently used to 
increase the national agricultural output. In many cases, this would necessitate long-range 
transfers of water from the “wet” north to the dry southeast. State-funded construction projects in 
the north or the cold Castilian steppe might provide temporary employment and local economic 
stimuli, Pardo argued, but a hydraulic infrastructure that would carry water to the Levante would 
yield far greater returns in the long term, raising national production and reducing the substantial 
international trade deficit.31 
Pardo also understood that a necessary precondition of this national hydraulic 
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infrastructure was the dismantling of existing local and regional control over water, which had 
long tended towards pork-barrel spending, a concentration of wealth, and inefficient resource use. 
Politics and science converged, not for the first time, when nationalist dictator Primo de Rivera 
authorized Pardo to divide the country into ten Hydrographic Confederations based on geological 
divisions between large watersheds in 1926 (Figure 8). Administered by the central government, 
these Confederations overwrote older divisions drawn by history, culture, and local politics and 
were tasked with determining the most efficient use of the country’s water for the benefit of the 
nation as a whole independent of local interests.32 Their boundaries, while ostensibly based on 
objective scientific criteria, carried overt political implications designed to undermine regional 
identities. In some cases, a single Confederation’s jurisdiction included territories in multiple 
regions, as in the case of the Confederation of the Ebro, which encompassed both Aragonese and 
Catalan lands. In others, several rivers that had historically been regulated by distinct local 
authorities were combined into a single Hydrographic Confederation. The Confederation of the 
Júcar in Valencia, for example, encompassed not only the eponymous Júcar River basin but also 
those of the Turia, the Senia, the Vinalopó, and the Serpis, each of which had very different 
climatological, historical, and cultural conditions. 
  
                                                
32 The Confederations were designed in part on the basis of hydraulic policy carried out elsewhere in Europe, and 
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French Agencias financieras de cuenca (1964); and the regional water organizations of Mexico (1974). Melgarejo 
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Figure 8: The Spanish Hydrographic Confederations 
 
Seven years after establishing the Hydrographic Confederations, under the auspices of the 
Second Republic government, Pardo unveiled his National Plan of Hydraulic Works (hereafter, 
1933 Plan), the product of nearly three decades of scientific research and analysis.33 He had 
adhered closely to Costa’s original vision of a unified national system, but unlike the discredited 
1902 Plan that had taken irrigation as a universal good to be applied wherever possible, the 1933 
Plan concentrated state resources on projects that would produce the most significant increase in 
overall national production of marketable goods, and thus the largest reduction of the national 
trade deficit.34 To that end, Pardo proposed the creation of more than 1.2 million hectares (three 
million acres) of newly irrigated lands over the course of twenty-five years, of which more than 
half lay in the warm, fertile, and arid Mediterranean basins of the Júcar, Segura, and Ebro Rivers 
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(Figure 9).35 “In the Mediterranean region,” he observed, “the most ancient uses, the liveliest 
traditions, the firmest irrigation institutions, the wisest practices, and the greatest and most 
generalized experience are conserved,” as well as the optimum conditions of “labor force, 
technology, and capital.” With “minimum intervention and effort by the State,” the Levante 
could produce “the most valuable and varied production to fulfill the national demand and the 
possible demands of the external market.”36 
Figure 9: Pardo’s 1933 Plan for the Levante 
The Levante, according to Pardo, encompassed the Júcar and Segura hydrological basins. Red lines indicate water 
transfers, including the proposed Tajo-Segura transfer. Dark green indicates irrigated areas where improvements 
would be made (notably the Horta and Ribera Baixa regions surrounding the Albufera), and light green indicates 
areas of new irrigation. 
 
The expansion of irrigation in the Levante would necessitate massive state investment in 
                                                
35 Almost two-thirds of the irrigated cropland was to be dedicated to wheat and other cereals, despite the fact that 
Spain was already self-sufficient in grain production. Lorenzo Pardo, Plan Nacional, 209; Simpson, Spanish 
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36 Lorenzo Pardo Plan Nacional, 133-34. 
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the form of interbasin water transfers, including a 300-kilometer “Tajo-Segura Transfer,” as well 
as a series of smaller internal canals.37 To ensure high returns on the state’s investments and 
prevent the sort of problems experienced in the recently-irrigated lands of the Ebro, Pardo 
suggested that the Levantine farmers who would receive this national largesse be required to 
abandon grain and other subsistence crops in favor of vegetables and industrial crops specifically 
chosen for their suitability for irrigated cultivation and for their high value on the international 
market. Farmers on the Castilian mesa, conversely, would continue to produce cereals, beans, 
potatoes, and other products for domestic consumption.38 River basins in the northwest, 
meanwhile, would not benefit from any state-funded construction but instead would continue to 
rely on private initiative for their hydraulic projects, which largely took the form of hydroelectric 
generation.39 
In an era in which the profound cultural, linguistic, and historical divisions between 
Spanish regions occupied a prominent place in public discourse, this nationalist vision failed to 
seize the popular imagination. Even engineers and economists who shared Pardo’s interest in the 
national economy cautioned him against the kind of regional favoritism towards the Levante that 
the 1933 Plan embodied.40 Valencia’s indigenous irrigation had already made it wealthy, they 
argued, whereas other regions lacked both jobs and infrastructure with which to pull them out of 
poverty.41 “Why was it necessary,” asked one engineer, “to favor rich areas, where the sole and 
splendid State has carried out a multitude of works, at the cost of poor ones, where the State has 
                                                
37 Lorenzo Pardo, Plan Nacional, 209; Melgarejo Moreno, “De la Política Hidráulica,” 296. 
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not carried out anything?”42 A Castilian newspaper, meanwhile, condemned the national 
administration for neglecting development in the dry interior, thereby “forever placing it in a 
plan of inferiority.”43 Many in the neglected northern and central regions called for an equitable 
distribution of infrastructure projects in areas with high unemployment in order to create jobs in 
construction, regardless of the area’s long-term suitability for irrigation, posing a fundamental 
contradiction with Pardo’s and the Regenerationists’ visions of national unity. Such complaints, 
combined with economic depression and political instability, contributed to the 1933 Plan’s 
defeat in the Spanish Cortes. In the political chaos and social turmoil of the rest of the decade, 
including the collapse of the Second Republic into civil war, a coherent national hydraulic policy 
remained a distant dream.  
The 1933 Plan was given new life, however, when mere weeks after the Nationalist 
victory in April 1939 Francisco Franco’s new Minister of Public Works, Manuel Peña Boeuf, 
published a General Plan of Public Works (hereafter, Peña Plan) that drew heavily on Pardo’s 
work. The Peña Plan, a basic plank of Franco’s aggressively nationalistic policies early in his 
regime, adopted many of Pardo’s most contentious proposals even while fundamentally altering 
his objectives of economic efficiency and Costa’s dream of yeoman farmers. Like Pardo, Peña 
Boeuf proposed the expansion of irrigation in the Levante using a series of costly long-range 
transfers and massive dams, and slated the new lands for cultivation in high-value vegetables, 
industrial crops, and citrus for export.44 But where Costa had dreamed of enriching the country 
both economically and morally, and Pardo had sought to improve the national balance of trade 
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and thereby its international standing, Peña Boeuf pursued Franco’s autarkic goal of increasing 
Spain’s food self-sufficiency. More than half of the land he proposed for irrigation lay in arid 
northern and central Castile, nearly all of it slated for crops such as corn and alfalfa, which had 
low value on the international market and yielded limited returns from irrigation investments. To 
a significant extent this signaled a reversion to the economically inefficient objectives of the 
1902 Plan, with hydraulic projects intended to promote resettlement and improved standards of 
living in the dry interior.45 Major projects in Badajoz and Jaen, two of the most desperately 
impoverished provinces in the country, were posited as a means of attracting internal 
resettlement to previously unproductive lands and slowing the trend of urbanization. Such goals 
were deemed more important than the fact that these and other provinces were not particularly 
suited for irrigation, and that the low-value crops grown there could not compensate for the 
immense state investments they would demand. Ironically, Peña Boeuf justified his very 
different policies in the same terms Pardo and Costa had used, calling on four decades of 
resonant rhetoric to describe his plan as an effort to improve “the utility and output for the nation” 
as a whole rather than each region individually.46 
The Peña Plan became a central feature of the early Franco regime’s national agenda, and 
speeches by the dictator and his ministers frequently made use of Regenerationist rhetoric of 
“persistent drought” and aridity to explain away the country’s problems. Those problems arose in 
large part from the dictator’s own policies and politics: Franco’s Spain remained officially 
neutral in World War II but unofficially strongly sympathized with the Axis, which translated 
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into diplomatic and economic isolation following the Axis defeat in 1945. This, in turn, 
combined with the country’s inability to rebuild its infrastructure following its own destructive 
Civil War, produced widespread poverty and hunger across Spain for the first decade of the 
dictatorship, which Franco and his ministers attributed to a “persistent drought.” Conversely, the 
foreign aid and warming of diplomatic relations in the 1950s “fell on Spain like water on parched 
ground.”47 The regime diverted many of its resources, including the labor of its political 
prisoners, to the construction of an immense national hydraulic infrastructure of dams, reservoirs, 
canals, and water transfers that physically transformed the face of the country.48 Between 1950 
and 1965 the area of irrigated land in Spain increased by 600,000 hectares (41%), principally 
planted in alfalfa, maize, sugar beet, and fruit trees.49 Franco himself earned the nickname of 
“Frankie the Frog” for his obsession with water, and perhaps the most iconic image to emerge 
from the early years of his regime was that of the dictator inaugurating the latest addition to 
Spain’s growing list of large dams. 
Over the course of thirty-five years, Franco’s Spain erected more than eight hundred 
large dams and hundreds of kilometers of new canals, feeding vast fields of thirsty new crops in 
the driest regions of the peninsula.50 Hydraulic engineers channeled about 40% of the total 
volume of Spanish rivers into reservoirs, rerouting massive flows from wetter river basins to 
drier ones along the Mediterranean coast in order to take better advantage of longer growing 
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seasons and the supposed superiority of Levantine agriculture.51 Along with the irrigation canals 
came plastic greenhouses, imported pesticides, and chemical fertilizers to make the desert bloom. 
The country’s petroleum consumption quintupled in the last half of the twentieth century, a fossil 
fuel revolution especially visible in the skyrocketing number of tractors, harvesters, and other 
farm machinery.52 
Such changes were not unique to Spain, but rather were part of the great twentieth-
century transformation of global environments and attitudes that John McNeill has called 
“something new under the sun.” The relationship of the Spanish government with the physical 
environment, like that of modernist states around the world, was one of increasing reliance on 
engineered “solutions” to control and modify natural conditions.53 Franco’s Spain altered river 
basins, drained wetlands, flooded valleys, cleared forests, reversed the flow of rivers, and 
exhausted groundwater supplies. The combination of mechanized, intensified agriculture and the 
heavy use of chemicals rapidly led to soil exhaustion across much of the country, and while 
various agencies within the Franco administration were assigned the task of monitoring and 
minimizing this critical problem, no information-gathering or remedial projects were ever fully 
realized.54 As in other developing countries, sanitation and water treatment in newly expanded 
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industrial and urban areas were virtually nonexistent, and rivers running through major cities 
were literally open sewers.55 
Even as hydraulic construction produced far-ranging effects on the physical environment, 
it failed to achieve the results promised by either the Francoist state or the regenerationists. 
Whereas agriculture was the central pillar of Spanish society in Costa’s day, and even in Pardo’s, 
by the second decade of the Franco regime circumstances had changed. Exacerbating prewar 
trends of rural depopulation, international isolation during the 1940s stemmed the flow of 
fertilizers and equipment from abroad and abruptly halted agricultural modernization efforts, 
contributing to widespread hunger in the villages.56 Lured by the promise of work and pushed by 
low prices for their products and poor standards of living in the countryside, no amount of 
internal colonization and new irrigation – especially absent any effort to democratize land 
ownership – could keep rural laborers on the land. Indeed, state irrigation policies frequently 
contributed to rural depopulation, tending as they did to favor large and efficient producers over 
smaller ones owned by independent farmers. Landless peasants and dryland farmers alike were 
pushed out of work and joined the rural exodus.  
Meanwhile, urban demand for water, though still constituting only a fraction of the total 
national water needs, had steadily increased, necessitating entirely new hydraulic construction 
including water treatment and sanitation that had not been considered in the original Peña Plan. 
In light of these circumstances, the continued expansion of irrigation at considerable expense to 
the state, while such fundamental problems as urban water supplies were ignored, made little 
sense from either an economic or a social perspective. As early as the mid-1950s, politicians and 
economic analysts had begun to openly express their doubts as to the sustainability of Franco’s 
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autarkic agricultural policy. In 1959, the government passed a national Stabilization Plan that 
would help reintegrate Spain into the international economy via carefully controlled economic 
liberalization, including currency control and new entry visa procedures.57 Encouraged by such 
measures, growing numbers of northern Europeans discovered the appeal of Spain’s sunny 
climate and low cost of living. Suddenly, previously unproductive beaches and coastal lands 
became the country’s most lucrative spaces. By the end of the decade, foreign visitors to Spain 
increased fourfold, making tourism the single largest sector of the Spanish economy.58 Between 
1959 and 1969 foreign tourism revenues covered two thirds of Spain’s trade deficit.59 In the 
regime’s propaganda films, clips of crowded beaches and the Minister of Tourism inaugurating 
new hotels replaced those of “Frankie the Frog” inaugurating dams as the representation of the 
regime. 
The single largest contributing factor to the decline of Spanish agriculture as a percentage 
of GDP and a source of employment, was not, then, its lack of irrigation but rather the expansion 
of other economic sectors. Development, especially industrial development, became entrenched 
as the government’s main priority following the cabinet appointments of 1962, and ongoing 
hydraulic construction was relegated to a secondary role. The “Plan for Economic and Social 
Development, 1964-1967” laid out a general framework for nationally-coordinated initiatives on 
multiple fronts, including not only irrigation but transportation, sanitation, and housing, on the 
model of other Western European countries. Nonetheless, the legal framework for hydraulic 
construction set forth in the Peña Plan, and more fundamentally the notion that the state bore a 
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responsibility to provide water wherever agricultural users demanded it, remained ingrained in 
Spanish society. The basic disregard for either economic efficiency or environmental 
consequences that this entailed would have far-reaching consequences for Spanish landscapes 








Chapter Three. Environmentalism and the Environment Under 
Franco 
 
Between hydraulic engineering, agricultural modernization, and rampant urbanization, 
the early Franco regime physically reshaped the Spanish landscape to an extent never before seen. 
In addition to the massive disruption caused by hydraulic construction described in the previous 
chapter, between 1951 and 1965, forestry engineers cleared 1,202,363 hectares (nearly 3 million 
acres) of native vegetation to plant pines, poplar, and eucalyptus in orderly rows around the 
country, in an effort to increase domestic lumber and paper production, prevent erosion and 
increase the amount of precipitation held by the soil.1 Meanwhile, to accommodate the floods of 
foreign tourists, developers supported by the state expropriated public parks, paved over 
agricultural fields and picnic grounds, and dramatically increased demands on local resources, 
both natural and financial, all while neglecting the demands of the burgeoning urban working 
class. Land speculation, especially along the Mediterranean coast, flourished amidst nepotism 
and corruption in local administrations, to the detriment of public coffers but the benefit of 
private investors. Urban and touristic development proceeded with an almost complete lack of 
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regulation or planning, and often violated national and regional regulations on issues ranging 
from building height to the area of open space.2 Urban planners today describe Franco-era 
coastal development as “wild urbanization” characterized by “apartment buildings of terrible 
quality, slum creation, lack of facilities and green spaces, and the private appropriation of public 
property.”3 
Despite the regime’s harsh suppression of dissent, such conditions raised substantive 
critiques, first from technicians and professionals concerned with the ecological impacts of 
development, and after 1963 from urban residents demanding the state mitigate the impacts of 
demographic and economic changes. This chapter describes the development of a Spanish 
environmental movement out of these parallel but distinct strains of activism, shaped by the 
specific circumstances of the late Franco regime but also by various strains of international 
environmental thought circulating among intellectuals around the world during the mid-twentieth 
century. The experiences of Valencian activists, recreated from archival records and oral 
histories, shed new light on the ways in which different groups understood environmental 
concerns to be part of a deeper social and political critique of the regime.  
 
Prior to the Civil War, the emerging interest in nature conservation among members of 
the Spanish intelligentsia differed little from that of their peers in other Western countries. Spain 
had been among the first countries in Europe to create a national park, and its wealth of relatively 
“wild” landscapes and mountain ranges inspired nature-lovers’ and bird-watchers’ clubs in all 
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the major urban centers. Such civic organizations were interrupted by the outbreak of war in 
1933, followed by the suppression of associations and crackdown on many members of the 
intellectual community throughout the 1940s, but even at the height of Franco’s White Terror a 
few voices echoed those early strains of conservationism. Most notably, some of Franco’s own 
forestry engineers expressed carefully-worded, ecologically-based reservations about the 
ambitious public works projects and predator control programs they were tasked with carrying 
out.4 By the early 1950s, professional field biologists and ornithologists had begun to use 
diplomatic channels to achieve a series of minor victories against specific projects endorsed by 
the regime, though their efforts would not arouse much public attention within Spain for more 
than a decade. Such efforts were among the few remnants of civil society in the dictatorship’s 
early years. 
The presence of dissenting conservationists under an authoritarian regime is not unique to 
Spain. In Soviet Russia and elsewhere, intellectual elites have repeatedly shown themselves 
uniquely able to frame arguments against specific regime policies in sufficiently “objective” 
language to avoid political repression.5 Carefully-worded letters, close social connections within 
the halls of power, and painstaking care to present conservation as an issue of national pride that 
would not conflict with the regime’s underlying economic and political objectives, enabled 
scientists to carve out a space for limited social protest. In so doing, the scientists engaged in a 
form of what Václav Havel has called “living within the truth,” challenging the dominant 
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narrative of progress and development espoused by the state simply by asserting an alternative 
set of facts and theories based on scientific expertise.6 
In Spain, as in other dictatorships, the perception of these scientists as eccentric 
dilettantes – “butterfly hunters,” as one former participant laughingly recalled in 2009 – 
protected them to some extent from being taken seriously as political threats.7 The safest form 
for such protests was the advocacy of discrete protected areas on the model of national parks, 
often in otherwise unproductive lands that even Franco’s enthusiasm for dams and reforestation 
could not conquer. Scientists further protected themselves from accusations of anti-regime 
sentiments by depicting nature preservation as a patriotic duty, arguing that the most spectacular 
Spanish landscapes deserved protection as exemplars of national magnificence and subjects of 
international recognition.8 Such tactics resulted in the declaration of three national parks in 1954, 
one in Catalonia and two in the Canary Islands, all of them occupying rugged, remote lands for 
which the State had no other use. 
But just as John Muir had Yosemite, and Aldo Leopold had Sand County, José Antonio 
Valverde, the founder of the modern Spanish conservation movement, had the Andalucian 
wetland of Doñana, the pivotal space around which definitions of nature and conservation would 
revolve in the Franco era. His career as an activist began in 1952, when Francisco Bernís 
Madrazo, one of Spain’s few professors of ornithology, invited Valverde, then an exceptionally 
promising doctoral student of vertebrate biology, to accompany him on a field research trip to the 
remote wetlands habitat of Doñana on the southwestern coast of Spain. Though this would be 
their first trip to the region, ornithologists from northern Europe had discovered the wealth of 
                                                
6 Václav Havel, The Power of the Powerless (1979). 
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birdlife there in the mid-nineteenth century, and professionals and enthusiasts from England, 
Germany, France, and Switzerland, in particular, had been making the difficult journey ever 
since.9 Valverde later described the voyage to the heart of Doñana, first by boat across the 
Guadalquivir River and then on a four-hour horseback ride through “an unreal world” of dunes 
and marshes, populated by breeding herons and an astounding diversity of wildlife. “That day,” 
he wrote, “I believe I leaned out into Nature with a capital N for the first time.”10 
He returned from the expedition resolved to create a Spanish ornithological organization 
that would parallel the activities of scientists elsewhere in Europe, and convinced that the first 
task of that organization should be the protection of Doñana as a natural reserve. The need for 
such protection was urgent: at the time, state forestry engineers were developing plans to plant 
large portions of the area with eucalyptus for lumber and guayule shrubs for rubber production. 
At Valverde’s urging, Bernís argued passionately for the area’s preservation in a personal letter 
to Franco. “Doñana is, above all, a beautiful relic of virgin nature that houses perhaps the most 
formidable and famous zoological community that survives in Europe,” he wrote. Without 
challenging the regime’s underlying policy of forestry management, Bernís suggested that while 
a eucalyptus plantation on the site of the marshes would not serve any overriding national 
interest, “what is really in Spain’s interest is the conservation of Doñana.”11 The administration’s 
tepid response reflected a general disinterest in the idea of habitat conservation, ambivalence 
about the scientists’ proposal to suspend plantation, and a practical objection to the necessary 
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funding that would be required for any effort to expropriate the large areas of private property 
within the proposed reserve. 
Undaunted, Valverde set to work organizing support for his idea among the scientific 
community. The Spanish Ornithological Association (Sociedad Española de Ornitología, 
hereafter SEO), formally integrated with eighty-five members in 1954, was technically a 
professional organization and not an advocacy group, and therefore did not run up against 
Franco’s prohibitions on political activity. Nonetheless, from the very start SEO’s mission was 
linked to conservation and specifically to the preservation of Doñana.12 SEO quickly developed 
links to an international community of conservation-minded scientists, again thanks to Valverde, 
who believed that learning all he could about “research and conservation abroad” was the “first 
step” towards protecting Doñana. To that end, he traveled frequently to conferences and wildlife 
reserves abroad, notably a 1954 trip to the Camargue wetlands of southern France, where he met 
the prominent Swiss ornithologist and conservationist Luc Hoffman.13 Over the next decade, 
Valverde would repeatedly return to France at Hoffman’s invitation and add trips to Switzerland, 
Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, England, and the United States.14 Such visits taught him not only 
about conservation and land management but also about the kind of research that could be done 
with adequate infrastructure and funding, sadly lacking in postwar Spain.15 He also served as a 
wildlife guide for a May 1957 expedition to Doñana attended by British ornithologists and 
conservationists including Max Nicholson, Julian Huxley, and Guy Mountfort, who would prove 
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pivotal in efforts to conserve the site.16 Through these projects, Valverde developed a strong 
network of friends and colleagues among the “relatively few who had realized the serious 
problems of conservation that were coming upon us in Europe.”17 
Armed with information on conservation methods, with a comprehensive study of 
Doñana compiled from his own and others’ work, and with his extensive connections at the 
highest levels of the international scientific community, Valverde appeared at the International 
Ornithology Conference in 1958 with a radical proposal. In response to the looming threat of 
development in Doñana, Valverde proposed that the scientists themselves raise funds to purchase 
the lands outright from the Spanish state, preserving them for science and the enjoyment of 
wilderness in perpetuity. Such a proposal had never before been made, and the ornithologists 
were not as enthusiastic as Valverde had hoped. Undaunted, he tried again at a meeting of the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature in Athens, where he met with a more positive 
response.18 Many of the scientists in attendance, especially those from the more industrially 
developed northern countries, had independently concluded that the protection of European 
wildlife would necessitate international collaboration.19 Hoffman, in particular, became a major 
booster of Valverde’s project, and the organization he co-founded to help with fundraising for 
Doñana – formally organized in 1961 as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) – would go on to play 
an enormous role in global conservation efforts modeled on Valverde’s project.20 
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Within Spain, too, Valverde’s campaign benefitted from support among high-profile 
scientists, specifically José María Albareda, a prominent Opus Dei technocrat and the Secretary 
General of the national Scientific Research Council (Consejo Superior de Investigaciónes 
Cientificos, hereafter CSIC). Like other members of his branch of the Franco administration, 
Albareda fully supported the idea of international collaboration as part of a push to end Spanish 
isolation, and encouraged Valverde’s efforts to involve the global scientific community.21 This 
internal pressure, combined with increasing international publicity, contributed to the weakening 
of the regime’s resolve to convert all “nonproductive lands” into forestry projects. 
In 1961, the Spanish government received a formal offer from the IUCN, acting on behalf 
of the just-formed WWF, for substantial financial assistance to purchase Doñana as a park. After 
negotiation, the WWF paid twenty-two million pesetas for the acquisition of lands in the Doñana 
area, which it promptly ceded to Albareda’s CSIC, while the CSIC itself set aside an additional 
eighteen million pesetas for facilities and upkeep. The new reserve encompassed less than half of 
the lands the conservationists had originally hoped to acquire, but it held an important symbolic 
role as the first achievement of an international conservation effort and as the first significant 
natural reserve achieved during the Franco era.22 
The Doñana campaign served as a crucial step towards raising public awareness of the 
Spanish environment. Its protection also suggested a significant change in policymakers’ 
attitudes towards nature conservation. Whereas the mountain parks, with their spectacular, 
rugged scenery, appealed aesthetically to a substantial constituency of nature lovers interested in 
strolling, picnicking, and mountaineering, the wetlands offered far fewer opportunities for mass 
tourism. Nor were they particularly appealing locations for other economic uses, although 
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Franco’s engineers had imagined them as sites of at least marginally productive tree farms. In 
fact, Doñana’s marshy ground, swarms of mosquitoes, and unassuming, flat vistas appealed 
almost exclusively to birdwatchers, who had long admired the vast flocks and rare specimens to 
be found there. It is no coincidence, then, that those birdwatchers had played a central role in the 
new parks’ creation. 
SEO member Félix Rodríguez de la Fuente, an amateur falconer, passionate hunter, and 
extraordinarily charismatic nature journalist, built on the success of the Doñana campaign amidst 
the gradually loosening restrictions on associations and the media of the mid-1960s. After 1964, 
“Amigo Félix” was a constant presence in living rooms and bars around the country, first 
through radio programs and later, as his popularity grew and more Spaniards were able to afford 
television sets, through several nature-themed series on the state-owned Television Español. He 
reached an even larger audience through summer camps, live lectures, encyclopedias, and special 
presentations, and became especially popular with children and young adults. While never 
overtly criticizing state policy, much less the Franco regime itself, his explanations of natural 
systems and landscapes routinely pointed out the ways in which modern Spanish society was 
upsetting the “balance of nature” and endangering the survival of native ecosystems. In one 
episode of his immensely popular program, he visited a flooded valley to explain the impacts of 
dams on local flora and fauna; in another, he drew careful diagrams in his ever-present field 
notebook showing how declining water tables interacted with well drilling and wetlands. He and 
his eager viewers were especially interested in a handful of telegenic predator species – the 
Iberian lynx, Iberian wolf, and Imperial eagle, in particular – whose ecosystem disruption and 
the regime’s bounty system had driven to the brink of extinction over the past decades. 
Rodríguez de la Fuente’s own half-dozen trained raptors and his personal pack of wolves, which 
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he had rescued as cubs and raised as family pets on the outskirts of Madrid, made frequent 
appearances on film, exemplifying the “softer side” of the predators so reviled by the regime. 
Rodriguez de la Fuente’s impact on the general public’s understanding of the 
environment cannot be overestimated. While frequently compared with Jacques Cousteau for his 
popular appeal, Rodriguez de la Fuente’s involvement with explicitly conservationist themes in 
fact began much earlier and ran much deeper than that of his French contemporary. While 
Cousteau’s The Silent World was shown at Cannes in 1956, his support of French nuclear testing 
frequently enraged environmental activists, and his early documentaries focused on exploration 
and adventure but ignored the anthropogenic roots of habitat degradation.23 Conversely, 
environmental activists today uniformly credit “Amigo Félix” with bridging the gap between 
Spanish popular culture and scientific conservation, fundamentally changing the way people 
viewed nature and their place within it. His enthusiastic narration and spectacular footage earned 
him instant popularity among those who could rarely afford to leave their villages, much less 
their country, and “Félix, friend of the animals” introduced to many the notion that nature was 
not something to be feared and conquered, but rather admired and protected. It was through 
Rodríguez de la Fuente that the majority of Spaniards became familiar with the concepts of 
biodiversity, food chains, and the interactions of humans with the natural world. 
But despite the obvious connections between the issues he addressed and the regime’s 
relentless exploitation of the natural world in the interest of national economy, like his 
predecessors in the Doñana campaign Rodríguez de la Fuente remained careful to abstain from 
any political attack on the regime itself. While self-identifying as a “conservationist” and 
“naturalist,” he stopped short of the systemic critiques of industrial capitalism that some activists 
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in the United States had begun to assert, and steered entirely clear of debates over the regime’s 
long-term impact on Spanish welfare. Carlos Aguilera, a lifelong friend of Rodríguez de la 
Fuente and the cofounder of several of his environmental initiatives, was himself a staunch 
supporter of Franco, as were many of the scientists in SEO.24 This apolitical stance enabled 
conservationists to continue operations in Franco’s Spain, reaching a growing audience and 
publishing implicit critiques of specific state policies with the regime’s blessing. But it also 
tacitly permitted the regime itself to usurp certain ideas and terminology to soften its own image, 
without making any substantive modifications in its policies and practices towards the 
environment. In 1971, for example, the national forestry administration changed its name to the 
“Nature Conservation Institute” (Instituto para la Conservación de la Naturaleza, hereafter 
ICONA), which became a major sponsor of Rodríguez de la Fuente’s programs, but made no real 
changes to its environmentally destructive forest management practices.25 Some conservationists 
were complicit in this rebranding: Antonio Valverde, the father of Spanish conservation, later 
wrote that when the Doñana reserve became a national park in 1969 “it was the Caudillo 
[Franco] who personally made the decision to order the creation of Doñana National Park,” 
while “the Minister of Tourism, Don Manuel Fraga, and the Minister of Agriculture did a 
splendid job” in the process.26 
In 1968, taking advantage of recently-loosened restrictions on the formation of civic 
associations, Rodríguez de la Fuente formed the Association for the Defense of Nature 
(Asociación para la Defensa de la Naturaleza, hereafter Adena), hoping to gain the active 
participation of a broader membership than the SEO intelligentsia. Crown Prince Juan Carlos de 
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Borbón accepted the organization’s honorary presidency, and financial giants such as Manuel de 
Prado and Colón de Carvajal joined its board of directors.27 The WWF’s designation of Adena as 
its Spanish branch brought additional ideas, money, and prestige to the new group’s 
conservationist agenda. Adena’s membership, boosted by Rodriguez de la Fuente’s personal 
popularity, soon reached 35,000, far outstripping that of SEO. For purposes of comparison, at the 
time the Sierra Club had 107,000 members and the society for German Bird Protection had 
around 50,000, both of them drawing on far larger national populations in open, democratic 
societies with long traditions of civic engagement.28  
Like SEO, Adena’s close relationship to the establishment permitted the group to survive 
and flourish in the repressive environment of the late Franco period, but also rendered it deeply 
suspect to a growing number of progressive intellectuals, especially those based outside of 
Madrid, who rejected everything associated with the aging regime. While apoliticism had made 
the scientific conservationists’ efforts possible, by the late 1960s such strategies had begun to 
attract criticism from a new generation of activists that came of age well after the Civil War or 
the White Terror of the early 1940s, who saw the regime less as a personal threat than as a 
manifestation of a fundamentally destructive, hierarchical socioeconomic system. For many 
Spaniards concerned with their country’s ongoing lack of basic civil rights, conservation seemed 
a frivolous secondary concern divorced from progressive politics; an elite hobby that threatened 
continued job growth and economic prosperity.29 Nonetheless, the success and growing popular 
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appeal of conservation organizations offered a model for the organizational efforts that would 
arise in the years to come. 
 
Scientific conservation, as practiced by Adena and SEO, focused on the protection of 
“wild” spaces and species relatively untouched by humanity. As William Cronon and others have 
made clear, the underlying philosophy of such efforts imagines humans as inherently separate 
from, and acting adversely upon, the natural world in ways that leave little room for a productive 
relationship between the two. But a second strain of environmental thought, far removed from 
the realm of field biology, offered a very different perspective on the human-nature relationship. 
In cities around the country, ideological dissatisfaction with the regime converged with 
widespread dissatisfaction among urban residents of all social classes with regard to the state’s 
failure to adequately support recent trends of urbanization and development with infrastructural 
investments. In a trend identified elsewhere in Europe as a crisis of “vanishing peasants,” rural 
unemployment and the economic unsustainability of traditional farming in the postwar era were 
intensified by the increasing efficiency of large producers, and contributed to urbanization and 
land abandonment across the peninsula.30 Between 1960 and 1970, 2.7 million people 
(approximately 8% of the national population) moved from rural to urban areas. Of these internal 
migrants, fully half moved to the major urban centers of Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, and 
Bilbao, where they settled in new neighborhoods outside of city centers, often little more than 
shanty towns, which lacked basic social services such as health facilities, parks, transportation, 
and schools.31  
While Adena and SEO campaigned to alleviate the effects of rural land abandonment and 
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increasing industrialization on the countryside, the new generation of urban activists was more 
concerned with the impact of these demographic and physical changes on human populations. 
Such sentiments echoed those of other industrial societies, such as Germany and France, where 
they helped give rise to active green and counterculture movements. In Spain, even under the 
relatively relaxed standards of the late Franco regime, organization was more complicated. 
Political parties remained illegal, and active persecution of those with Marxist, Communist, or 
anarchic ties relegated the so-called “political opposition” to clandestine spaces and 
compromised its ability to gather popular support and participation.  
Outside of this relatively narrowly defined political sphere, civil society expanded 
significantly over the latter part of the decade. Manuel Fraga Iribarne, appointed Minister of 
Information and Tourism in 1962, used his position to institute a slate of modest reforms 
designed to promote the country’s image as a fully modern and European nation in order to 
promote foreign tourism. Among others, Fraga’s 1964 Law of Associations made it easier for 
Spaniards to form clubs and groups around professional or personal interests, so long as they 
refrained from political discussions or activities. Adena was among the first major groups to take 
advantage of this new law. Far more popular, however, were the “neighborhood associations” 
(Asociaciones de Vecinos) formed by small groups of urban residents in order to address 
common problems related to their living conditions and the state’s failure to provide adequate 
public services.32 In particular, they objected to the lack of adequate “land use planning” 
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(ordenación) that had contributed to the haphazard construction of slums without adequate 
infrastructure. By defining membership on the basis of geographic residence and common 
concerns rather than on social class, the neighborhood associations succeeded in casting 
themselves as communities with legitimate social interests rather than Marxist political groups. 
After Fraga eliminated pre-publication censorship in print media in 1968, urban peoples’ 
interests were further served by a number of increasingly bold journalists willing to risk fines 
and reprimands for critiquing what Pamela Radcliff has called the state’s failure to “soften the 
effects of untethered capitalist development.”33  
To some extent, these voices revived the civic activism of the early twentieth century, but 
the issues they addressed were unique to the political and demographic climate of the late Franco 
period. The lack of adequate housing and services for new urban residents was a source of 
universal condemnation, even among the regime’s staunchest supporters, and citizen protest 
against such neglect could easily be couched as a non-political issue and therefore a legitimate 
subject for civic activism. Neighborhood associations mobilized around issues specific to their 
localities and circumstances: the equitable distribution of urban resources, including green spaces 
and well-ordered parks; sanitation and safe drinking water; noise pollution; and the right of local 
people to determine the best use of the lands where they lived. Local governments received 
petitions signed by hundreds of residents, complaining of everything from dangerous pedestrian 
crossings to low water pressure to an absence of local parks.34 Many such groups lasted only as 
long as an individual campaign, but others found themselves embroiled in long-term struggles 
for social justice relating to issues of development, public health, and the distribution of 
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resources in their areas.35 In this, they echoed similar citizen movements in emerging 
democracies around the world, as well as those of the counterculture movements of the Western 
democracies.36 
The link between these urban voices and the growing interest in the natural world is not 
immediately evident. Many, if not most, of the activists within the neighborhood associations 
would not themselves have made the connection. But a small group of Spanish intellectuals, 
hailing not from the earth sciences but from university faculties of architecture, law, medicine, 
and sociology, understood the urban grassroots activism of the late Franco era as both Marxist 
and environmental and used the apolitical trappings of the conservation movement to disguise its 
explicitly anti-regime aims. 
Josep-Vicent Marqués, a young professor of sociology at the University of Valencia, saw 
in working peoples’ concerns about land-use planning a reconceptualization of the urban 
environment as an essential component of human welfare. Sanitation, clean water, adequate 
housing, and safe neighborhoods were not only social needs, but physical ones as well, 
necessitating an integrated approach that sought to produce human settlements compatible with 
the sustainable health of the physical environment. Marqués called this philosophy, which drew 
heavily on Marxist materialism, “environmentalism” (ecologismo), describing it as the pursuit of 
“a life that is leisurely, creative, egalitarian, pluralist and free of exploitation, and based on 
communication and cooperation between people.”37 While environmentalism might converge 
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with conservationism, as practiced by Adena and SEO, on issues such as the need for clean air 
and water and the preservation of healthy green spaces, their motivations and methods diverged 
dramatically.38 Unlike “nostalgic conservationism’s” interest in “birds and trees” for their own 
sake, Marqués wrote dismissively, environmentalism arose from “the deterioration of the living 
conditions of the working population.”39 The neighborhood associations, like the intellectuals 
who supported them, wanted well-ordered parks, safe energy sources, clean air and water, but 
had little use for the preservation of inaccessible habitats such as Doñana or the bourgeois values 
they represented. Though “it was logical that bird-lovers, naturalists and environmentalists 
coincided and even fought side by side,” environmentalists differed from the conservationists 
who were willing to tolerate an undemocratic, developmentalist society in exchange for the 
protection of isolated areas and species.40 
The distinction Marqués drew between conservation and environmentalism has direct 
parallels to the evolution of thought about the environment across the western world during the 
1960s and 1970s. Michael Bess, writing of the French case, calls the former “nature-centered 
environmentalism,” which treats nature as a valuable object in itself, requiring protection from 
human abuses, and the latter “social environmentalism,” which understands nature as a social 
space essential for the quality of human life.41 Félix Rodriguez de la Fuente drew a similar 
distinction: always speaking in the third person with reference to “environmentalists” 
(ecologistas), he described Marqués and his colleagues as “developing a very important and very 
positive role” but distinguished between his own dedication to conservation and their broader 
interest in social justice and counterculturalism in defiance of the regime. Among those who took 
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to the streets to protest the destruction of a local landscape, the construction of nuclear facilities, 
or the pollution of a river, he wrote, “there may be people who, perhaps, if environmentalism did 
not exist, would be an activist of hippies and flowers.”42 
Indeed, among intellectuals and university students involved in the protests of the late 
Franco era the objective of disrupting the cultural status quo and strengthening popular support 
for democratic reforms generally guided their actions, though there is no reason to doubt the 
genuineness of their interest in individual campaigns.43 Marqués himself showed little 
understanding of the environment as an ecosystem, at least in the early years of his activist career. 
In one of his first protests, he and a few colleagues snuck onto the recently completed Dehesa of 
El Saler golf course – a local symbol of the usurpation of public lands for the benefit of the 
wealthy – in the dead of night and spread herbicide all over the grass. The operation proceeded 
perfectly until the automatic sprinkler system came on, startling the monkey-wrenchers, who 
thought they had been discovered and fled, leaving their “environmental” protest burned into the 
soil. Though this sort of damage was not always part of their protests, Marqués and the other 
environmentalist intellectuals made no secret of the fact that they valued nature primarily for its 
practical benefits to humanity, not its intrinsic value, though unlike the productivist engineers of 
the regime they considered factors such as human health and recreation as among those benefits. 
To some extent, then, Marqués and other elites used rhetoric about the environment as a 
cover for their underlying political agenda of reform. With groups like Adena and SEO so fully 
accepted and integrated in the regime, opponents of Franco’s antidemocratic regime could fly 
under the radar by masking their efforts to destabilize social policies behind language about 
                                                
42 Quoted in Joaquín Araújo, Félix Rodríguez de la Fuente: La Voz de la Naturaleza (Barcelona: Editorial Salvat., 
1990), 95.  
43 Fernández, El Ecologismo Español, 52-53; Anna Mateu and Martí Domínguez, “Cuando El Saler volvió al 
pueblo,” Métode 70 (Summer 2011). 
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ecosystem health and landscape preservation. Moreover, by focusing on a local scale – water 
treatment in a suburb of Madrid, green spaces in Barcelona, air pollution in Bilbao – these 
campaigns escaped accusations of nation-wide agitation directed at the regime as a whole. This 
is not to say that the “environmentalists” of the late Franco era did not genuinely care about the 
environment as a whole, or that their efforts in individual campaigns were insincere. My research 
does suggest, however, that environmental causes and language provided a convenient cover for 
a more expansive social and political agenda. 
In 1970, Marqués joined with like-minded thinkers from around the country to form the 
Spanish Association for Land-Use Planning and the Environment (Asociación Española para la 
Ordenación del Territory y el Medio Ambiente, hereafter Aeorma). Later described by prominent 
activists as “the first truly environmental group in the history of the movement in Spain,” 
Aeorma overtly borrowed from the rhetoric of the neighborhood associations in its emphasis on 
“land-use planning.” and over the next six years played a role in local campaigns around the 
country on a variety of issues ranging from park construction to nuclear energy. Its expansive 
national agenda included labor policies, urban planning, public education, and the complete 
overhaul of the political system as well as issues dealing more directly with the environment.44 
Although the relatively high social status of its participants, combined with its evasive tactics 
and avoidance of overtly political activity, generally insulated them from official reprisals, the 
group occupied a dangerous liminal space between the clandestine, illegal political opposition 
and the apolitical, legal neighborhood associations and conservation groups. Members often used 
the rhetoric and tactics of the latter to espouse the views and objectives of the former. In one of 
their first national campaigns, for instance, members took to the countryside to disrupt a hunt of 
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endangered grouse, startling birds and distracting hunters. Whether their primary objective was 
truly to protect the grouse, as they claimed to the members of the Guardia Civil (the national 
police force responsible for repressing political dissidents) who came to arrest them, or rather to 
inconvenience and annoy the distinguished Francoist politicians and sympathizers who were 
participating in the hunt, remains an open question.45 
In interviews, members of progressive Valencian society in the early 1970s affirm the 
sense of Aeorma as an amorphous counter-cultural affiliation, not an organized group with a 
clear environmental objective. With Marqués at its center, the Valencian branch attracted friends 
and acquaintances affiliated with the local university, eager for an outlet for their political 
frustrations. I asked Vicente González Móstoles, one of the group’s most active participants, to 
describe it to me. “What was Aeorma?” he shrugged. “I don’t know. It had no money, no 
structure, no organization, no clear agenda.”46 Others claimed Aeorma was nothing more than a 
phantom, a name used to give the illusion that Marqués and the other “most active intellectuals 
in the university” represented a larger group than just themselves.47 Indeed, identifying 
Valencian activists retrospectively as “members” of Aeorma is fruitless, since no such formal 
designation existed at the time. This posed a sharp contrast to Adena’s formal, hierarchical 
structure, and represented an organization even looser than that of the ephemeral neighborhood 
associations and NIMBY campaigns around the country. 
Aeorma’s informality and lack of boundaries were to some extent a response to its semi-
clandestine status. The Guardia Civil could not easily shut down or arrest members of an 
                                                
45 Fernández, El Ecologismo Español, 53. 
46 Gonzalez Móstoles interview, Valencia, April 26 2012; Josep-Vicent Marqués, documents related to Aeorma 
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47 Vicente Ramón Quiros, Miguel Ramón Quiros, and Francisco Pérez Puche, interview with the author, Valencia, 
May 2 2012; Maria Consuelo Reyna, interview with the author, Valencia, May 1 2012. 
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organization that did not exist. Móstoles, for instance, laughed when I showed him the cover of a 
booklet he had produced some thirty-eight years earlier (Figure 10), which attributes authorship 
to “Aeorma team 3.” “Team three!” he giggled. “That was for the police. ‘If there’s a team three, 
there must be a team one and a team two! Investigate it!’”48 
Figure 10: Booklet produced by “AEORMA Team 3” opposing development on the Dehesa, 1975. 
 
 
The detached amusement and self-deprecation Móstoles expresses today towards his 
activism in the 1970s is characteristic of many in his generation. When I asked him about the 
activists’ daring in the face of ongoing political repression, Francisco Pérez Puche, one of the 
city’s most progressive journalists, scoffed that “we believed we had come to change the world. 
Ugh!”49 He describes their political involvement in terms commonly used for counterculture 
movements around the world, calling it “juvenile, chaotic, improvised. We were trying out 
everything for the first time: freedom of expression, of demonstrations, politics – and we were 
                                                
48 Gonzalez Móstoles interview, Valencia, April 26 2012. 
49 Francisco Pérez Puche, email to the author, January 21 2012. 
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thirty years old.”50 Indeed, spontaneity and a spirit of youthful rebellion may have played 
important roles in the protests of the early 1970s in Spain as in democratic Western societies, but 
the fact remains that such activism in the late Franco era was far from safe, and a relatively small 
number of Spaniards were willing to put themselves on the line for the sake of their political and 
social ideals. The Guardia Civil tended to come down hardest on labor activists, who they 
suspected of Marxist tendencies, but university students and other intellectuals were by no means 
exempt from persecution. Guillermo de Felipe, who later came to play an important role in 
Valencian environmental policy, was expelled from two different universities for his anti-Franco 
activities, while in Madrid environmentalist Francisco Sánchez Aguado remembers spending 
“more time running from the police than in a classroom” during his college years.51 Pérez Puche, 
despite his denials that he or the other journalists and activists were ever in real danger, admits 
that “of course today we see it much more clearly than when we were in the midst of it.”52 At the 
time, the Aeorma activists’ efforts to deceive and evade the police suggest that they felt 
otherwise, and their willingness to run such risks suggests that their dedication to a progressive 
political agenda was genuine.  
Protests and minor rebellions such as those in Valencia took place all over the country, 
but despite the nominally national character of umbrella groups such as Aeorma the real work of 
environmental and other countercultural organizing took place at a local or, at most, regional 
scale. This capitalized on the existing structure of the neighborhood associations, but had the 
added benefit of complicating regime efforts to disrupt their nascent social and tactical networks. 
Such decentralization led naturally towards the development and internalization of strong 
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regional identities within many of the environmental groups, including Aeorma’s regional 
branches, especially outside of Castile. Even Marqués, despite having developed his ideas 
through contact with French sociologists and exercising significant influence among intellectuals 
all over Spain, had a distinctly Valencian bias in his activism and thought. He was particularly 
influenced by the teachings of Joan Fuster, the intellectual father of “NeoValencianism,” whose 
writings in the early 1960s helped shape the political identity of a generation of university 
students.53 Fuster’s 1962 essay, “We the Valencians” (Nosaltres els Valencians) revived the turn-
of-the-century concept of the “Catalan Lands” (Paisos Catalans) and the cultural unity of 
Catalan-speakers on the Spanish Mediterranean. Unlike some other regional movements, Fuster 
and his followers did not advocate Valencian or Catalan separatism, but they did directly 
challenge the authority of the Madrid-based state and sought increased autonomy and self-rule 
for the regions.54 They also rejected Valencia’s stereotypical identity, based around the image of 
the industrious peasantry, as relegating Valencians to a peripheral and “provincial” role, and 
asserted a new one based on linguistic unity, political progressiveness, and above all, 
modernization.55 
Unlike the Valencianism espoused by Blasco Ibañez and others in the prewar era, the 
Valencian renaissance Fuster spawned has been described as “a civic Renaissance and not a 
cultural or folkloric one.”56 Where Blasquismo celebrated the picturesque customs of the 
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Valencian countryside as “local color” making a significant contribution to the national whole, 
under Fuster and Marqués regional pride took the form of social protest and concerted efforts to 
distinguish regional identity from that of the nation. This followed a global trend, as regional 
nationalisms merged with Marxist theory in wars of independence across the Cold War world. 
Like colonial subjects in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, leftists in many of the peripheral 
Spanish regions in the late Franco era embraced the need for the working class to rise up in 
simultaneous national and socialist revolutions and overthrow the dominance of the colonial 
power (Castile or Spain).57 Pan-Catalan Valencianism, then, was unequivocally an ideology of 
the political left, adopted primarily by the intellectual and professional middle classes, and 
especially by younger faculty members at the University of Valencia.58 The more daring 
professors, among them Marqués and his fellow monkey-wrenchers, taught Fuster’s theories to 
their students, and when the faltering regime finally lifted anti-regionalism laws in the mid-1960s 
urban progressives who had spoken Castilian their entire lives flocked to Valencian language 
classrooms to “reconnect” with their roots.59 
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While Fuster himself was at best indifferent towards the environment, Marqués 
successfully integrated Fusterian regionalism with his own ideas about landscape as an integral 
part of cultural and regional heritage and a central facet of human well-being. Moving beyond 
the traditional importance of farmland to Valencian identity, Marqués incorporated wilder spaces 
– beaches, forests, and wetlands – into the concept of the Valencian nation.60 The demise of 
endemic species such as the Valencian toothcarp or the destruction of iconic landscapes such as 
the Horta or the Albufera were particularly offensive in light of their unique “Valencianness.” 
State efforts to rezone culturally significant agricultural and wild areas for further substandard 
urban development were thus reframed as attacks on Valencian identity itself.  
Writing in the context of late twentieth-century efforts to protect local farmland from 
development projects such as the construction of a new international trade port, David Prytherch 
has identified landscape-centered Valencian nationalism as a form of anti-globalization, and the 
battle to preserve unique Valencian environments as pitting “global versus regional, urban versus 
rural, Castilian or Spanish versus Valencian-speaking, and modern versus traditional.”61 Global 
forces could easily be blamed for many of the problems faced by local activists in the early 
1970s, from the touristic development boom to the acceleration of production to feed global 
markets. But they directed their campaigns not against globalization as a phenomena or even 
foreigners in particular, but rather against the specific developers or polluters immediately 
responsible for local problems. Those culprits, in turn, stood in for the Francoist regime itself, 
from which they had benefitted through political or personal connections or through favorable 
regulations and lack of oversight. Valencian and other regional identities were employed 
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strategically, not as a counterpoint to globalization, but as a rejection of that regime. Thus 
activists pointedly used Valencian, not Castilian, for their slogans and posters, and described 
space as “nostra” (ours), articulating the possession of the Valencian people, as opposed to the 
possession of the Spanish nation as a whole. Thus, the apparent insularity of Spanish regional 
environmental movements is deceptive, and in fact represents a rejection of the Francoist central 
state in favor of a more global community of like-minded activists. True, most Spaniards 
continued to focus on local causes and not global environmental problems, but this was not 
atypical for the era and did not necessarily represent an anti-global mentality. 
Indeed, advocates of the Valencian environment routinely adopted global, and 
specifically European, ideas and strategies in pursuit of their goals. The notion that a healthy 
environment was a basic necessity for human quality of life was shared by regional 
environmental movements, Green parties and citizens’ groups across Europe, and by the early 
1970s had become a hallmark of developed Western societies. Translations of foreign books and 
treatises on ecology, including Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (which reached Hispanophone 
audiences in 1964), made a profound impression among Spaniards worried by increasingly 
obvious local air and water pollution. News of ongoing degradation and high-profile disasters 
around the world, especially the 1967 Torrey Canyon disaster off the coast of Brittany, drew 
additional attention. Nuclear energy was an area of special concern in Spain as elsewhere, and by 
the early 1970s protest marches and letter-writing campaigns around plant construction were 
comparable to those of any European state. Spain’s problems, and the ideas of its citizens, would 





Chapter Four. “El Saler for the People”: Tourism, Development, 
and Environmental Activism in the Late Franco Period 
 
The rise of urban environmentalism coincided with an intense surge of economic 
development across Spain, especially concentrated along the Mediterranean coast, stemming 
from the exponential increase of foreign tourism between 1960 and 1970. To an even greater 
extent than in the suburbs, touristic development produced land speculation and environmental 
destruction on a grand scale. In response, Valencia, while late to join the touristic development 
boom, became ground zero for one of the most significant protests. In what some chroniclers 
have called “the first environmental movement in Spain”1 and even “possibly the most important 
citizen mobilization in the history of conservationism in favor of a natural space,”2 Valencian 
conservationists, environmentalists, and their colleagues in the anti-Franco intelligentsia fought a 
bitter campaign, largely in the recently-liberated press, to save the Dehesa of El Saler from a 
touristic development planned by the city. Populist interest in preserving a public park, scientific 
interest in habitat conservation, and a critique of the undemocratic political regime overlapped 
and intersected, transforming the movement into a general protest against privatization, an attack 
on local political corruption and incompetence, and an outlet for generalized rebellion against the 
political and social status quo. The campaign, known retroactively as “El Saler for the People” 
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(El Saler per al Poble, in Valencian), offers a case study of the multiple forces at work in the 
rapidly changing Spanish society during the late Franco era. 
 
The 1960s were a decade of significant reform within the regime and of rapid changes in 
Spanish society more generally. In visibly deteriorating health, Franco celebrated his 76th 
birthday the year Adena formed, and even his staunchest supporters doubted that the socio-
political structure would outlive the dictator himself. One of the most prominent politicians of 
the era was Manuel Fraga Iribarne, appointed to the position of Minister of Information and 
Tourism in 1962, whose tireless efforts to promote Spanish tourism among an increasingly 
affluent European population did much to fundamentally transform the nature of the dictatorship 
in its final decade. Fraga aggressively pursued the expansion of foreign tourism as a means of 
both strengthening the regime and liberalizing the economy, without risking radical 
democratization. His highly productive propaganda machine played a pivotal role in Spanish 
modernization, promoting acceptance of the regime abroad as well as legitimizing it at home.3 
The orientalist vision of a quaint, anachronistic Spain populated by flamenco dancers, Gypsies, 
and bullfighters, which had featured heavily in international propaganda prior to Fraga’s tenure, 
gave way to a new slate of posters and pamphlets that depicted the country as fully modern and 
European, featuring architecture, art, religious ceremonies, and diverse regional customs in 
addition to the traditional sunny skies and sparkling beaches.4 National and regional tourism 
bureaus promoted Spain not only as a land of romance and folklore but also as a thoroughly 
modern European country with all the conveniences and luxuries a visitor could desire.5 Just as 
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Fraga had hoped, foreign tourists returned home with stories of the country’s beauty and 
hospitality, undermining older images of a repressive dictatorship and a backwards society. A 
wave of new employment opportunities in the construction and service sectors, meanwhile, along 
with a sharp rise in national revenue, helped legitimize the regime among Spaniards.6 
Franco’s initial reluctance to encourage international tourism, which he viewed as a 
danger to social order and public morality, had prevented the adoption of a comprehensive 
development policy for the increasingly popular coastal regions. By the time Fraga took office, 
speculators eager to maximize their investments routinely violated the national Terrains Law 
(Ley de Suelo) without repercussions.7 Developers rarely attempted to provide adequate 
infrastructure, instead building quickly and densely with little planning and substandard 
materials and methods. A national survey in 1964 found that only 27% of coastal cities had a 
sufficient water supply and only 10% had adequate sewage facilities.8 Sewage flushed directly 
into the sea by hotels routinely washed back up onto the beaches, and stomach sickness from 
local drinking water ruined many foreigners’ summer holidays. In the rush to capitalize on rising 
land prices, the hotels themselves were often constructed quickly and shoddily, with little or no 
attention to their aesthetic value, harmonization with their surroundings, landscaping or green 
space. Members of the SGT expressed further concern that the homogeneous skyscrapers and 
concrete bungalows were erasing regional and local character, making them less attractive to 
foreigners and endangering the future of the tourist industry itself.9 
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While Valencia remained largely insulated from such haphazard development by the 
1911 law that required the city to maintain the Dehesa as woodland, the Mediterranean coast 
nearby suffered from some of the worst cases of unregulated development in the country. In 
Alicante, the Directorate General of the Guardia Civil informed Fraga in 1964 that “everyone has 
built wherever they have pleased, and anyone who had a small or medium sized plot aiming to 
maximize profit has built a skyscraper and then sold it off floor by floor without concern for 
proper sanitation, running water, or zoning. This has created truly foul odors in some places.”10 
Immediately south of the Dehesa, the town of Cullera sold its development rights to a private 
firm in 1963. Over the next seven years, the firm transformed the village’s rocky terrain into a 
densely-packed grid of vacation homes without ever submitting a plan for development or 
infrastructure, in open violation of national and regional building laws (Figure 11).11 These 
developments were retroactively legalized in 1970, but problems with sanitation and water 
supply continued well into the 1990s. 
Figure 11: Development in Cullera.12 
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Fraga and others expressed alarm that such overdevelopment threatened the very 
characteristics – clean beaches, rural idyll, and local color – that had attracted tourists in the first 
place, and developments like Cullera notwithstanding, by the mid-1960s he had achieved some 
success in his efforts to curtail activities that threatened touristic potential by damaging scenic or 
historic landscapes.13 In addition to pushing for improved regulation of industrial and urban 
activities nearby, Fraga’s basic solution was to implement a comprehensive zoning plan that both 
protected touristic sites, offered funding for those hoping to build local tourist accommodations, 
and increased state control over infrastructure and development.14 Under the 1964 Law of 
Centers and Zones of National Tourist Interest, developments with a capacity to lodge more than 
5,000 tourists were subject to Ministry oversight and regulation to ensure adequate standards of 
planning and maintenance.15 Those standards included requirements for green space and 
municipal services intended to mitigate the aesthetic and practical challenges of earlier 
developments, and had as one of their major goals the diversification of touristic centers outside 
of the already overpopulated Catalan Costa Brava and the Andalucian Costa del Sol. 
Valencia, lying approximately halfway between these two centers of Mediterranean 
tourism, benefitted from the Ministry’s efforts at geographical diversification and obtained the 
designation of Zone of National Touristic Interest in 1964. With its long, undeveloped white-
sand beaches, shady forests, and tranquil atmosphere just a few kilometers from the city center, 
the Dehesa of El Saler appeared to be a perfect place for a high-class new touristic resort that 
would fill the city’s coffers and place Valencia on the international map. But the land that local 
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boosters saw as vacant and waiting for economic exploitation was in fact already occupied, at 
least intermittently, by thousands of Valencians who had used it for decades as a public park. 
Middle-class longing for a “return to nature” was not, of course, unique to Spain, but three near-
simultaneous trends—mass urbanization, improved transportation, and increasing disposable 
incomes—converged between about 1950 and 1960, and Spaniards took to the roads in droves. 
Though they could not, perhaps, afford to travel abroad or even far from home, working families 
in the cities could certainly pack up the car each weekend and drive out to a nearby park for 
some rest and rural idyll. Beach vacations, for those lucky enough to live near the coast, were 
especially popular. In Valencia, more often than not, this meant the Dehesa. 
Ironically, given Valencia’s historic reputation as a “garden,” during the Franco era the 
Dehesa was one of the only green spaces readily available to the public. Families making the 
short trip from the city to the coast would drive their cars up under the trees, spread out their 
picnic blankets, and enjoy long days at the beach or in the shade. Children wandered through the 
woods searching for wild asparagus or mushrooms, gathered wood for campfires over which to 
cook paella, and learned to swim in the cool surf. As early as 1942, towns on the outskirts of the 
Dehesa had begun to fill with Spaniards’ vacation homes, and by the mid-fifties the city had 
installed a campground and a handful of restaurants and kiosks which catered almost exclusively 
to local day-trippers.16 By and large, however, the city’s “improvement” efforts in the area were 
dedicated to providing “a place of recreation and amusement for the people of Valencia,” and 
consisted of sporadic and minimally effective programs to plant additional trees or reduce the 
local mosquito population by draining the malladas. These “improvements” generally failed as a 
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result of the area’s complicated soil conditions.17 Thanks to the terms of its 1911 sale to the city, 
which committed Valencia “to conserve the forest of the Dehesa and the integrity of its soil, 
which cannot have any use or agricultural purpose other than woodland,” throughout the early 
years of the Spanish tourism boom the Dehesa remained an island of green along an increasingly 
concrete coast (Figure 12).18 
Figure 12: Four views of the Dehesa ca. 1963.19 
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Boosters routinely described this state of affairs as a regional embarrassment; a sign of 
local backwardness that revealed Valencians to be outside of the larger modern European 
community. Members of the city council hyperbolically lamented that “from Sicily to Huelva, 
the Valencian coast is certainly the only one on the Mediterranean shore that remains 
undeveloped,”20 and argued that touristic development on the Dehesa could make Valencia part 
of “a fantastic linear city of thousands of kilometers extending along the coasts of Spain, France, 
Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and countries of North Africa.”21 To that end Valencia’s unelected city 
council, headed by the enthusiastically developmentalist mayor Adolfo Rincón de Arellano, 
decided that a planned, high-quality touristic development was better than the apparent 
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alternative of unregulated, illegal development that could destroy the area’s value altogether. As 
early as 1958, city councilor José Barberá proposed the drafting of a comprehensive urbanization 
plan for the Devesa to prevent the area from becoming a “a true chaos” like Cullera, an imminent 
threat judging by illegal and unregulated construction already in progress.22 
Over the next six years, amidst enthusiastic anticipation by the official press, architect 
Julio Cano Lasso, a Madrid-based architect working for a Madrid-incorporated corporation 
called Valencian Lands, Limited (Terrenos de Valencia, S.A., henceforth Tevasa), developed an 
ambitious plan for construction along the entire twelve-kilometer length of the Dehesa (Figure 
13 and Figure 14). On the northernmost two and a half kilometers of the Dehesa, Tevasa would 
level the coastal dunes and replace them with an elevated concrete boardwalk, built atop a series 
of dressing rooms, shops, restaurants, bars, and public restrooms.23 Architect Cano Lasso 
deemed these facilities, along with parking lots capable of accommodating five thousand cars, 
“adequate for the large masses of people on holidays.”24 
To the south, however, the Dehesa would belong to paying guests only. In all, the plan 
entailed the privatization of more than two-thirds of the Dehesa. South of the public area, the 
roads to Valencia ended, replaced with private drives and parking facilities closed to pedestrians, 
buses, and the general public. The dunes would again be leveled, this time to provide a better 
view from the three-story beachfront residences. Farther back, amidst the pine trees, the city 
would auction off the rights to construct 60 high-rise apartment buildings, 32 large hotels, 162 
smaller hotels, 6,000 residences, four churches and chapels, and dozens of public administrative 
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offices, theaters, shops, restaurants, and supermarkets.25 To avoid the problems faced by 
unplanned developments elsewhere along the coast, the city would pay Tevasa to construct all 
the necessary infrastructure, including a system of paved roads, potable water, waste collection 
and treatment, streetlights, residential electricity, public transportation, medical facilities, public 
service buildings, schools, libraries, parks, and markets. This represented a massive public 
investment, which the city hoped to recoup by selling land on the Dehesa to private investors 
who would be responsible for constructing and maintaining the hotels and other facilities. 
The Dehesa development was notable not only for its massive scale, but for the obvious 
effort to attract a “better class” of tourists than the blue-collar holiday-seekers, specifically 
foreigners, who tended to frequent the resorts of the Costa del Sol. Cano Lasso envisioned the 
Dehesa as a satellite city of Valencia, connected to the residential center by modern highways, 
with a permanent population of 40,000 and a seasonal capacity of 100,000. Visitors would have 
their choice of five-star hotels, Mediterranean-style “Casbah” residences, or luxurious 
apartments with lake or ocean views. During their stay, they could dine at the elevated revolving 
restaurant, catch a show at the Roman theater, or thrill to a stereotypical Spanish spectacle at the 
Dehesa’s private bullring. In addition to these luxuries, Cano Lasso’s plan called for such 
extravagances as a helipad and a sizeable artificial lake complete with multiple ports and a yacht 
club, located within half a kilometer of both the Mediterranean Sea and the Albufera Lake.26 The 
city council invited the public to admire a scale model and explanation of the urbanization, but 
provided no means for public feedback and unsurprisingly did not receive a single comment, a 
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sign the regional tourism magazine optimistically interpreted as “a plebiscite in favor of the 
project.”27 Fraga, who was in the midst of a concerted national effort to improve the quality of 
foreign tourism, was pleased with these efforts.28 In late 1964, in exchange for a gift of land for 
construction of a state-run luxury hotel and accompanying golf course (which Marqués and his 
friends would later sabotage), the Minister arranged for the derogation of the 1911 protections 
and authorized the city to begin construction.29 
Figure 13: Tevasa’s general plan for the urbanization of the Dehesa, 1965. 
The northern third (left) would remain relatively undeveloped and available for public use, while the heavy 
development in the south would be limited to paying guests. The infamous golf course lies at the extreme south 
(right). 
 
Figure 14: Partial views of Tevasa’s model of the Dehesa plan, 1964. 
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Although there is no reason to believe that members of the City Council were entirely 
insensitive to the concerns of local people who used the area, and indeed they frequently claimed 
that the development would bring economic benefits to all of Valencia’s citizens, it must be 
pointed out that they did not choose to develop the Dehesa as a public park along the lines of 
London’s Hyde Park, Paris’ Bois de Boulogne, or New York’s Central Park, as many Valencians 
had long sought. Rather, they chose to pursue a Fraga-style development intended specifically to 
attract wealthy international tourists and to exclude local working people. This can be explained 
only partially by the fact that many members of the city government stood to benefit financially 
from a major construction project in the city, either personally or through connections with well-
placed members of the local bureaus of commerce and tourism.30 As significantly, the Dehesa 
development was intended to counteract Valencia’s perceived backwardness vis-à-vis its 
Mediterranean neighbors and to promote a more modern, European image to the world.31 
Boosters of the project repeatedly insisted that it would “bring prestige to Valencia, revalue the 
Municipal Patrimony, create a positive factor in Valencia’s economy and acquire competitive 
capacity in the international tourism market.”32 
Perhaps anticipating protests that the construction would destroy a beloved local 
landscape, boosters of the project depicted it as the city’s effort “to fight with all the means at its 
disposal for the protection and defense of the landscape,” comparing the orderly construction and 
preservation of green space to the unregulated speculation that had ruined neighboring Cullera. 
According to city officials, the Dehesa development would “respect the natural characteristics;” 
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“preserve the greatest possible amount of the existing pine forest as an area of common 
enjoyment,” and “defend and enhance the natural beauty of the whole.”33 Members of the local 
tourism board agreed, describing the development as a guarantee “that this great natural park that 
belongs to our city and that serves as a marvelous contrast to the sea and the Albufera, will not 
disappear, but rather, much to the contrary, will grow and become more beautiful.”34 
Photographs of the scale model of the development (Figure 14), featuring gleaming white 
buildings nestled amidst lush forests beside sparkling blue waters, were reprinted in tourism 
magazines and popular periodicals nationwide. Marketing materials sent to potential investors 
touted the area’s natural beauty, with one brochure describing the Dehesa as “eleven kilometers 
of uninterrupted beaches of fine sand, bounded by the calm, warm waters of the Mediterranean 
to the east and the marvelous freshwater lake, the Albufera, to the west,” an idyllic location for 
hotels or summer homes.35 
While the Dehesa development undoubtedly was preferable, from a social, economic, and 
environmental standpoint, to the speculative devastation that had occurred elsewhere along the 
Mediterranean, the plans nonetheless made it clear that the landscape would be fundamentally 
transformed. In particular, Tevasa’s claims to preserve the landscape focused exclusively on the 
shady pine forest, whereas the construction would purposefully do away with less-popular 
features such as the mosquito-ridden malladas or the brush-filled dunes. Upon the plan’s 
approval by the city council, respected scientists from all over Spain contacted Mayor Rincón de 
Arellano in alarm at “the announcement of a projected series of construction complexes, some of 
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astounding extent” in “this incomparable location.” Pine forest notwithstanding, they claimed, 
destruction of the other features of the Dehesa’s complex landscape would prove catastrophic to 
the immense wealth of birdlife that wintered or nested in the nearby Albufera Lake, one of the 
most significant wetlands on the continent. The mayor accepted the scientists’ offer to produce a 
thoroughly researched report on how to make the urbanization compatible with the Dehesa’s 
ecological value. After several years of studies culminating in an international conference in 
1968, the scientists compiled a list of modest recommendations they deemed compatible with the 
existing plan, including perimeter defense of the lake, creation of a biological station, regulation 
and enforcement of hunting and fishing seasons, dredging the Albufera’s increasingly polluted 
sediments, reducing water pollution, and creating a botanic garden in the Dehesa. The mayor, 
who by this time had already authorized construction to begin, gravely accepted the report, 
thanked the scientists for their time, and failed to follow through on a single one of their 
suggestions.36 
Several years after the scientists’ failed attempt to reform the plan, in February 1970, 
industrial engineer Guillermo Pons Ibañez submitted a notarized “Opposition to the Dehesa Plan, 
in its entirety” to the city government, calling Tevasa’s plan “totally contrary to the touristic and 
social interests of the Valencian people, and an offense to their way of thinking.” Unlike the 
scientists, Pons Ibañez’s critiques arose largely from his concern for social and aesthetic 
concerns, calling the city’s expropriation of public property “anti-social” and roundly 
condemning the irrational use of “a splendid and lush Natural Park” for heavy construction that 
would “destroy its essence.” In making his case, however, he relied not on local discontent with 
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the plan but rather the unfavorable impression of Valencia that the plan would create 
internationally. Touristic activity on the scale envisioned by the city, he wrote, would invite “the 
shame of universal criticism, considering that the World Congress for the Protection of Wild 
Birds…unanimously recommended ‘the most exquisite care’ be taken of our Royal Albufera.”37 
Such wording suggests a sense, even in those early days of the global environmental movement, 
that Spain would be judged adversely for failing to care for its environment as global patrimony. 
The regime, however, seemed indifferent to such warnings, and met Pons Ibañez’s warnings with 
official silence. 
By the time Pons Ibañez wrote his angry letter, in fact, the ecological value of the 
northern half of the Dehesa had all but vanished. To build the boardwalk along the public section 
of the beach, Tevasa’s bulldozers leveled the entire line of coastal dunes and filled in the 
malladas to make room for boardwalks, roads, and parking facilities, while workers removed 
underbrush in the interest of landscaping and preparing the terrain for future construction. 
Without the protective dunes and vegetation, ocean winds carrying sand and salt blew 
unobstructed into the forest, lashing the trees and drying out the sandy soil so completely that no 
new vegetation could take hold. No sooner did the city complete a new street than blowing sand 
would bury it; within a few months of their construction whole sections of the boardwalk began 
to erode from wind and waves; vast areas of cleared underbrush turned into barren deserts where 
no grass would grow. As amply documented by photographs taken by opponents of the 
development, the trees behind the boardwalk blackened, sickened and died (Figure 15). The 
extensive network of streets and paths, meanwhile, disrupted drainage of the Dehesa into the 
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Albufera and fragmented ecosystems.38 Populations of plants and animals native to both the lake 
and the Dehesa declined sharply with the rapid destruction of these habitats. 
Figure 15: The Dehesa ca. 1971.39 
   
As construction progressed, however, so too did social changes across the country that 
emboldened many Valencians to speak out against the perceived problems with the Dehesa 
development and against the weakening regime more generally. While Marqués and his friends 
poured herbicides on the golf course to protest the land’s expropriation, scientific 
conservationists launched a reinvigorated campaign to raise awareness about the ecological 
destruction of the Dehesa’s ecosystem. Miguel Gil Corell, president of the Valencian chapter of 
SEO, asked Rodriguez de la Fuente himself to intervene, though he cautioned that “to fight 
against the urbanistic project would be the equivalent of tilting at windmills” and that the best 
they could hope for would be a scaling-back of some of the plan’s more expansive features, such 
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as the number of high-rises or their proximity to the fragile lakeshore.40 Rodriguez de la Fuente 
obliged, dedicating an episode of his program “Wild Life” (Fauna Salvaje) on Television 
Española to the Albufera, describing it as a unique and immensely rich ecosystem at risk from 
the nearby development.41 Biologist Ignacio Docavo Alberti, who had led local scientists in 
asking for modifications from the city four years earlier, promptly followed up with a lengthy 
opinion piece in the local paper criticizing the city’s refusal to listen to conservationists’ advice 
and arguing that “well-thought-out biological studies...are the only thing that can ensure the 
salvation of the Dehesa and the Albufera.”42 
The publisher of Docavo Alberti’s piece was a newspaper called Las Provincias, the only 
Valencian daily that was not owned by Franco’s National Movement political party. Throughout 
the Franco regime, even after Fraga’s Press and Printing Law of 1966, the central administration 
controlled radio and television broadcasts as well as nearly half of the country’s daily 
newspapers.43 Privately-owned periodicals, including Las Provincias, were also subject to strict 
government censorship and despite their nominal autonomy had historically functioned largely 
as instruments of regime propaganda.44 The 1966 reform mitigated this state of affairs somewhat, 
most notably by eliminating pre-publication censorship, though the regime retained substantial 
discretion in sanctioning journalists and editors for writing that was judged too inflammatory or 
socially divisive. Writer Francisco Pérez Puche, for example, was memorably summoned to a 
private meeting with the provincial governor in the late 1960s to defend his report that 
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Valencians were unhappy about a new water tax. Nonetheless, today he describes journalists’ 
experience of the late Franco era as one of “benevolent dictatorship” (dictablanda) in which such 
official reprimands were the worst that could befall them.45 He and others used their position to 
promote reform, primarily by “writing between the lines” to spread information that the regime 
did not want publicized, or by “running lots of stories about elections in foreign democracies in 
the world news section.”46 
José Ombuena Antiñolo, in his role as Las Provincias’ director since 1959, had managed 
over the course of a decade to turn it into what Pérez Puche describes as “a newspaper prudently 
distant from Francoism and with the sufficient critical capability to make its independence 
known when it was convenient.”47 A political moderate, at least in his own writings, Ombuena 
nonetheless allowed his younger writers substantial discretion and responsibility.48 After the 
1966 Press Law, those writers grew increasingly daring, publishing interviews and articles that 
closely skirted the limits of what the regime would deem acceptable. Several times, Las 
Provincias reporters were hauled into the offices of local politicians to defend themselves and 
the paper received financial sanctions, though such intimidation tactics rarely resulted in 
substantive punishments. 
Beginning with Docavo Alberti’s piece, Las Provincias became the primary platform for 
opponents of the development, and over the next four years would make that its signature issue.49 
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To a generation of young, progressive intellectuals, the city’s plans to privatize and develop the 
Dehesa of El Saler in the final decade of the Franco regime represented all that was wrong with 
the political and socioeconomic system. In France, the refrain “sous les pavés, la plage” (beneath 
the paving stones, the beach) embodied university students’ desire to peel away the artifice and 
repression of modern industrial society to reveal, in the words of the historian Michael Bess, “the 
spontaneous dimension of human free play and imagination, lying trapped below the metaphoric 
paving stone.”50 In Valencia, both the paving stones and the beach took on literal dimensions, as 
the planned privatization of the largest green space in the city, which also happened to contain an 
ecosystem of internationally recognized scientific importance, would bury Valencia’s last 
undeveloped beach under tons of concrete and steel hotels for the enjoyment of wealthy tourists. 
 The underlying spirit of youthful dissent that motivated French protests was also a key 
feature of the Valencian campaign, intensified by progressive frustration with the regime’s 
continued existence even as that same regime limited the ways in which they could express their 
frustrations. To some extent, the Dehesa urbanization was merely a convenient issue through 
which reporters and others could express their opposition to the regime. In particular, the general 
apoliticism of conservation movements prior to 1970 made it more difficult for the regime to 
oppose critiques that remained nominally concerned with environmental issues. But in other, 
important ways, the fact that Las Provincias seized on an environmental campaign as its flagship 
issue of the late Franco years reflects the profound importance of local landscapes, and local 
control over those landscapes, in the anti-regime movement as a whole.  
Using the scientists’ complaints as his starting point, Pérez Puche, then a young journalist 
in charge of the city desk at Las Provincias, came to understand the Dehesa not only as an 
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ecological catastrophe but also as a profoundly undemocratic undertaking by the city government, 
akin to its neglect of social issues elsewhere in the city. Already used to challenging the regime 
in subtle critiques and unfazed by the official reprimand he had received from the provincial 
governor a few years earlier, Pérez Puche seized on the Dehesa as a means of issuing more direct 
attacks against the undemocratic city government. Just a few months after Rodriguez de la 
Fuente’s show aired, Pérez Puche published the first in a series of articles about the Dehesa in 
which he accused the city of irresponsible management, expropriation of public property, and 
misleading the public with regard to the nature of the urbanization.51 Walls and fences cut off 
public access to the beach, he reported. The boardwalk was a disaster, the forest where Valencian 
families had long picnicked would be sacrificed to private development, and the few existing 
public areas suffered from a depressing lack of facilities. Writers at Triunfo, a prominent national 
journal at the forefront of media critiques of the regime, seized on Pérez Puche’s lead, reiterating 
the scientists’ arguments and defending “the rights of the Valencian people to enjoy the only 
green space available in the capital...[i]ndependently of the reasons provided by the biologists 
and naturalists against this urbanization.”52 
In such arguments, Pérez Puche laid the groundwork for a four-year campaign that used 
the Dehesa as a stand-in for all that was wrong with Spanish politics.53 Though he frequently 
evoked imagery of dying pines and devastated dunes, in his own view the ecological conditions 
of the Dehesa were important principally insofar as they reflected the dramatic decline in the 
quality of the Dehesa as a public park. As he would later describe it, the environmental aspects 
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served as a tapadera, a cover, for his political critique.54 This approach allowed Pérez Puche to 
appeal to a much broader segment of the population than the scientists who approached the 
Dehesa from a purely conservationist perspective. Whereas many Spaniards remained wary of 
conservation’s perceived adverse impacts on economic growth, Pérez Puche’s interest in urban 
pollution and park access for the working class seemed to address a different set of problems 
altogether. Such concerns echoed many of those voiced by Josep-Vicent Marqués and other 
Aeorma “members,” who used Las Provincias and the Dehesa issue to obtain a wider audience 
for their critiques. 
In addition to a steady stream of articles and interviews with such figures, Las Provincias 
also published the city’s responses to its critics, beginning with a histrionic press conference 
called in response to the accusations leveled by scientists and naturalists shortly after Rodríguez 
de la Fuente’s show aired. City representatives declared those accusations “alarmist,” 
“sensationalist,” “groundless,” “inaccurate and even cruel,” and countered with a series of 
scientifically and logically incoherent explanations for the obvious destruction of the forest. It 
had been caused by a “change in the winds of the Levant,” they suggested, or perhaps “all the 
pines that are now described as sick were in fact already dead well before the urbanization works 
even began.” While Valencians could plainly see that the dunes on the northern section of the 
beach had been destroyed, the city claimed they had been merely “lowered slightly only in a 
short stretch of the boardwalk.”55 Likewise, the immense parking lots and wide avenues Tevasa 
had paved all along the Dehesa were, according to the city, built entirely “in areas that did not 
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have trees.”56 In addition to being an obvious lie, this latter claim also ignored the 
conservationists’ observation that trees alone could not preserve the Dehesa’s ecosystem. 
The mayor of Valencia, though he had no hand in establishing or approving the 
development plan, became a frequent target of rhetorical attacks in Las Provincias. Vicente 
López Rosat had been one of the city’s best neuropsychiatrists in private life, but his sole 
political experience prior to his appointment consisted of the time he had spent as president of 
the local council of parents’ associations for the city’s schools. Pérez Puche, a thorn in the 
mayor’s side throughout his tenure, later confirmed the impression provided by archival 
materials and interviews that López Rosat was a fundamentally good-natured man who was 
profoundly unsuited for the political role to which Franco had appointed him. Another prominent 
journalist of the era described the mayor as “an octopus in a garage,” hopelessly unable to 
control the competing political and social forces converging around him.57 Hoping only to avoid 
conflict and to reduce the debts incurred by his predecessor, including those to Tevasa for its 
construction of infrastructure on the Dehesa, López Rosat instead found himself under constant 
pressure from the public, including both members of the press and an increasingly activist 
population of university students.58 He later described the Dehesa project itself as a bad situation 
over which he had little control, and often felt he had “boarded a moving train” insofar as he had 
inherited the project and its attendant controversy from his predecessor, Rincón de Arellano.59 
“Above all,” he would later tell Pérez Puche, “I didn’t like auctioning, selling land that belonged 
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to the City.”60 The fact that Las Provincias frequently focused on precisely that aspect of the 
urbanization hit a particular nerve. 
The mayor’s reservations about the development were magnified in February 1971 when 
Alfredo Sánchez Bella, Fraga’s replacement as Minister of Information and Tourism, told him in 
no uncertain terms that the Dehesa project was “a mistake.” Recently returned from Rome, 
Sánchez Bella warned that elsewhere in Europe towering concrete towers like those already 
under construction as part of Tevasa’s plan were passé. Modern tourists wanted tasteful, 
understated landscaping; distinctive architecture reflecting the local character; and natural beauty. 
The Dehesa project represented an older model of development that would, as Sánchez Bella 
assured the increasingly depressed mayor, make it difficult for the city to find high-quality 
buyers for the lots and building rights it had to sell. “Either you resolve it soon,” he added, “or 
you will have problems.”61 
Many within the regional administration and the city government took Sánchez Bella’s 
advice to heart, but his words were not made public, and López Rosat’s lieutenants (many of 
whom had vested financial and personal interests in the urbanization) refused to stop or even 
meaningfully revise Tevasa’s plan.62 City councilor Luís Puig Esteve, who was in charge of the 
day-to-day operations of the project, stood by his earlier statements that it would prove a benefit 
                                                
60 Perez Puche, La Valencia de los Años 70, 48. 
61 These are not direct quotes from Sánchez Bella, but rather the paraphrase provided by López Rosat to Pérez Puche, 
who later published them in La Valencia de los Años 70, 47 and “Cambio de rumbo en la urbanización del Saler,” A 
la Luna de Valencia, February 12 2011. Miguel Ramón Izquierdo, López Rosat’s successor as mayor, and other 
politicians of the era report hearing similarly-worded warnings upon the occasion of Sanchez Bella’s visit, which 
were a source of general discussion and great consternation at the regional government in the months and years 
following. Ramón Quiros and Pérez Puche interviews. 
62 Perez Puche, La Valencia de los Años 70, 48-49; Ramón Quiros and Pérez Puche interviews; Pérez Puche, 
“Cambio de rumbo;” Manuel Girona, “El Saler a encuesta (1): El Saler urbanizado hubiera podido ser modelado, 
explotado, sin ser privatizado, hubiera podido ser utilizado por la poblacion,” Las Provincias, June 18, 1974. 
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to the population as a whole.63 Before Tevasa had stepped in, he claimed, the Dehesa had been in 
a state of abandon, used by “only a few rich kids” (señoritos). The urbanization, conversely, 
would put the land “at the disposal of all Valencians” so that “a great number of people will be 
able to enjoy it.”64 
This statement caught the attention of 26-year-old María Consuelo Reyna, the recently-
appointed assistant director of Las Provincias. As a scion of the powerful Reyna Domenech 
family, which owned and operated the paper, she enjoyed almost complete immunity from the 
regime and unprecedented editorial freedom. One collaborator, economist Vicent Soler Marco, 
described Consuelo Reyna’s influence at the paper as “a light coming on” in the darkness of the 
Franco era, offering progressive intellectuals their first public forum to express their ideas.65 She 
extended her protections to a handful of young journalists, first among them Pérez Puche, who 
shared her disdain for regime policies and her interest in promoting reform through the media.66 
Guest columnists and interviewees over the years raised critical perspectives on a wide range of 
issues, often couched in terms of objective expertise to protect their overtly political slant. 
Favored topics included the construction of an immense Ford factory on the outskirts of the 
Albufera; the planned installation of a nuclear power plant upstream; the ongoing international 
energy crisis; rampant highway construction; and of course the continued expropriation of public 
lands on the Dehesa. 
                                                
63 Mayor Miguel Ramón Izquierdo would later describe the urbanization as Puig Esteve’s “baby,” noting that the 
counsellor had been actively intervening in negotiations with the construction companies and the promotion of 
parcel sales...and even made a promotional trip to North America.” Miguel Ramón Izquierdo, Memoir (unpublished), 
MRI. 
64 Francisco Pérez Puche, “La urbanización de la Dehesa, al día,” Las Provincias, February 25 1973. 
65 Quoted in Perez Puche, La Valencia de los años 70, 276. 
66 Maria’s brother, Santiago Consuelo Reyna, worked as a forestry engineer for the local branch of the Nature 
Conservation Institute (ICONA), and environmental activists today describe him as having a significant personal 
interest in conservation as well. Victor Navarro, interview with the author, Valencia, May 2 2012. 
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This latter would become a hallmark of Consuelo Reyna’s early tenure at Las Provincias, 
and when interviewed in 2012 she emphasized her sense of the Dehesa and another major 
Valencian park as her personal legacy to the city. In her recounting, her attention was captured 
by the Dehesa shortly after her return from a family vacation at a low-key beach resort in 
Andalucia, which she contrasted with the Dehesa development’s immense scale and exclusive 
character.67 Although today she claims that her interest in the Dehesa arose from its importance 
in its unique ecosystems, noting that it was “the last authentic Mediterranean forest” that had not 
been altered “by the hand of man,” her words at the time suggest that she was far more outraged 
by the elitist character and dismissive attitude towards Valencian families evinced by the city 
government.68 Puig Esteve’s ill-chosen comment that the Dehesa historically served only “a few 
rich kids” proved a catalyst for the first of many populist diatribes Consuelo Reyna penned for 
Las Provincias. “A few rich kids?” she echoed incredulously. 
Half of Valencia was among those ‘few rich kids,’ or even all of Valencia. The members 
of a family who went there to spend their Sunday are “rich kids;” those who, because of 
their jobs, had to stay in Valencia during the summer and escaped to swim at El Saler are 
“rich kids;” those who were unable to pay for a summer vacation somewhere along the 
coast and instead went to El Saler every morning are “rich kids.” Sure, ‘a few rich 
kids.’69 
Denouncing Puig Esteve and other city representatives as “demagogues,” Consuelo Reyna’s 
intensely confrontational piece and her enthusiasm for the topic set the stage for a flood of 
articles, editorials, and interviews at Las Provincias.70 In the eighteen-month period between this 
first editorial and the end of 1974, the paper published 139 articles and columns relating to the 
                                                
67 Consuelo Reyna interview, Valencia, May 1 2012. 
68 Consuelo Reyna interview, Valencia, May 1 2012. It is of course impossible to accurately ascribe motivations to 
historical actors, but it seems likely that Consuelo Reyna’s assertions in 2012 about her interest in environmental 
themes reflect current beliefs more than past ones. Apart from the Dehesa, which as mentioned she discussed 
overwhelmingly in populist terms at the time, a review of the topics she covered during her journalistic career does 
not support her claims of interest in environmental issues. 
69 Consuelo Reyna, “La Dehesa (2).” 
70 Perez Puche, La Valencia de los Años 70, 47 and 276. 
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urbanization of the Dehesa and featured dozens of images depicting the ongoing destruction of 
the landscape.71 Staff photographer José Penalba spent countless hours walking on the Dehesa, 
documenting the ongoing destruction, capturing such iconic images as the one that graced the 
cover of the Las Provincias almanac for 1974 (Figure 16). The photograph, which featured a 
sign posted in the Dehesa that read “respect this park, report those who mistreat it,” exemplified 
the sharp humor characteristic of the paper’s coverage. 
Figure 16: Las Provincias coverage of the Dehesa development, 1973-197472 
  
Though Las Provincias journalists and their collaborators repeatedly claimed to represent 
a public opinion staunchly opposed to the urbanization, with continued regime suppression of 
elections, polling, and freedom of expression there was no way to either prove or disprove this 
claim. In the summer of 1972, engineer Guillermo Pons Ibañez actually hired a public notary to 
accompany him around the city and verify the appearance of anti-development graffiti, offering 
                                                
71 Mateu and Dominguez, “Inicios del columnismo ambiental,” 179. 
72 Photos by José Penalba for Las Provincias, 1973-1974. 
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the resulting document as evidence of a popular uprising. Indeed, Pons Ibañez led the notary to 
five separate locations where some person or persons had painted slogans such as “Don’t 
speculate with El Saler – Thieves;” “El Saler belongs to the People;” and “Don’t make El Saler a 
private beach.”73 This, of course, proved very little. It is entirely possible that Pons Ibañez or 
another of the prominent anti-development activists had painted the slogans himself, and even if 
this was not the case five isolated incidents did not constitute much evidence of a mass 
movement. Nonetheless, Pons Ibañez claimed such slogans reflected “the sentiments of all the 
Valencian People” and described them as indicative of “the universal outcry against the dangers 
to Humanity represented by the disappearance of green spaces and the pollution of the 
environment.”74 Although the accuracy of his statement is impossible to ascertain, he did at least 
seem convinced in his own mind, and urged the city to confirm his beliefs by conducting surveys 
of the Valencian population about their desires for the Dehesa.75 
Today, the journalists of Las Provincias freely admit that they took advantage of the 
uncertainty surrounding public opinion to assert claims that they knew to be gross exaggerations, 
creating an illusion of popular consensus that enabled them to exert additional pressure on the 
city government.76 According to Pérez Puche, activists – including scientific conservationists 
who penned repeated protests to the City Council and to local papers, as well as social activists 
such as Marqués, Pons Ibañez, and Móstoles - did “just enough” to give the journalists 
something to write about, while Las Provincias “magnified everything” so as to create an 
                                                
73 Rafael Azpitarte Camy, Notary of Valencia, July 6 1972.  
74 Guillermo Pons Ibañez, “Parcelación y Venta del Monte de la Dehesa,” to Ayuntamiento de Valencia, April 24 
1972, MCR. 
75 Guillermo Pons Ibañez, “Parcelación y Venta del Monte de la Dehesa,” to Ayuntamiento de Valencia, April 24 
1972, MCR. 
76 Perez Puche email, January 19 2012. 
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impression of citywide consensus on the issue.77 “If one person went to the Dehesa” to protest 
the conditions there, Consuelo Reyna agrees, “it appeared in the paper as if it were one 
hundred.”78 A few letters to the editor penned in agreement with the paper’s positions, 
meanwhile, were presented as evidence of a groundswell of spontaneous grassroots support.79 
Like the graffiti, these letters were often anonymous, and may well have come from the activists 
themselves. 
In keeping with the portrayal of a popular moment, activists adopted the motto “El Saler 
for the People” as the rallying cry for those opposed to the development. “People,” in this 
context, meant not only the working families Marqués and his colleagues claimed to represent, 
but also the Valencian people, in the sense of regionalist connections to and ownership of the 
land, distinct from the Madrid-based nationalism of the regime.80 “We need El Saler,” read one 
flyer handed out on the street, “because the working people have the right…to rest and have 
contact with nature.”81 Posters and bumper stickers (affixed only to the cars of the “very brave,” 
according to Móstoles) featured a cartoon fist holding a tree and the motto “The Dehesa is ours 
and we want it green” (“la Devesa es nostra i la volem verd,” in Valencian), again asserting 
regionalist ownership of the land. The vision of the Dehesa as a Valencian commons starkly 
contracted with the city’s depiction of the development primarily as a means of improving the 
city’s international profile, but it would be a mistake to assume that the movement against the 
development represented a form of opposition to globalization. As discussed in the previous 
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78 Consuelo Reyna interview, Valencia, May 1 2012. 
79 E.g., letters from P. J. de P and A Valencian, “El futuro del Saler,” Las Provincias, May 19, 1973. 
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chapter, activists in the late Franco period borrowed tactics from and appealed directly to an 
international audience, seeking support from their democratic sympathizers abroad. Moreover, as 
land sales continued on the Dehesa it became clear that buyers hailed not from England and 
France, as the city had originally boasted, but from the upper echelons of Spanish and, more 
specifically, Valencian society itself. In this, it was little different from other developments of 
the time, which overwhelmingly tended to benefit local officials and members of the regime who 
took advantage of the subsidies and low prices of such state-funded projects. The “Valencian 
people” for whom activists claimed to speak, then, can be more accurately understood as 
working- and middle-class Valencian families, whose rights were under attack not from a foreign 
threat but from undemocratic elites with ties to the central regime.  
By the summer of 1973 the minimal work necessary on the public area of the Dehesa had 
been completed, Fraga’s luxury hotel expanded, the golf clubhouse opened, and plans to build a 
horse racing track on one of the principal bird nesting grounds approved. 82 Behind this apparent 
progress, however, the project was in trouble, having lost the support of the central 
administration following Sánchez Bella’s negative report from Rome. To make matters worse, 
Franco was now eighty-one years old and visibly ailing, and social unrest, often violently 
suppressed by the police, grew with the anticipation of the approaching transition. Local 
authorities received orders from Madrid to seek compromise and conciliation, but above all to 
keep the peace. Thanks to the Las Provincias campaign, the urbanization topped the Valencian 
administration’s list of trouble spots where it would need to make concessions in order to prevent 
young progressives from taking to the streets. 
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Miguel Ramón Izquierdo, a prominent legal academic and respected attorney, replaced the 
previous mayor in the fall of 1973 with an unwritten mandate to minimize social unrest via 
compromise and conciliation on the issues of greatest concern to young radicals, and especially 
to resolve the situation with the Dehesa.83 He immediately set to work placing insurmountable 
obstacles in the path of the urbanization, using his knowledge of the Valencian legal code, a 
sharp and deliberate mind, and some mild prevarication to subvert developers’ efforts. Citing a 
series of technicalities and small irregularities, within a few weeks of taking office he suspended 
all further land sales and construction licenses, telling the council and the press that “the entire 
project needs to be updated and that the Valencian people must understand the reality of the 
project and its future possibilities.”84 Simultaneously, he invited the most active opponents of the 
project, including Marqués himself, to submit a plan for its revision with the dual mandate of 
“preserving nature” and “restoring the public character of the area” to the greatest extent 
possible.85 In short, the activists could not have asked for a more conciliatory mayor, nor one 
more predisposed to halt the urbanization.  
But by the spring of 1974, nothing the mayor could have done would have quelled the 
political dissatisfaction and social unrest running through progressive Valencian society. Ramón 
Izquierdo had the misfortune of taking office just as political tensions in Spain reached their peak, 
with a massive proliferation of left-wing groups, increasingly fearless protestors, and wild 
                                                
83 Ramón Izquierdo, quoted in Perez Puche, La Valencia de los Años 70, 60; Ramón Quiros and Pérez Puche 
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speculation about the imminent end of the Franco regime. In early October 1973, just a month 
after the new mayor first set foot in City Hall, the Yom Kippur war broke out and sparked a 
major energy crisis across the western world, prompting Franco’s technocrats to announce plans 
for fourteen new nuclear energy plants. The move emboldened environmental activists around 
the country and gave rise to more than seven hundred new citizen groups. Even more important, 
that December, Basque extremists assassinated Admiral Luís Carrero Blanco, President of the 
Spanish state and Franco’s designated heir, ushering in an era of political uncertainty and 
redoubled social unrest. 
As these national developments unfolded, the Dehesa project acted as a lightning rod for 
progressive Valencia’s increasingly bold expressions of displeasure with the regime. Las 
Provincias published a series of new discoveries about the development, calculated to arouse 
indignation and outrage from a public already primed for news of corruption and wrongdoing in 
the regime. In the winter and spring of 1974, Las Provincias reported that the forest of El Saler 
had been reduced by 30%;86 that the city had not followed proper legal channels for any 
revisions since 1965, making much of the completed construction technically illegal;87 and that 
the state had subsidized many of the touristic residences and summer homes as low-income 
housing, thus directly using taxpayer funds to reduce the cost for wealthy purchasers.88 At one 
particularly disastrous press conference, Puig Esteve admitted that several members of the city 
government had financial interests in the hotel chains involved with the development and that 
“the city government had never consulted with scientists, biologists, ecologists, or technicians of 
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any kind” on the project.89 Each new revelation brought predictable howls of protest from 
journalists and letter-writers. When Ramón Izquierdo released the recommendations for the 
Dehesa that had been submitted by Marqués and other progressive young experts in the early 
summer of 1974, the experts themselves promptly turned around and denounced it as elitist and 
insufficiently conservationist. Ramón Izquierdo privately recorded his special frustration with 
Marqués on this count, noting that the sociologist had received 25,000 pesetas in exchange for 
his input and that “in spite of seeming pleased with the acceptance of his suggestion was later a 
great detractor of the remodeling.”90 
Admittedly, not even the mayor himself was particularly thrilled with the new plan.91 
Faced with the impossible task of reconciling the desire to protect the Dehesa with the desire to 
make back the money the city had already spent on infrastructure there, the revisions left 
everyone unhappy. The original plan had bound Valencia to finance the entire project using 
money obtained through land sales, but to date the city had spent 1,635 million pesetas and made 
only 376 million back. To compensate for this enormous deficit, the city’s experts – including 
Marqués – agreed that they would have to allow construction to move forward, albeit on a 
significantly more modest version of the original plan.92 In accordance with progressive demands, 
it reduced building volume, eliminated many of the more disruptive landscape elements of the 
original design, and prohibited any development on the 330 hectares (815 acres) of untouched 
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forest to the south of the Pujol canal. However, Marqués and others, again using the pages of Las 
Provincias to get their message out, immediately denounced this as nothing more than the 
unethical, illegal sale of Valencian patrimony to private interests. 
In many respects, the last Francoist mayor of Valencia was the unsung hero of the Dehesa. 
In the five years following his cancellation of sales and licensing, Ramón Izquierdo steadfastly 
stalled, hedged, and manufactured a series of technical and legal obstacles that made it 
impossible for construction, sales, or the granting of licenses to proceed. Tevasa officials sent 
him a series of increasingly frustrated letters demanding that he concede the necessary permits, 
which he carefully filed away and ignored completely.93 Landowners, construction workers, 
developers, and business owners on the Dehesa followed suit with a series of formal memoranda 
and angry visits to his office, describing themselves as the victims of a “tendentious press 
campaign, which, in spite of its insignificance, has had a much greater impact than expected,” 
and demanding he allow the urbanization to proceed.94 Nearly forty years later, I unearthed many 
of these unanswered complaints in a pair of overstuffed filing cabinets in Ramón Izquierdo’s 
sons’ legal office, carefully collated with other legal notes and correspondence from the same 
period. Documents he received from various state agencies on the Dehesa issue, filed alongside 
the citizen complaints, showcased both the massive bureaucratic inefficiency of the crumbling 
regime and the way that Ramón Izquierdo was able to use a series of minor technical 
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irregularities to stall final decisions on the urbanization until the advent of democratic local 
elections.95 
But such machinations necessarily occurred behind the scenes, reflecting Ramón 
Izquierdo’s awkward position as both a symbol of the Francoist regime that had appointed him 
and his private advocacy of democratic reform. As such, he was a relatively easy target for 
Marqués and others seeking to direct populist outrage against the state. Much to his frustration, 
this revisionist version of history is the one that stuck: articles in the local press and official 
histories of the El Saler controversy published over the next few decades routinely described 
Ramón Izquierdo as “selling El Saler” and erased any mention of his role in halting the 
urbanization.96 Figure 17, for example, shows a history of the controversy published by the new 
city government in 1983, entitled “El Saler becomes Ours Again” and subtitled “Democracy is: 
Recovering El Saler,” which completely excised any mention of Ramón Izquierdo’s 1973 order 
to cease sales and construction, as noted in his handwritten addendum. Nor did this inaccurate 
portrayal fade with time: A scathing critique of the former mayor appeared in local papers in 
1991, entitled “Seventeen years ago Ramón Izquierdo approved the urbanization of the entire 
Dehesa of El Saler.” This slander elicited an indignant, notarized complaint insisting that “during 
my mayoral term not a single square meter of El Saler was sold” and demanding a correction of 
the public record.97 Such efforts notwithstanding, Valencians today are overwhelmingly ignorant 
of Ramón Izquierdo’s role in stopping the development, while Aeorma and the democratic 
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government get all the credit. As discussed further in Chapter Five, this feeds into a broader 
narrative contrasting the progressive democratic governments with a caricature of Francoist 
oppression prevalent across contemporary Valencian society. 
Figure 17: City of Valencia’s official history of the anti-development movement, 1983. 
   
By early July 1974, when an ailing Franco temporarily recused himself from office, the 
campaign had at last begun to spread beyond the initial core of journalists and university 
professors – not so much as to constitute a real popular consensus, but enough that Pérez Puche 
and the others at Las Provincias could justify its claims to represent at least a significant 
minority of the population. Notably, much of this popular appeal came from political radicals 
eager to take out their frustrations on the government more generally, who found El Saler a 
convenient campaign already in progress. Communist activists took to the street to hand out a 
dense page of text in both Valencian and Castilian, outlining their arguments against El Saler’s 
expropriation and closing with the rallying cry “Down with the fascist city government! Down 
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with the corruption of the Regime! El Saler for the People!”98 A similar flyer distributed by a 
group calling itself “the Friends of El Saler” added to these its own calls, not only for “El Saler 
for the Valencian People!” and “Freedom for the Valencian People!” but the more overtly anti-
establishment “Down with the Governor, the Guardia Civil and the Police who defend those who 
steal from the people!” “Punish the guilty!” and “Freedom for the Valencian People!”99 
Neighborhood associations sent letters to the editor of Las Provincias rejecting the 
revision in its entirety on the basis of its nondemocratic nature and the lack of public facilities.100 
In response to a call for action from Aeorma, more than two hundred Valencians attempted to 
plant a Valencian flag on the beach at the Dehesa, but were stymied by a police cordon.101 
Activists from the school of architecture, the department of sociology, and Las Provincias itself 
gathered 15,750 signatures in support of a petition stating in part that “Valencia does not want 
the remodeling of El Saler, but rather that it becomes a public park.”102 Aeorma-affiliated 
lawyers submitted formal complaints challenging the legal basis for the urbanization and its 
revisions.103 A highly technical exhibition on the proposed revision of the plan attracted 
thousands of visitors, while across town, at the School of Architecture at the University of 
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Valencia, Móstoles held a counterexhibition put together by fellow academics in Aeorma’s 
name, depicting El Saler as “a symbol of the fight for the working people’s right to relax, for 
those who could not buy themselves private land.”104 By the end of the summer, the city had 
received twelve kilograms of documents on the issue, including thirty-five formal challenges and 
more than five thousand letters (three thousand in opposition, two thousand in favor).105 Las 
Provincias touted this as a resounding popular consensus.  
Nearly forty years later, however, the activists say that their campaign never represented 
popular opinion. Despite involvement by a steadily growing number of Valencians, activism 
against the development retained its essentially elitist character and continued to emanate 
primarily from the young progressives of Las Provincias. Evidence for this is found not only in 
the letters and other documents sent to the mayor himself by unhappy Valencians, but in the fact 
that many of their writers also sent copies to Maria Consuelo Reyna, where I found them in 2012. 
Whether she commissioned or suggested their composition is entirely uncertain, but it seems 
clear that she remained a central figure for the opposition to the development. From those 
documents, moreover, which list the profession of each claimant among other personal details, it 
is also clear that the overwhelming majority of activists were highly educated professionals 
working in law, medicine, or the social sciences. Doctors, lawyers, artists, civil engineers, artists, 
                                                
104 AEORMA, El Saler per al Poble, 3; “Sublime excursion: Visita de las autoridades al Saler,” Valencia-Fruits, 
June 23, 1974; S. Barber, “Guillermo Pons Ibañez: ‘El Ecosistema del Saler y la Dehesa, único en el mundo, habría 
que dejarlo como estaba,” Las Provincias, June 27, 1974; Manuel Girona, “El Saler a encuesta (2): Se debería tender 
a la recuperación al máximo y a la conservación de las mejores condiciones de un parque público absolutamente 
necesario,” Las Provincias, June 19, 1974; Trinidad Simó, “Mas claridad en la exposicion de la ultima remodelación 
del Saler,” Las Provincias, June 18, 1974; Ricardo Bellveser, “Los que visitan la exposición sobre El Saler: Casi 
total unanimidad, hay que salvarlo como sea,” Las Provincias, June 16, 1974; Ricardo Bellveser, “El Saler: Datos 
para una decision colectiva,” Las Provincias, June 29, 1974; Marisa Ortega, “Cronica de Valencia: El Saler, para el 
Pueblo,” El Mundo, July 27, 1974. 
105 “12 kilos de documentos, 35 impugnaciones, y unos 5000 escritos de todo tipo, balance provisional de la 
información pública sobre la Dehesa,” Las Provincias, July 27, 1974. 
 
 137 
and economists, among others, offered sophisticated legal and fiscal critiques of the city’s plans, 
urging the mayor to “rescue the park for the use of all citizens.”106 
Broader public opinion remains elusive, though most activists agree with Móstoles’ 
statement that “the great majority [of Valencians] wanted urbanization, tourism, hotels, 
development, and to be able to go to a proper beach, as was happening all over Spain.”107 
Tevasa’s plans, and even the city’s 1974 revisions, were clearly “excessive” in light of these 
popular desires, but it is unclear whether the general public shared the activists’ adamant 
opposition to the revisions in the summer of 1974, or if perhaps many people were more 
forgiving of the compromise attempt. As demonstrated by the increasingly radical slogans on 
flyers handed out in the street, however, by that time, the campaign had transformed from the 
relatively modest efforts at compromise first proposed by the neighborhood associations or the 
scientific conservationists, into something very different. To some extent, the El Saler campaign 
had ceased to be about El Saler at all, and instead was about a confrontation between two very 
different visions of Spain’s political future. Móstoles and Pérez Puche describe themselves as 
“leftists dressed in green” (vestidos de verde), primarily interested in opposition to the regime 
and using the Dehesa as a tapadera for their desire to stir up trouble for the city government.108 
Indeed, by the start of 1975, Las Provincias had almost completely abandoned the issue of the 
Dehesa and moved on to campaigns against a host of other social and political abuses. 
                                                
106 José Luis Massoni Muedra, José Velasquez Malboysson, and Maria Herta Esteve Werblow, letter/legal 
memorandum to Miguel Ramón Izquierdo (Mayor of Valencia), July 22, 1974, MCR; José Luis Lorente Tallada, 
Andrés Castrillo López, María García Lliberós Sánchez-Robles, and Esperanza Gómez Ferrer Soldova, letter to 
Miguél Ramón Izquierdo (Mayor of Valencia), July 5 1974, MCR; José Francisco Sánchez-Cutillas Martínez, letter 
to Miguél Ramón Izquierdo, Septemer 25 1973, MCR; José Francisco Sánchez-Cutillas Martínez, letter to Miguél 
Ramón Izquierdo, February 16 1974, MCR; José Francisco Sánchez-Cutillas Martínez, letter to Miguél Ramón 
Izquierdo, May 13 1974, MCR. 
107 Pérez Puche email, January 21 2012. 
108 Gonzalez Móstoles interview, Valencia, April 26 2012; Pérez Puche interview, Valencia, April 26 2012. 
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This nonetheless begs the question of why the Dehesa, in particular, first attracted young 
Valencians’ attention as a cause worth fighting for. The campaign to save the Dehesa offers a 
glimpse into the convoluted social and political world of late-Franco activism, and specifically 
into the close relationship between landscape and power. It represents, to some extent, a holistic 
vision in which social change passed through environmental imaginings. This contrasted sharply 
with the more compartmentalized perspective of the scientific conservationists who had driven 
earlier campaigns, such as that of Doñana, and to some extent of the environmental campaigns 
that would emerge after the transition to democracy.109 The integration of social and 
environmental concerns in local campaigns bore a close resemblance, however, to concurrent 
“green” movements elsewhere in the Western world. This suggests that the regime’s efforts to 
keep Spain “different” by suppressing political dissent and enforcing conservative social mores 
were overwhelmed by countervailing forces of modernity, specifically the “opening” of Spain to 
foreign visitors and ideas, the rise of activism in increasingly overdeveloped and underserviced 
urban areas, and the coming-of-age of a new generation of educated and relatively affluent 
young intellectuals of widespread development and ecological destruction. 
While the campaign to save the Dehesa thus bore strong resemblances to other 
environmental movements of the time, it was also shaped by the local specificity of Valencia’s 
place in Franco’s Spain. The association of the central state and its development projects with an 
erasure of local difference magnified the importance of local control over land, especially an 
iconic “Valencian” landscape such as the Dehesa. The Dehesa development, designed by 
Madrid-based corporations and architects and carried out by a city council lodged firmly in the 
                                                
109 One significant exception to this trend towards compartmentalization is the extremely popular Spanish 
antinuclear movement, which in Valencia coalesced around the Cofrentes nuclear energy facility, located about 
ninety kilometers from the city, which was completed amidst massive protests in 1984. 
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dictator’s pocket, embodied the regime’s appropriation of Valencia’s natural wealth for the 
benefit of an elitist, corrupt, imminently capitalist sociopolitical system. The crucial importance 
of recapturing Valencian lands for the Valencian people thus formed a central plank in the 
resurgence of regional identity in the final years of the dictatorship, and lent special significance 





Chapter Five. The Albufera Natural Park: Regionalism and 
Europeanization in the post-Franco era, 1975-1989 
 
On November 20, 1975, following a lengthy battle with Parkinson’s disease and even 
lengthier anticipation among his political opponents, Generalissimo Franco died in a Madrid 
hospital, thirty-nine years after rising to power as the Head of the Spanish state. His appointed 
heir, Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón, was crowned King and sworn in two days later, promising 
loyalty to Franco’s Fundamental Laws. Amidst tearful mourning on the right and celebration on 
the left, an atmosphere of apprehension and tension settled over the country. Could Francoism 
continue without Franco? Would the king follow in his predecessor’s authoritarian footsteps, or 
would Spain become a liberal democracy on a par with other Western European countries? 
Progressive Spaniards took to the streets in numbers unparalleled since the prewar era, calling 
for the immediate dismantling of the state apparatus and the creation of a democratic government, 
while conservatives within the administration, including the former Minister of Information and 
Tourism Manuel Fraga, had opposition leaders arrested and threatened to “smash demonstrators 
to a pulp.”1 
Over the next seven years, in a process rife with tensions and conflicts, a new, democratic 
Spain took shape, haunted by its Francoist legacy but predominantly characterized by a 
                                                
1 Pedro Costa Morata, quoted in P. Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain (London: Methuen, 1986): 87. 
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decentralization of legislative authority and the expansion of the country’s international 
connections. A series of dramatic reforms culminating in the passage of a national constitution in 
1978 created the “State of the Autonomies,” a political structure that recognized the right of 
“nationalities and regions” to self-government while maintaining “the indissoluble unity of the 
Spanish nation.”2 By 1983 legislative authority over an array of policy matters devolved to 
seventeen Autonomous Communities, including the “historic nations” (the Basque Country, 
Catalonia, and Galicia) and fourteen other areas, including Valencia, that asserted unique 
regional identities. National elections began in 1979, followed shortly thereafter by regional and 
local elections that brought many former activists to positions of power within the new 
governments. 
The enormous uncertainty and instability that followed Franco’s death contributed to an 
atmosphere in which pressing social and political issues, from women’s rights to labor 
organization, diverted the attention of many of those who had been active in environmental 
movements in the early 1970s. The idea of local control over land use remained central to many 
of the new issues, however, echoing not only in the campaigns for regional autonomy but also in 
a variety of other prominent debates with environmental connections. Antinuclear activism, for 
instance, garnered some of the widest participation of any single-issue protest across Spain, with 
passionate participation by regional activists opposed to the expansion of central control over 
energy and the endangerment of local environmental and human health. The concerns of the 
neighborhood associations, moreover, grew even more prominent as urban populations found a 
newly receptive government willing to listen to their demands: in Valencia, one of the most 
                                                
2 Spanish Constitution of 1978, Art. 2. 
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prominent such campaigns was an eight-year grassroots effort to turn the old riverbed of the 
Turia into a public park (1975-1983). 
The Turia campaign, in fact, gained far more attention from working and middle-class 
Valencians than the Dehesa ever had. The proposed park wound directly through the heart of the 
city, making it far more accessible and immediate to urban residents than the severely-damaged 
Dehesa, which was more than an hour’s walk away and hardly qualified as an urban park, despite 
being owned by the municipal government. With construction and privatization already halted 
there, the Dehesa’s fate could no longer be framed in political terms. Indeed, in the years 
immediately following the cessation of construction, interest in the Dehesa came principally 
from the same conservationists “of birds and trees” who had first raised their voices against the 
urbanization a full decade earlier. The Dehesa campaign had garnered attention from a number 
of notable international scientists, and in the summer of 1974, at the height of the protests, Las 
Provincias published an extended interview with Gerardo Budowski, director of the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature. Budowski expressed special concern for the Albufera’s 
degradation, which he described as “a problem of global importance” that would require the 
collaboration of “the greatest local and foreign talents.” As one of the most outstanding and 
important wetlands in the world, he advised, the lake’s preservation should “not be considered as 
an onerous burden, but rather as an interesting heritage that could be used to produce profits 
through conscientious touristic exploitation.”3 But in the years following Franco’s death, that 
advice would go unheeded.4 
                                                
3 “Rueda de prensa: El doctor Budowski habla de la Albufera y la Dehesa,” Las Provincias, June 27, 1974.  
4 Valencia’s Transition-era city councils contracted a series of engineering firms for minor jobs such as protecting 
the forest from the sea winds, but those efforts failed spectacularly due to Spanish forestry engineers’ almost total 
lack of training in non-productive, non-extractive methods of land management. 
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In April 1977, four years after Mayor Ramon Izquierdo permanently halted all 
construction and sales on the Dehesa and three years after the close of the press campaign to 
“save” the area, journalist Francisco Pérez Puche described the Dehesa disgustedly as “a lunar 
landscape – or, rather, a terrestrial landscape in agony after a thermonuclear explosion.”5 The 
boardwalk and aborted coastal installations were in shambles, with corroded metal railings 
emerging perilously from piles of blowing sand. The razed sand dunes had left the remaining 
vegetation exposed and vulnerable to sea breezes, and the once-lush vegetation had withered 
under the combined onslaught of salty winds and construction. Urban Valencians continued to 
visit this degraded landscape each weekend, driving their cars up under the pine trees, picnicking 
and strolling through the woods, and in the process eroding fragile soils, exposing tree roots, 
scattering litter across the landscape, and inadvertently setting a series of fires that burned 20% 
of the remaining forest. Compounding these problems, the expansion of the port of Valencia just 
to the north of the Dehesa blocked sand deposition from ocean currents, accelerating beach 
erosion. The forestry engineers of the Nature Conservation Institute (ICONA), while unable or 
unwilling to correct any of these issues, continued to invest in anachronisms such as a partridge 
farm and an Asian carp hatchery, which further disrupted the area’s ecosystem (Figure 18).6 
  
                                                
5 Francisco Pérez Puche, “Saler 1977: Los fantasmas del pasado,” Las Provincias, April 19, 1977. 
6 Valencia Atracción, “Panorama turistico valenciano,” November 197810; see also “La playa de El Saler retrocede 
un metro por año,” Hoja de Lunes, October 2, 1989; “El Saler, un poco más cerca,” Valencia Atracción, September 
19753; C.M., “La agonia de la Albufera,” Triunfo, August 25 1973, pp.18-23, 23; Paloma Mateache, interview with 
the author, Valencia, May 9 2011. The Dehesa’s degradation was later described in detail in the city’s Preliminary 
Studies for the Territorial Planning of the Dehesa of El Saler (Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Estudios Previos para la 
Ordenación del Monte de la Dehesa del Saler, April 1980. 
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Figure 18: Comparative views of the same section of the Dehesa in mid-1960s and in 19747 
 
The lake’s condition was no better than that of the Dehesa. Steadily increasing 
contamination from urban and industrial sources and the introduction of progressively more toxic 
pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers to the rice fields and other agricultural lands upstream 
overwhelmed the ecosystem over the course of the 1960s.8 The human population residing 
within the Albufera’s catchment area doubled between 1960 and 1970, while the number of 
industries rose by a factor of ten.9 Sanitation and infrastructure lagged far behind, with factories 
and towns draining their waste directly into the canals.10 Local industries included 
slaughterhouses, tanneries, and producers of plastics, chemicals, and paper, to name only some 
of those located closest to the lake, while waste from another 5000 factories and more than a 
million inhabitants reached the lake indirectly.11 
                                                
7 Photos from OTDA. 
8 Jose Manuel Benet Granell, “La Albufera de Valencia: Datos para una política de soluciones,” Revista de Obras 
Públicas (February-March 1983): 172-75; Jose Manuel Benet Granell, “El Proyecto de canal perimetral al sur de la 
Albufera,” Jornadas sobre la problemática de la Albufera (Ayuntamiento de Valencia, 1982). 
9 E. Vicente and Maria Miracle, “The Coastal Lagoon Albufera de Valencia: An Ecosystem under Stress,” Limnetica 
8 (1992): 89. 
10 José Manuel Taléns Mollá, “Descontaminación del Parque Natural de L’Albufera,” 2000, unpublished, in 
possession of author. 
11 Generalitat Valenciana, Estudio sobre la Contaminacion el el Lago de la Albufera, December 1980, FDMA; 





Blue-green algae thrived in the high concentrations of phosphates and nitrogen flooding 
into the Albufera, turning the water an opaque brownish-green and starving rooted vegetation of 
light and oxygen. Dead algae and eroded soils settled thickly on the floor of the lake, leading 
engineers in the early 1970s to estimate that the lake would fill completely within fifteen years. 
Without rooted vegetation to provide food and habitat, populations of native species declined 
precipitously and many of the smaller and more sensitive species of fish, crustaceans, and 
plankton vanished completely. Hardy species like Asian carp, mullet, and of course the 
ubiquitous algae thrived in this altered environment, steadily overwhelming the populations of 
native species.12 
As the successes of SEO and Adena during the Franco regime make clear, concern for 
environmental health was not always a political issue in Spain. Over the course of the 1970s, 
however, campaigns such as that of the Dehesa and manifestos penned by intellectuals such as 
Josep-Vicent Marques built a strong case for the conflation of an interest in “nature protection” 
with a progressive agenda based on a rejection of high capitalist society, including its offshoots: 
industrial pollution, unplanned urbanization, and nuclear energy. The personal experiences of 
many of the newly-elected local officials whose entrée into the political world had come through 
the neighborhood associations or other groups that had long linked social justice with 
environmental health reinforced this understanding of left-wing politics as essentially related to 
environmental protection. Like newly-elected municipal governments around the country, the 
center-left coalition government elected to Valencia’s city hall in 1979 included several former 
citizen-activists including leaders of workers’ rights groups, neighborhood associations, and 
                                                
12 Vicente and Miracle, “The Coastal Lagoon,” 87 and 95; Núñez de Murga, “La Albufera, inundada;” Soria, J.M., 
M.R.Miracle, and E. Vicente, “Aporte de Nutrientes y Eutrofización de la Albufera de Valencia,” Limnetica 3 




participants in “Aeorma” campaigns. Though forced to compromise with moderates and 
conservatives, these politicians and administrators were quick to implement many of the changes 
for which they had worked over the past decade, rapidly improving living conditions for 
thousands of urban residents and working people.13 
Among the many social and legal changes implemented by the new government was a 
renewed focus on the environment. Almost immediately after taking office, the new Valencian 
city council ordered Vicente Gonzáles Móstoles, the architect who had coordinated much of the 
earlier protest, to coordinate a series of ecological and sociological studies with the objective of 
analyzing the damage caused by the aborted development and assessing possible remedies. For 
the ecological aspects of the report, Móstoles subcontracted to biologist Guillermo de Felipe, a 
radical progressive activist who had done occasional odd scientific jobs for the city in the past, 
and Felipe in turn recruited like-minded scientists from the local universities, notably biologist 
Victor Navarro, to assist him.14 Felipe’s team spent the next six years producing a series of 
exhaustive scientific analyses of the Dehesa and the Albufera, an experience that would drive 
several members to form a nature-centered environmental group they called Agró (Valencian for 
“Heron,” after one of the lake’s most prominent denizens) as a means of expressing their 
conservationist politics in a personal as well as in an official capacity. 
 Felipe’s central conclusion, consistent with other expert opinions solicited by the city, 
was that the Dehesa, the Albufera, and the rice fields surrounding the lake formed a single 
                                                
13 Many authors and observers have described this as the “decapitation” of Spanish civil society by the Socialist 
party, mollifying the masses and taking protest leaders off the streets without undertaking any of the more radical 
propositions voiced by the former opposition. García, “Urban Communities,” 69; Pedro Costa Morata, Hacia la 
destrucción ecológica de España (Grijalbo, 1985), 179; Marqués, Ecologia y Lucha de Clases, 155; Francisco Pérez 
Puche, email to the author, February 7, 2012. 
14 Guillermo de Felipe, interview with the author, Valencia, April 30 2012. 
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incorporated ecosystem, each part essential to the survival of the rest.15 Despite substantial 
degradation, the area retained significant ecological and cultural value both as a bird habitat and 
as the site of “important traditional uses” such as farming, fishing, and recreation, but ongoing 
human actions continued to threaten these values.16 Hunters in the rice fields killed thousands of 
birds each season, disregarding the many laws that protected endangered species. Agricultural 
chemicals spread by farmers poured down the canals into the lake, along with urban and 
industrial pollution from farther upstream. Most recently, in response to new market pressures, 
landowners had begun to drain or abandon their rice fields, selling their land to developers and 
speculators or shifting to new, more profitable crops.17 To save the ecological and cultural value 
of one piece of the “Dehesa-Albufera ecosystem,” the scientists concluded, the Dehesa, the 
Albufera, and the rice fields all needed legal protections that would sharply curtail these 
abuses.18 
 The city accepted these scientific recommendations and tasked Felipe, whom it hired in 
late 1980 as the “Biologist Conservator of the Dehesa-Albufera,” with carrying out the necessary 
changes. Felipe set to work in the newly-formed Technical Office of the Dehesa-Albufera 
(OTDA), housed in an old ranger station in the forest. In order to protect the landscape, the 
scientists’ first step was to bar humans from entering the area at all (Figure 19). New rules 
                                                
15 A concurrent study by an independent expert, commissioned by the lame-duck Provincial government just prior to 
its dissolution and replacement with the Autonomous Community, echoed these conclusions. Ignacio Docavo 
Alberti, La Albufera de Valencia: Sus Peces y sus Aves, (Valencia: Diputación Provincial de Valencia, 1979), 8. 
16 Consell de la Generalitat Valenciana. “Decreto 89/1986 de régimen jurídico del Parque Natural de la Albufera,” 
Diari Oficial 408 (July 23, 1986): 3091. 
17 Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Estudios Previos Dehesa; Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Estudios Previos para la 
Ordenación del Lago de la Albufera de Valencia (1984), 165, MCR; SEO-Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Informe sobre 
la situación actual de la Albufera de Valencia (April 1984), FDMA. 
18 Guillermo de Felipe, interview with author, Valencia, June 7, 2011; Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Estudios Previos 
Lago; Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Estudios Previos Dehesa; “Aprobado por el Pleno: Hubo unanimidad, a pesar del 
debate,” Las Provincias, June 5, 1980; Ferrer Alpera, “Posible consulta popular sobre el futuro de El Saler,” Levante, 
May 20, 1980; Asociaciones de Vecinos, “Consideraciones sobre el plan del Monte de la Dehesa,” Noticias, March 
8, 1983; Pedro Muelas, “El Supremo confirma el cese de licencias en la Devesa,” Levante, October 16, 1985. 
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prohibited driving or parking off-road, lighting fires, motocross racing, pulling up plants, 
littering, and making excessive noise that could disturb nesting birds.19 In addition to uprooting 
eucalyptus saplings and removing abandoned construction materials, Felipe and his coworkers 
placed chains across many of the internal roads left by the development, tore up parking lots and 
streets, and planted bramble thickets to keep people from wandering into sensitive areas.20 They 
closed the lakeshore, parts of the northern forest and dunes, and most of the southern half of the 
Dehesa to the public so as to “make possible the natural regeneration of the different 
ecosystems.”21 
Figure 19: Land use on the Dehesa, 1980.22 
Public areas are outlined in red. 
 
                                                
19 Jesús Sanz, “El pulmón de la ciudad, a pleno rendimiento,” Diario de Valencia, May 25, 1981. 
20 OTDA, La Gestión de L’Albufera de Valencia y su Devesa (Valencia: Ayuntamiento de Valencia, November 
2000), 25, OTDA; Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Plan Especial de Reforma Interior y de Proteccion del Monte de la 
Dehesa del Saler, 1983, SP. 
21 Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Pleno Extra Nov 28, 1980, AHMV; Felipe interview, Valencia, June 7 2011; OTDA, 
La Gestión de L’Albufera, 7; Jesús Sanz, “De la destrucción al disfrute popular,” Diario de Valencia, May 23, 1981. 
22 Map (modified) from SP. 
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The progressive agenda had clearly shifted over the course of the 1970s. Just a decade 
earlier the Las Provincias campaign had focused on the city’s efforts to block the public from 
accessing the Dehesa, but now local papers reported approvingly on the OTDA’s actions as a 
campaign to “transform this no-man’s land into everyone’s land.”23 The sense of ecosystem 
preservation as a boon to the community arose in no small part from public education efforts, 
spearheaded by Felipe and fellow Agró member Antonio Vizcaino, both working out of the 
OTDA. Starting in 1982 under the motto “This is Life!” the OTDA produced videos, guided 
tours, hosted school field trips, installed a permanent Information Center in the hamlet of El 
Saler, and printed informative pamphlets and posters inviting visitors to “get to know the 
Dehesa.”24 These materials emphasized the history of human use and abuse of the Dehesa, 
especially its near-destruction in the 1970s, and presented responsible, scientific conservation as 
its only means of salvation. They also made it clear that the conservation of this unique 
ecosystem was a point of specifically Valencian pride. The “Rules of Use,” for instance, 
explained that restrictions on public access would ensure that “both the Valencians of today and 
those of future generations” could enjoy “a space that was collective, natural, and singularly 
unique.”25 
The narrative of conservation as a means of protecting Valencian patrimony meshed 
seamlessly with the new government’s demonization of Franco-era politics. Francoist city 
                                                
23 Sanz, “El pulmón de la ciudad.” In their thoughtful analysis of New York’s Central Park, Roy Rosenzweig and 
Elizabeth Blackmar urge us to consider the “cultural dimension of a park as a public space,” that is, the way in 
which people use the space, as well as the political and legal dimensions of ownership. While the Dehesa legally 
belonged to the public (the city), the reduced access permitted by OTDA rules severely curtailed its effectiveness as 
a free, nonexclusive space. The fact that OTDA scientists, in their environmental education campaigns, described 
the creation of a human-free wilderness as a “public good” that preserved the Dehesa for future generations adds an 
additional layer to this apparent contradiction. Roy Rosenzweig and Elizabeth Blackmar, The Park and the People: 
A History of Central Park (Cornell University Press, 1992): 6. 
24 Felipe interview, Valencia, June 7 2011; Felipe interview, Valencia, April 30 2012; OTDA, “¡¡Esto es Vida!!” 
1982, SP. 
25 OTDA, “Normes d’Ús,” February 1982, SP. 
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officials, they noted, had sought to destroy the Dehesa just as the regime’s repressive nationalism 
had sought to destroy Valencian identity. Now that democracy had been restored, the Socialists 
promised to restore the landscape to its former glory in the name of “Valencian lands for the 
Valencian people.” Statements and publications from the city downplayed or erased the pivotal 
role played by Miguel Ramón Izquierdo, the last Francoist mayor, in saving the Dehesa from 
development, and promulgated a revised narrative in which the notion of conservation had 
originated entirely with grassroots activists and the democratic government. This selective 
revision of recent history, in which the OTDA and Agró were complicit, carefully repurposed 
anti-Franco slogans such as “the Dehesa is ours and we want it green” or “El Saler for the 
people,” transforming them from populist demands for accessible public parks to calls for 
environmental preservation. In the process, the official narrative reflected a sense that regional 
identity in the post-Franco era was intrinsically tied to the Socialist agenda of protecting unique 
and ecologically important local landscapes. 
This notion lay at the heart of a neo-Valencian agenda espoused by a growing population 
of educated urban elites. Valencia in the early 1980s was no longer the land of yeoman farmers 
depicted by Sorolla, Blasco Ibañez, and a half-century of hydraulic engineers. By the end of the 
dictatorship, less than 20% of the Valencian population still worked in agriculture, and that 
number would drop to around 13% over the next decade.26 While many urbanites still saw 
agrarian life through the rose-tinted glasses of nostalgia, the population was increasingly 
distanced from the sort of experiential ties to the land held by those responsible for bringing 
crops to the city’s overflowing markets. Instead, urban Valencians sought to forge a new identity 
that fit their altered circumstances. 
                                                
26 Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas, Censos de Población. 
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When Navarro, Felipe, and other scientists founded Agró in 1981, they explicitly 
embraced Valencian nationalism as a guiding principle in their defense of local habitats. This 
decision matched trends elsewhere in Spain, especially in the “historic nationalities” of the 
Basque Country, Galicia, and Catalonia.27 For these self-described “eco-nationalists,” 
conservation was a fundamental component of regional nation building.28 In practice, this meant 
that “the integrity of Valencian lands” was more important than larger national or global 
environmental issues, and Agró members only rarely participated in cooperative campaigns or 
conferences with popular, Madrid-based, national environmental groups such as Adena or 
Environmentalists in Action (Ecologistas en Acción), despite obvious overlaps of their missions 
and ideologies. Like other Valencian progressive organizations of the era, Agró used the 
Valencian language in its newsletters, press releases, and publicity materials, creating a sense of 
insularity for members and sympathizers while impeding outside participation or interference. 
This adamant Valencian nationalist identity bolstered members’ claims to represent the interests 
of the “Valencian people,” and served as a strong rhetorical point in their negotiations with the 
press and politicians in the years to come. 
Agró’s wholehearted embrace of Joan Fuster’s pan-Catalan ideology, combined with 
Marqués’ emphasis on local landscapes and environments as the heart of Valencian identity, 
highlights the essentially urban nature of neo-Valencianism vis-à-vis older, land-based notions of 
regional belonging. Before Fuster, notions of Valencian identity tended to focus on historical ties 
to the land and connections to specific places forged through the labor of generations. Farmers 
whose ancestors had physically created the landscapes around the city, filling in the Albufera to 
                                                
27 E.g. Santiago Vilanova and Iñaki Bárcena, both quoted in Fernández, El Ecologismo Español, 72. This 
regionalism would later impede efforts to form a Spanish Green Party, as extreme political fragmentation and the 
anarchist tendencies of a significant faction within the movement translated into poor results at the polls. 
28 Acció Ecologista-Agró, “El Ecologismo que Queremos,” June 1993, FDMA. 
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build rice paddies or digging canals to irrigate new groves, possessed a unique sense of 
ownership of those landscapes and were, as we have seen, idealized in art, literature, and politics 
as the quintessential hard-working, independent Valencians. 
This innate connection to the land was not, however, accessible to those who lived 
outside of the rural sphere, which by the 1970s constituted the overwhelming majority of the 
population. The neo-Valencian emphasis on language and aesthetic/scientific landscapes 
facilitated the assumption of Valencian authenticity by those whose lives were not connected to 
the land in the personal, generational ways of the agricultural population. By studying the 
language and asserting a progressive, modernist Valencian identity as a contrast to that of the 
conservative Castilian core, even those without deep roots in the land could lay claim to it. Most 
Agró members, for example, were not originally from Valencia: some had immigrated to the city 
in their youth from as far away as Ceuta or the Basque country, and others had spent significant 
time away from the area for studies or work. None had ever worked as farmers, nor did they 
come from farming families in the area. They were highly educated, predominantly with degrees 
in science and law; they generally spoke at least some English or French; and almost all had 
travelled internationally. By their own admission, most “never really learned to speak Valencian” 
or spoke it “very badly” despite using it exclusively in organizational communiqués and 
propaganda, picking it up in adult life through classes or conversations.29 Navarro, one of the few 
members who was born in Valencia, nonetheless spoke primarily Castilian in his youth and 
equates his interest in Valencian with his interest in the preservation of endangered species: he 
wanted to revive it because it was “in danger of extinction.”30 How well one spoke Valencian 
                                                
29 Victor Navarro, interview with the author, Valencia, May 2 2012; Guillermo de Felipe, inerview with the author, 
Valencia, April 30 2012; Ignacio Lacomba, interview with the author, Valencia, April 26 2012. 
30 Navarro interview, Valencia, May 2, 2012. 
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mattered less, for the purpose of claiming a Valencian identity, than the political act of speaking 
it at all. 
While neo-Valencian identity formed in part around a celebration of local language and 
culture, it was also defined by its cultural and political distance from Castile. Fuster’s pan-
Catalan concept brought Valencians some obvious compatriots in the other “Catalan-speaking 
lands,” notably Barcelona, but beyond that local network Valencians looked north to Europe for 
their political and cultural alliances. “Europeanization,” in the sense of making local culture 
more consistent with the norms of the flourishing Western democracies, was a central objective 
not only for Valencia’s new government but also for Spain as a whole. While the national 
government negotiated the country’s accession to the European Community, the regions sought 
to forge their own ties to Europe. Whereas the national process of Europeanization would 
primarily be achieved through a top-down process of policy change, then, the regions focused on 
the horizontal transfer of ideas between member states, and especially from the politically and 
economically powerful states of north and central Europe outward to the peripheries.31 
One of the most important of these ideas was that of environmental conservation, which 
in many ways echoed the “greening” of European policy both transnationally and in the form of 
national green movements in France, Germany, and England. UNESCO inaugurated its “Man 
and the Biosphere” program in 1970, and France created the world’s first Ministry of the 
Environment in 1971, signaling an increased profile for environmental issues but accomplishing 
little concrete change. In the watershed year of 1972, which saw the publication of The Limits to 
                                                
31 E. Bomberg and J. Peterson, “Policy transfer and “Europeanization: Passing the Heineken test?” Queens Papers 
on Europeanization 2 (University of Belfast 2000); Andrew Jordan and Duncan Liefferink, “The Europeanization of 
national environmental policy,” in Environmental Policy in Europe: The Europeanization of National 
Environmental Policy, ed. Andrew Jordan and Duncan Liefferink (London: Routledge, 2004): 6; A. Héritier, D. 




Growth by a concerned group of international businessmen and scientists as well as the 
formation of the United Nations Environment Program through the UN Conference on the 
Human Environment in Stockholm, independent national environmental movements around 
Europe first became aware of each other and began to work in concert for large-scale changes.32 
By the time Spain joined the European Community in 1986, European cooperation and identity 
were closely tied to new environmental policies, if not practices. 
Conservation of ecologically valuable regional spaces, then, offered Valencian politicians 
a way to prove their “Europeanness” to an international audience, as well as to instill 
cosmopolitan values in their constituency. Agró scientists seized on the opportunities this image-
making provided them to achieve their own conservation goals, and along with their 
longstanding aversion to Spanish nationalism contributed to a sense of themselves as “more 
European than Spanish.” While still eschewing entanglements with Madrid-based groups, they 
formed loose alliances with organizations in other peripheral regions and with international 
groups, helping to bypass national authority and appeal directly to Brussels.33 Their education 
and personal experiences gave them many of the tools and connections necessary to navigate 
legal and bureaucratic complexities, which they used adroitly to press their legislative and 
cultural agenda in local and regional government.  
One of the first tests of these skills came in 1984, when Felipe submitted a proposal to the 
city council asking for the designation of 21,120 hectares (52,200 acres) of land and water 
composing the “Dehesa-Albufera ecosystem” as a Valencian natural park to protect its scientific, 
                                                
32 B. Varillas and H. Da Cruz, Para una historia del movimiento ecologista (Madrid: Miraguano Ediciones, 1981), 8. 
33 Navarro interview, May 2, 2012. 
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pedagogic, and cultural value.34 While providing many of the legal protections of the better-
known “national parks,” under Spanish law the designation and management of a natural park 
fell under regional jurisdiction. By designating a natural park rather than a national park, the land 
would stay under the authority of the Valencian Autonomous Community’s regional government, 
the Generalitat, rather than that of Madrid. Felipe’s OTDA, meanwhile, would continue to 
collaborate with the Generalitat’s new park administration on projects in the city-owned Dehesa 
and lake.  
In addition to this jurisdictional advantage, the law on natural parks was also designed to 
protect substantially modified landscapes and certain “traditional” human activities within the 
area considered essential to its scenic, ecological, and cultural value.35 Since the first national 
parks were declared in the United States in the late nineteenth century, the parks concept had 
been applied around the world to pristine or wild regions, often to showcase unique or especially 
beautiful geological or biological features. Even when the land had in fact been occupied, 
abandoned, and modified by human activities many times throughout their histories, as is the 
case across Europe, park narratives presented them as timeless and museum-like, untouched and 
thus undegraded by the hand of man. Compounding this aesthetic preference, Franco’s regime 
had been reluctant to set land aside for nature protection if it might serve economically 
productive purposes. Consequently, the parks he declared were all located in uncultivated areas 
like Doñana or the Canary Islands. 
As environmental historians and analysts have frequently pointed out, the dichotomy 
between pristine and degraded environments left little place for positive human-nature 
                                                
34 Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Plan Especial de Reforma Interior; OTDA, La Gestión de L’Albufera, 10; SEO-
Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Informe sobre la situación actual de la Albufera de Valencia, April 1984, FDMA. 
35 Jefatura del Estado. “Ley 15/1975, de 2 de mayo, de espacios naturales protegidos,” Boletín Oficial del Estado 
107 (May 5 1975): 9419. 
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interactions. In the postwar era, this understanding began to change in tandem with new 
understandings of the role of the environment in human quality of life. “Nature Parks” that 
combined preservation, recreation, and traditional economic activities came to play a significant 
role in German environmental management, while French activists emphasized the need to 
preserve “a countryside in which rural people practice agriculture.”36 The Spanish law on 
protected spaces, passed a few months before Franco’s death, similarly incorporated the concept 
of a “natural park” for the protection of coproduced rural landscapes, legally recognizing their 
ecological and cultural value.37 
To that end, Felipe and other advocates of the Albufera’s protection argued that it was the 
ecosystem’s coexistence with human activities that gave the rice fields their special value and 
justified their protection. The park proposal described the need to maintain “the presence in the 
area of important traditional uses and exploitation which, in interaction with the natural 
ecosystem, have determined the current characteristic environmental conditions.” The park’s 
fundamental goal was to make “the orderly use of the space” for traditional and recreational 
activities, which were, according to the scientists, entirely compatible with “the maintenance of 
ecological values.”38  
While internal Valencian politics and the passion of local scientists and advocates 
brought Felipe’s proposal to the table, the Generalitat’s approval and subsequent declaration of 
the Albufera Natural Park in 1986 was a product of the interplay between regional, national, and 
international politics. The same year, after a decade of negotiation, Spain finally gained entry to 
the European Community (EC) and the national government set to work enacting the European 
                                                
36 Bernard Charbonneau, Sauver nos régions, 175, quoted in Bess, The Light-Green Society, 134; Dominick, The 
Environmental Movement in Germany, 131. 
37 Ley de Espacios Naturales Protegidos. 
38 Decreto de régimen jurídico, 3091. 
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acquis, bringing the legal code into line with member state requirements on issues ranging from 
human rights to economics. Among these was an extensive slate of new environmental 
regulations, imposing strict standards on everything from industrial pollution, to urban 
development, to species protection. 
European environmental policy as it was applied in the Mediterranean countries (and, 
later, in the new states of the Eastern expansion) in some ways mirrored the north-south divide of 
global environmental governance. On a global scale, transnational environmental policies have 
almost always been drafted by leaders in industrial countries based on their own experiences and 
understanding of global needs. Forced to accept such policies as part of the terms of their 
accession to governing bodies, less-developed states then assume the burden of implementing 
environmental restrictions that not only fail to address local problems and impose significant 
checks on economic development, but which place a disproportionate burden for global 
conservation squarely on those regions with lowest rates of industrial development. Though the 
economic and cultural divides within the EC’s member states are significantly narrower than 
those of the world as a whole, the same dynamic is at work in European environmental politics. 
Having destroyed much of their own biodiversity in previous centuries and decades, the original 
member states responsible for drafting European environmental policy, primarily Germany, 
insisted on strict protections for the remaining habitats and species on the continent, a 
disproportionate number of which lay within the relatively rural areas of southern Europe. 
Unsurprisingly, the convergence in continental environmental policy came into stark conflict 
with national traditions, physical realities, and local identities. 
Eager to at last gain access to the EC’s development funds and new markets, Spanish 
delegates declined to negotiate the terms by which they accepted these regulations, though it was 
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immediately obvious that there would be serious problems with their implementation. Spaniards 
not only lacked the training, technology, and funding to fully enforce the European code, but the 
social will as well. In the words of Paloma Mateache, a biologist who has spent more than thirty 
years working on environmental management for the Valencian Community, “all the ideas 
arrived from Europe, not from internal convictions.”39 Full implementation of the new laws 
would require a complete bureaucratic overhaul, massive infrastructural developments, and a sea 
change in the public’s understandings of research use and personal responsibility.40 None of 
these were likely to happen in time to meet the EC’s deadlines. 
The decentralized nature of the Spanish government further complicated implementation. 
While the 1978 constitution reserved authority for international agreements and “organic” laws 
to the national government, each of the seventeen Autonomous Communities had responsibility 
for designing, approving, and implementing its own independent plan for execution of these 
broad mandates. Faced with a dazzling array of new mandates, a lack of technical expertise, a 
lack of political pressure, and chronic underfunding, the ACs logically started with the low-
hanging fruit. Pollution reduction and infrastructure creation would be costly, time-consuming, 
and socially disruptive, but the protection of isolated areas as parks and wildlife preserves 
offered a relatively inexpensive and uncontentious way for regions to demonstrate their 
ideological alliance with the European core. Even as they routinely failed to enforce major 
European regulations on emissions and sanitation, regional governments created hundreds of 
new protected habitats throughout the 1980s.41 
                                                
39 Mateache interview, Valencia, May 9, 2011. 
40 Millán 267, 272-80. 
41 Between 1983 and 1995 Spanish governments declared more than 450 protected spaces. Fernández, El 
Ecologismo Español, 166; Millán, 278-81. 
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The Albufera Natural Park, Valencia’s first protected natural space, came into being 
during this legislative rush to meet European standards. The area’s particular physical 
characteristics, namely its ability to house immense populations of wild birds, made it a high-
profile target for such efforts. Bird protection has a long European tradition, dating back to the 
late nineteenth century in northern countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom. Because 
birds migrate across political boundaries, transnational cooperation has always been essential for 
their protection, and in the early part of the century northern Europeans frequently lamented the 
indiscriminate slaughter of migratory birds by less-sensitized Italians and Spaniards. As a result, 
one of the European Community’s first environmental laws had been the 1979 European Council 
Directive on the Conservation of Wild Birds, which redefined migratory birds as the patrimony 
of all Europeans, outlined basic prohibitions against egg-gathering and indiscriminate hunting, 
and created a list of valuable bird habitats in member states where special protection measures 
would be required.42 Inclusion in the list became a mark of prestige for local governments eager 
to prove their green credentials.  
For decades, as a side effect of its relatively low rate of industrialization as well as the 
happy coincidence of its geographic location and its generally mild climate, Spain has had the 
most diverse bird population in Western Europe. Iberian lakes and marshes not only provide 
year-round habitat for hundreds of native species, but also serve as stopovers and wintering 
grounds for birds migrating between Europe and Africa. As one of the few wetlands to survive 
Franco-era land transformations and hydraulic construction, and despite its severe degradation, 
the Albufera was the third-largest bird habitat in the country in the 1980s. In cooperation with 
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the city, SEO members ringed birds, conducted censuses, carried out studies on the impacts of 
local hunting, and participated in international scientific campaigns with the objective of 
ensuring that “the Albufera be recognized once again in all national and international scientific 
circles as one of the most important wetlands in Spain, and fundamental for migratory species.” 
Among other findings, the scientists learned that the area was home to over two hundred and 
fifty species of birds, of which eighty were listed as endangered, making it one of the preeminent 
bird habitats in Western Europe. These birds included huge permanent populations of grey 
herons, little egrets, and various ducks and seasonal visitors including flamingos, black-tailed 
godwits, and hundreds of African migrants. Volunteers and recreational birdwatchers frequently 
spotted locally and internationally endangered species, including marbled teal, ferruginous or 
fudge duck, Eurasian coot and purple swamp hen. Moreover, while the city’s turn-of-the-century 
efforts to protect the area had focused on the lake and Dehesa, SEO researchers discovered that 
the “artificial wetlands” of the rice fields were just as, if not more, important to the overall 
ecosystem, providing birds with 90% of their food and serving as a “green filter” that absorbed 
large amounts of nitrogen and phosphates from the water.43  
This knowledge was local conservationists’ most potent weapon in the effort to protect 
the area. One SEO scientist described how hunters “kill the birds that are born in Europe and 
come to die in the Albufera,” and emphasized that “this is not Valencia’s personal property. If 
there are 60,000 ducks in the winter, not all of them belong to us, not even the majority.”44 In its 
official report, SEO insisted on the importance of committing Valencia to “recover [the 
                                                
43 Pedro Muelas, “Empieza el Control de Aves en la Albufera,” Levante Magazín, November 3, 1985, 4; Ignacio 
Lacomba, Informe sobre la importancia del arrozal en la conservación de la integridad ecológica del Parque 
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Albufera] for European natural patrimony.”45 Such arguments reflected the fundamental 
justifications of the Wild Birds Directive, and asserted bird conservation as an obvious way to 
raise Valencia’s international profile. Still more appealing to local politicians, Felipe pointed out 
that the park could be a source of future funding from the EC, emphasizing that because of the 
overriding importance of bird habitat in European law, European financial and ideological 
support for the park would “depend on the amount of the wetland that we are able to preserve,” 
that is, the area of rice fields that could be included within the park boundaries.46 
The icing on the cake for local politicians was the assurance that while park declaration 
offered significant benefits for the region it would not necessarily require significant outlays of 
money or resources from the government. Neither the Birds Directive nor the Ramsar 
Convention on wetlands of international importance, another designation pursued by 
conservationists for the Albufera, imposed any new duties on signatories beyond vague 
requirements that member states “conserve and protect” the habitats and species within their 
borders – a general proscription that lacked specificity or enforceability.47 Instead, they simply 
highlighted areas of exceptional biodiversity and provided international recognition of their 
value to the global environment. 
To a significant extent, this international context explains the Generalitat’s unexpectedly 
positive reception to Felipe’s park proposal. By the time the proposal came up for debate at the 
Generalitat, Valencian authorities themselves had begun to describe the Albufera as an integral 
“European” wetland in official documents; as “a basic piece of the Western European wetlands 
                                                
45 SEO-Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Informe sobre la situación actual. 
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system”; and as one of the most important such spaces in the country or the continent.48 “We are 
dealing with one of the most important wetlands in Europe, the protection of which has been 
demanded by many international organizations,” argued Rafael Blasco, the Valencian Minister 
for Public Works, at one legislative hearing.49 This compelling case swiftly overwhelmed the 
angry outcry from local landowners, who objected in the strongest terms to the inclusion of rice 
fields and other private property in the protected area, and Felipe’s plans passed with no major 
revisions. Announcing the declaration to the public, Blasco continued to emphasize the 
international importance of the Generalitat’s actions, describing the Dehesa-Albufera ecosystem 
as “the most important in the Valencian Community, and one of the most important in Spain and 
in Europe.”50 Months after the park’s declaration, the Valencian tourism trade magazine echoed 
such sentiments, describing the Albufera as “not merely local heritage, but rather universal, a 
European ornithological wealth that comes principally from remote places in distant latitudes, 
and which we must harbor and preserve.”51 When the park was listed under the Ramsar 
Convention in 1988 and then the Birds Directive in 1989, these achievements immediately 
appeared on promotional materials for the city and community of Valencia as evidence of the 
area’s “green” credentials and connections to the European community.52 
While some within the government, and of course the conservationists themselves, 
genuinely hoped to restore and protect the ecosystem, even those with little interest in enforcing 
the new park regulations understood its declaration as a savvy political move. The Albufera Park 
                                                
48 See e.g., Conselleria de Obras Públicas y Transportes, Programa de Actuaciones para la protección y 
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put Valencia on the map in terms of European-style conservationism; it looked good to the 
growing number of urban voters interested in green politics; and it offered the potential for future 
funding from EC sources designed to encourage restoration and protection of valuable habitats. 
In a more metaphysical sense, however, the declaration of the Albufera Natural Park was part of 
a transnational trend towards constituting regional identity in an era of Europeanization. In 
peripheral regions around Spain over the late 1980s and early 1990s, regional identity took shape 
in an obvious backlash to Franco-era centrality but took the form of a cosmopolitan, Europe-
centered outlook focused on introducing cultural and social mores commonly found in other 
major urban cities across the continent. This reshaping of regional identity was not uniform, but 
rather embodied a specifically urban idea of what it meant to be Valencian at the end of the 
twentieth century. As such, many rural people experienced European ideas and policies as 
foreign, inorganic values that imposed severe social and economic burdens and ran counter to 
their own notions of regional authenticity, even as they embraced certain aspects of globalized 
trade and information networks. The grassroots movement that arose in opposition to the 





Chapter Six. A View from the Rice Fields: Conservation with 
Common Sense 
 
 On a warm spring evening in 2012, the air in Sueca is filled with the scent of orange 
blossoms and the sound of many of the town’s 30,000 inhabitants strolling through the main 
plaza and gathering on terraces outside the bars. We are running late for a meeting, but José 
Segarra, director of the Albufera Natural Park since 1999, insists on giving me the complete tour 
of his hometown, pointing out the ornate facades of mansions sandwiched between 1970s-era 
apartment buildings; the massive church (one of two) that rivals Valencia’s cathedral in size; the 
18th-century city hall filled with wooden carvings and paintings of rice farmers in the Albufera. 
All are remnants of the town’s heyday, when the Albufera’s rice fields made its most prominent 
citizens rich. Today, while members of the older generations are eager to share their memories of 
work in the rice fields, young Suecans leave each morning for jobs in the city as bankers, 
construction workers, and attorneys. Still, Sueca is filled with reminders of the lake and the rice. 
As Segarra explains, “the town, the rice, and the Albufera are inextricable.”1 
José Luís Mateses, the septuagenarian former president of the Sueca Irrigators’ 
Community, meets us outside a social club on the main square. Within moments of our 
introduction he is telling me of his many visits to Latin America: Venezuela, Colombia, Costa 
                                                
1 José Segarra, interview with the author, Sueca, April 25 2012. 
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Rica, Cuba. Every winter, after the rice harvest is in and the fields are flooded to create winter 
habitat for the park’s protected birds, he takes a trip for a month or two to explore foreign 
national parks. His favorite voyage, he says with an excited smile, was to see the Orinoco River. 
When I ask him why he chooses ecotourism for his vacations, he shrugs. “I’m a rural man,” he 
says. “Cities get me down.”2 
The last in a long line of Valencian rice farmers, Mateses has been farming his family’s 
land since he was ten. He and his brother have purchased the lands of friends and neighbors as 
they retired without heirs over the past few decades, and together the two currently work more 
than 60 hectares (148 acres) of rice paddies. None of his three adult daughters are interested in 
carrying on the family tradition, nor are their husbands, but Mateses insists, “I don’t care if my 
daughters don’t want to cultivate the land. What I want is that it is conserved for them, so that 
they can go to the fields and hear the frogs and see the birds. But I want it to be conserved with 
common sense.”3 
In the 1980s, Mateses joined with more than eight thousand other rice farmers to oppose 
the declaration of the Albufera Natural Park, a legal designation that embodied what they 
understood as the antithesis of “common sense” conservation. The centrality of bird conservation 
to the Albufera’s ecological value necessitated the inclusion of private rice fields in the park’s 
declaration, which placed significant restrictions on local landowners’ ability to adapt to 
changing economic circumstances. For almost a decade, Mateses and his neighbors would 
angrily protest these changes in a series of demonstrations, legal claims, and civil disobedience 
intended to undermine environmental protections and to reassert traditional Valencian identity in 
the face of Europeanization. But this opposition cannot easily be dismissed as a manifestation of 
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their lack of interest in the natural environment. Instead, it was in large part an expression of the 
farmers’ frustration with being made to bear the burden of changing regional and international 
priorities as Spain continued the process of bringing its institutions and legislation into line with 
those of other western democracies. The rapid opening of national markets, decline of 
protectionist agricultural policies, and application of conservationist restrictions on land use 
converged on rural people, creating contradictory pressures to increase production while 
reducing their impact on the environment. The imposition of a natural park for the benefit of 
scientists, foreigners, and other elites challenged not only the farmers’ right to manage their 
fields as they saw fit, but also the legitimacy of local experiential knowledge and the place of 
agriculture in the Valencian cultural imagination. 
This chapter explores the social and political changes that underlay confrontations 
between farmers and conservationists in the Albufera in the late 1980s. Coinciding with massive 
demographic shifts, the opening of global markets, and the onset of complex and often-
contradictory international regulations on agriculture and the environment, these confrontations 
represented a clash between rural and urban values in an era of rapid modernization. Farmers’ 
and scientists’ widely divergent understandings of the costs and benefits of European integration, 
in particular, played a central role in the debate. As such, the conflict was a direct consequence 
of the post-Franco re-scaling of Spanish politics and of the symbiosis between increasing 
transnational connections and evolving regional identities. This chapter suggests that rice farmers’ 
opposition to the park failed because their vision of Valencianness relied on traditions and 
history to which they themselves had a weakening connection, and which urban Valencians 




Though the Generalitat imagined the Albufera Natural Park as a multi-use space within 
which the farmers could coexist with tourists, scientists, and wildlife, the derision and outrage 
with which farmers greeted news of the park’s declaration in the summer of 1986 attested to their 
belief that it represented an unsustainable challenge to their way of life. The park’s boundaries, 
which Felipe and his colleagues had drawn purely on the basis of hydrology and biology, 
included not only the city’s property on the lake and the Dehesa, but more than 14,000 hectares 
(34,595 acres) of privately-owned lands lying within thirteen different municipalities (Figure 20). 
This overwrote the social and economic criteria upon which farmers had based their own sense 
of the land, including proximity to irrigation sources, private ownership, and municipal 
boundaries. Proposed regulations included restrictions on the types and amounts of chemicals the 
farmers could apply, on when and how they tilled their fields, and on the annual schedule of 
flooding and draining.4 Property owners could not dig canals, repair dams, or build so much as a 
shed without express permission from the Generalitat. Farmers could not grow anything other 
than rice, in order to ensure an annual supply of flooded wetlands for bird habitat, and their land 
was permanently zoned as agricultural. Those who had planned to build on their land for 
personal or commercial use, or to change their crops to meet market demands, now saw these 
expectations dashed.5 
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Figure 20: The Albufera Natural Park 
The Park boundaries, outlined in black, redefined three distinct geographical features - the lake, the Dehesa, and the 
rice fields - as a single ecological system. It also encompassed parts of thirteen municipalities (colored blocks), 
including several urbanized areas and inland citrus orchards. 
 
The effect of these environmental restrictions must be understood within the context of 
international economic and political changes occurring simultaneously. Despite significant 
protective tariffs under Franco, as the rice market expanded during the twentieth century 
Valencia’s high costs of production had become a serious problem. While farmers had responded 
to rising agricultural prices in the eighteenth and nineteenth century by cultivating previously 
unused land, they now focused instead on increasing yields from the lands already under 
cultivation.6 On average, Valencian farmers owned less than two hectares (five acres) of land 
apiece, and tended to eschew farming collectives that shared machinery, storage space, and other 
equipment to reduce costs. Despite significant increases in the amount of herbicides, pesticides, 
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and chemical fertilizers used in the region, for financial reasons most of them continued to rely at 
least in part on low-tech, labor-intensive methods (Figure 21).7 As the market grew more 
competitive, many farmers on the outskirts of the rice-growing region switched to fruit and 
vegetable cultivation, which brought higher prices, or sold their land to developers. By 1980 the 
area around the Albufera was the only rice-growing area left in Valencia, and many of the 
remaining holdouts were considering selling out or converting their fields to other uses.8 The 
park’s regulations precluded that possibility, cutting off their last avenue of economic escape, 
without offering subsidies or compensation in return. 
Figure 21: Rice farming in the Albufera, 1983.9 
 
European Community accession negotiations for Spain, as for Greece and Portugal, had 
revolved around several key issues, including membership in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization and the terms under which their massive agricultural sectors could be incorporated 
into the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In 1962, when the original EEC members voted the 
CAP into force, Europe’s agricultural goals were to increase production, stabilize markets, and 
                                                
7 “La industria arrocera fija precios a la baja,” Agricultores y Ganaderos, October 1990, 10; “El arroz se salva de la 
crisis del campo,” Agricultores y Ganaderos, June-July 1993, 7; Simpson, Spanish Agriculture, 139. 
8 EPYPSA, Plan Especial de Protección, 41. 
9 Photo from Museo Etnográfico de Valencia, taken as part of an ethnographic study of local rice farmers. 
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ensure the availability of supplies, a fair standard of living for farmers, and reasonable prices to 
consumers. To achieve those ends, a council composed of member states’ Ministers of 
Agriculture agreed on annual “target prices” for each regulated commodity and maintained those 
prices through import levies, export subsidies, and intervention buying of surpluses. 
In theory, a target price should be set at a level sufficient for even the least efficient 
farmers in the EC to gain “an adequate income” from their crops. In practice, however, those 
who increased their efficiency could expect significantly higher profits. Freed from the risk that 
overproduction would drive prices down, large, efficient producers in wealthy states increased 
their yields at unprecedented levels. Even with guaranteed prices, small farmers throughout 
Europe struggled to compete with large ones, as their real incomes dropped. Simultaneously, the 
increased reliance on fertilizers, phytosanitary chemicals, and mechanized agriculture to increase 
production created new environmental problems and food safety concerns. Though many 
member states achieved complete self-sufficiency in food production within ten years, thousands 
of small producers were forced out of business altogether. 
By the mid-1970s, Brussels’s storage of surplus crops had become financially onerous, 
and the Council of Agricultural Ministers decided to alleviate the burden by subsidizing exports. 
The dumping of European crops on the international market, however, predictably angered 
foreign producers whose own farmers suffered plummeting prices while finding European 
markets virtually closed to their own more expensive goods. Many of those countries, especially 
the United States and Australia, found themselves forced to choose between allowing their 
farmers to fail or funding their own subsidies to enable competition with Europe. The cost of the 
CAP to the EC itself, meanwhile, continued to rise, and by the time of Spanish accession it 
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already absorbed half of the EC’s entire budget.10 All of this led London’s Economist magazine 
to call the CAP the “single most idiotic system of economic mismanagement that the rich 
western countries have ever devised.”11 
Despite the many evident problems and an inherent wariness of “a profound change of 
adaptation to a common agricultural policy established from Brussels,” Valencian farmers at first 
expressed cautious optimism with regard to Spanish accession in the EC. The CAP’s “protection 
of community markets relative to outsiders and the support of internal prices and markets 
through intervention prices,”12 they hoped, could open up new markets for their products while 
raising prices domestically, and AVA suggested that it might even compensate for the loss of 
Franco-era protectionism. However, the terms of Spanish accession were disappointing from the 
start. Spanish farmers initially received lower subsidies than their Italian and French competitors, 
and AVA accused the EC of “abandoning the traditional policy of market support” with steadily 
reduced prices, anti-production fees and penalties, and new budgetary restrictions.13 National 
farm lobbyists accused Spanish negotiators of sacrificing agricultural interests for the greater 
social and political benefits of integration, allowing a flood of cheap produce from northern and 
central Europe into Spanish markets, thereby undermining domestic production.14 
By the late 1980s, then, Albufera rice farmers’ economic prospects were defined far more 
by decisions made in far-off boardrooms than by Spanish diets, environments, or culture.15 Their 
tiny individual land holdings, high labor costs, and relative lack of machinery and chemicals 
                                                
10 Rolf Moehler, “The internal and external forces driving CAP reform,” in The perfect storm: The political economy 
of the Fischler Reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy, ed. Johan F.M. Swinnen (Center for European Policy 
Studies, 2009). 
11 Economist, “Europe’s farm farce,” September 29, 1990, 15. 
12 “El Campo en Lucha,” Agricultores y Ganaderos, Jan 1991, 4. 
13 SEDES16; “El Campo en Lucha,” 5. 
14 Pedro Barato, national president of ASAJA, “Situación y perspectivas de futuro de la PAC,” Agricultores y 
Ganaderos, Mar-April 1996, 5. 
15 “La industria arrocera fija precios a la baja,” Agricultores y Ganaderos, October 1990, 10. 
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contributed to exceptionally high production costs, especially compared to the large, efficient 
Italian farms that produced similar short-grain rice varieties and received the full CAP 
subsidies.16 European production of short-grain rice reached surplus levels by the late 1980s, 
even as domestic demand declined, both factors driving market prices steadily downwards. 
Increasingly, Albufera farmers found that the sale of their crops did not even cover their costs of 
production.17 Between 1983 and 1990, agricultural incomes across the Autonomous Community 
of Valencia declined by 40%, and Valencian farmers lamented that “our income is farther each 
day from that of the other sectors.”18 
Thus, international economic pressures encouraged Valencian farmers to “modernize” 
and increase production, even as park regulations prevented them from doing so. While farmers 
outside the park abandoned rice in favor of onions, citrus, pigs, and other more profitable uses of 
the land, those within the park’s boundaries were forced to grow rice or do nothing at all with 
their land.19 In the words of one farmer, “if the park didn’t exist, some lands would increase in 
value, because like it or not, they would go from solely rice cultivation that is going to leave you 
in poverty to having a good business and being able to sell it....It’s very important to us that we 
cannot change our crops.”20 
Pressed to the brink of ruin by market conditions, marginalized by an increasingly urban 
society, and now demonized as polluters and habitat-destroyers by ecologists, rice farmers took 
                                                
16“Una gran asamblea para quien lo quiera entender,” Agricultores y Ganaderos, October 1989, 5. 
17 José Luis Mateses, interview with the author, Sueca, April 25 2012; “Propuestas para equilibrar los mercados de 
arroz en la CEE,” Agricultores y Ganaderos, March 1991, 15; “Arroz largo subvencionado,” Agricultores y 
Ganaderos, June 1992, 16; “Arroz se paga ya a 47 pesetas el kilo en el campo,” Agricultores y Ganaderos, 
November-December 1992, 25; “El arroz puede alcanzar una cosecha récord, Agricultores y Ganaderos, September 
1991, 8; Francisco Astorga Ramírez, “La evolución del sector arrocero en la Comunidad Valenciana,” Agricultores 
y Ganaderos, September 1989, 5. 
18 “El Campo en Lucha,” 5. 
19 Junta Rectora del Parque Natural de l’Albufera, Informe sobre las transformaciones Agrarias en el Ambito del 
Parque Natural de l’Albufera, Actas de la Junta Rectora, May 10, 1988, OGPA. 
20 AVA, quoted in Garcia and Cabrejas, “Medio Ambiente y Conflicto Social,” 86. 
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to the streets and to the press to defend their rights. The newly-formed Valencian Farmers’ 
Association (Asociación Valenciana de Agricultores, henceforth AVA), which represented about 
80% of the farmers in Valencia and essentially all of the rice farmers, organized and coordinated 
many of the protests and press conferences, at times held in conjunction with the owners of 
illegal businesses within the park and a small but passionate group of hunters.21 In protests, 
interviews, and petitions, the farmers espoused a vision of Valencianism derived from personal 
experience in the countryside, radically different from the cosmopolitan and scientific vision of 
the Agró eco-nationalists. Citing their own labor as well as that of their ancestors, they described 
the land as inseparable from those who worked it and themselves as both the traditional 
embodiment and the best guardians of Valencian heritage. 
By the fall of 1986, just months after the park’s initial declaration, the Generalitat had 
received a total of two hundred and fifty-six written objections calling the park “totally 
disproportionate and outside of any logic” and demanding that the boundaries be redrawn to 
exclude all private property. These included a petition with more than 1700 signatures, as well as 
letters from individuals. There were also formal complaints filed from town councils, irrigation 
collectives, and citizens’ groups within the rice-growing area.22 The perceived lack of democratic 
process inherent in the park’s declaration was a particular sore point for many of the farmers. 
                                                
21 Ignacio Lacomba, interview with the author, Valencia, May 6 2011. 
22 Camara Agraria de Sueca, report to the Conselleria de Obras Publicas, April 25, 1986; Amparo Beltrán Artés, 
“Recurso de Reposicion contra Decreto 89/1986 de 8 de julio,” August 28, 1986; Recurso de la Camara Agraria de 
Sueca, April 25, 1986; Recursos de las Camaras Agrarias of Sollana, Sueca, Algemesí, Valencia, Catarroja, 
Beniparrel, Albalat de la Ribera, Silla and Cullera (August 1986); Asociacion Valenciana de Agricultores, “Recurso 
de Reposicion, Decreto 89/1986 de 8 de julio,” August 28, 1986; Recurso de la “Union Cristiana” of Sueca; 
“Alegaciones que presenta el Grupo Popular del Ayuntamiento de Valencia al Decreto 89/1986, de 8 de Julio, del 
Consell de la Generalidad Valenciana de Regimen Juridico del Parque Natural de la Albufera,” August 25 1986; 
Manuel David Pardo, Daniel David Pardo, Consuelo Bigne Fink, and others, “Recurso de Reposicion contra Decreto 
89/1986 de 8 de julio,” August 26, 1986; forty-two complaints filed by individuals and small groups of tancat 
owners. All documents from the Archivo Histórico de la Generalitat Valenciana, Expedientes, 3/564-26 (Grupo 
popular) and Documentos Varios, 6/4042-4 (farmers). 
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Consistent with the general practice of the era, Felipe and the other ecologists had designed the 
park without any input from those who lived and worked there, resulting in a top-down, 
technocratic set of regulations that ignored the concerns and potential contributions of those who 
would be most affected.23 Ignacio Lacomba, a founding member of Agró and a scientist 
employed by the Generalitat who worked on many of the studies that gave rise to the park, today 
notes that the park “was declared from an office,” and that the park managers “arrived to give 
orders in someone else’s house.”24 This generated a flood of objections from farmers, who 
insisted that “a natural park of 270,000 hanegadas [a Valencian unit of measurement] cannot be 
established by decree”25 and that “a natural park is not viable without consensus.”26 
The Generalitat’s flat rejection of all these appeals on the grounds that “the proposed 
reduced ambit is not functional as an ecosystem” opened the government to renewed accusations 
that it cared more about ducks than about rural families.27 Rumors flew that the 
environmentalists intended to return the entire area to its “natural state,” prohibiting rice farming 
altogether.28 Such accusations bring to mind William Cronon’s observation of the demographic 
trends associated with nature conservation, namely the difference between rural and urban 
understandings of wilderness. 
The dream of an unworked natural landscape is very much the fantasy of people who 
have never themselves had to work the land to make a living—urban folk for whom food 
comes from a supermarket or a restaurant instead of a field, and for whom the wooden 
                                                
23 José Ramón Pascual Monzó, president of AVA’s rice sector, quoted in “La forma de imponer el parque es una 
tomadura de pelo,” Agricultores y Ganaderos, July 1989, 6. At no point in their planning did anyone from the 
OTDA attempt to consult with the farmers. Felipe interview, Valencia, June 7 2011. 
24 Lacomba interview, Valencia, April 26 2012. 
25 AVA president Vicente Hernández, quoted in AVA, Anuario Asociación Valenciana Agricultores (1989), 10. 
26 “Un parque natural no es viable sin consenso,” Agricultores y Ganaderos, Feb-Mar 1994, 13. 
27 Conselleria de Obras Públicas, Generalitat Valenciana, Desestimación de recursos contra el Decreto 89/1986, de 
8 de Julio, de Regimen Juridico del Parque Natural de La Albufera. September 16, 1986, Expedientes, 1/3909-24, 
AHGV. 
28 Miguel Minguet, interview with the author, Alfafar, March 2 2011. See also Camara Local Agraria de Cullera, 
“Recurso de Reposicion contra el Decreto 89/1986,” August 26, 1986, documentos varios, 6/4042-4, AHGV.  
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houses in which they live and work apparently have no meaningful connection to the 
forests in which trees grow and die. Only people whose relation to the land was already 
alienated could hold up wilderness as a model for human life in nature, for the romantic 
ideology of wilderness leaves precisely nowhere for human beings actually to make their 
living from the land.29 
 
While the conservationists did not, in fact, seek to revert the entire area to an “unworked natural 
landscape,” their extremely restrictive vision of the rice fields as “green filters” for the lake 
nonetheless left farmers with a severely curtailed productive role in their own lands. Whereas 
Valencian rice farmers depended on the land for their survival, urban conservationists sought to 
preserve the same landscapes for aesthetic and moral purposes. Such radical disconnect between 
the two groups’ worldviews almost inevitably led to conflict and resentment. 
Protests against the park continued for years after its initial declaration, frequently 
serving as an outlet for farmers to vocalize their frustration with the decline of the economic 
clout and social prestige of the Spanish agricultural sector. AVA joined the Sueca town hall and 
the rice farming associations from Sueca, Sollana, Alfafar, Sedaví, and Castellar in filing suit to 
annul the park’s declaration,30 while hundreds of rice farmers marched through downtown 
Valencia to demand its repeal and the formation of a representative commission to negotiate new 
boundaries and terms. AVA itself proudly documented the protests in its monthly magazine, 
printing photographs and lengthy descriptions of farmers with signs reading, in Valencian, “The 
lands are ours;” “No to the dictatorial Park;” and “Our environmentalism is practical, not utopian” 
blocking traffic downtown (Figure 22).31 While AVA organized protests and filed legal 
complaints, a small number of hunters used a more vigilante approach: Anti-park graffiti 
                                                
29 Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness.” 
30 “Los agricultores arroceros contra el parque de la Albufera, oficial,” Levante, November 2, 1988. This lawsuit 
eventually succeeded on a technicality, but the victory was purely symbolic, as the Generalitat had imposed 
precautionary measures that ensured the park’s survival. 
31 Juan Lagardera, “Los arroceros colapsan el centro para que se derogue el parque de la Albufera,” Levante, 
December 3, 1988; “10,000 Agricultores reclaman a Lerma la reforma de las condiciones del Parque de la Albufera,” 
AVA, Anuario 1989, 9. 
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appeared around Valencia, the city’s boat dock on the lake was burned, and Felipe arrived at 
work one morning to find that someone had thrown Molotov cocktails through the windows of 
the OTDA.32 
Figure 22: AVA protests against the park, 1988.33 
 
Confrontation, not negotiation, ruled the day. While the farmers were by no means eager 
to communicate with the scientists, the lack of understanding between the two groups was 
exacerbated by the scientists’ own rhetoric, which ignored economic realities in favor of 
environmental and aesthetic ones, and by their inability or refusal to meet the farmers on equal 
footing. Without ever talking to the farmers directly, Felipe and other scientists tended to 
attribute their protests largely to a deliberate campaign of misinformation and manipulation by 
wealthy businessmen with personal financial interests in the park’s defeat.34 According to former 
Agró member Ignacio Lacomba, developers and large landowners took advantage of the lack of 
public participation in the park declaration process to “poison the atmosphere” before the 
                                                
32 Juanjo García del Moral, “Un incendio provocado daña la oficina de los biólogos del parque natural de la 
Albufera,” El País (Valencia), December 12, 1988; Victor Navarro, “L’Albufera conflictiva: Entrevista amb Victor 
Navarro, membre d’Agró-Acció Ecologista,” Diarí Cultural del País Valencià 44, January 1989. 
33 Photos from AVA. 
34 Lacomba interview, Valencia, May 6, 2011; Lacomba interview, Valencia, April 26, 2012; Felipe interview, 
Valencia, April 30 2012. 
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Generalitat itself had a chance to explain the declaration.35 Victor Navarro accused AVA itself of 
using “this lack of information, by misinforming and manipulating the farmers.”36 Agreeing with 
this assessment, representatives of left-wing political parties, the University of Valencia, and 
local environmental groups signed a “Manifesto for the Albufera” in which they claimed that the 
agricultural groups working against the park “do not represent the legitimate interests of rural 
workers, but rather the economic thirst of certain speculative capitalists.”37 Blasco, the regional 
minister of Public Works, simply implored opponents to “carefully read the park declaration” 
and avoid objections on the basis of “problems that do not exist” and “things that [the 
declaration] does not say.”38 
Such statements added to the farmers’ frustrations as they saw their very real economic 
concerns written off as mere paper tigers and their political activism dismissed as puppetry 
orchestrated by wealthy businessmen. José Ramón Pascual Monzó, a rice farmer from Sueca 
who led many of the protests, says that he read the park legislation “cover to cover” and held 
meetings in the villages to explain it to other farmers. He adamantly denies ever being influenced 
by outsiders, and takes offense at the suggestion that he or anyone else was “manipulated” into 
opposing the park. Though he did have one meeting with local business owners who were 
strongly opposed to the park, he says, the meeting did not take place until well after AVA’s 
mobilization had begun.39 Other farmers agree with his assessment, insisting that their opposition 
sprang not from any distortion of the facts but from the park legislation itself.40 
                                                
35 Lacomba interview, Valencia, May 6, 2011. 
36 Navarro, “L’Albufera conflictiva.” 
37 Environmental coalition, “Manifest per l’Albufera,” Diarí Cultural del País Valencià 44, January 1989. 
38 Rafael Blasco, quoted in “Sobre la polémica en torno a la declaración de parque natural,” Las Provincias, August 
26, 1986. 
39 José Ramón Pascual Monzó, interview with the author, El Palmar, May 4, 2012. 
40 E.g. Mateses interview, Sueca, April 25, 2012; Segarra interview, El Palmar, April 24 2012; and Minguet 
interview, Alfafar, March 2, 2011. 
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The scientists’ tendency to see the farmers as easily-manipulated rubes was matched by 
farmers’ perception of the scientists as interfering outsiders with no real connection to Valencia 
in general or the Albufera in particular. On the rare occasions when Agró scientists spoke with 
farmers on the outskirts of the city, their lack of fluency in Valencian contributed to this 
impression. One AVA representative dismissed Agró members as “mov[ing] in a different world 
from ours, in a postcard-vision; we touch and walk on and profit from the park, but they have a 
completely different sense of it. They are interested exclusively in the environment and so their 
basic concern is that the little ducks are pretty.”41 “For these civil servants,” one AVA 
representative told the press, “the survival of miniscule creatures in the mud of the canals must 
be more important than the fields of rice with which millions and millions of people are fed.”42 
Conversely, in their own words, the farmers “really need the area to be in good conditions” and 
thus had a vested interest in protecting the land in a more holistic, practical, and lasting way.43 
AVA’s repeated references to the farmers’ personal interest in the health of the land and 
water of the Albufera to some extent challenged the dominant conservationist narrative of 
agriculture as a major threat to the ecological survival of the area. The way that farmers talked 
about water pollution and their appeals to the Generalitat for help, even as they fought against 
the park in court, demonstrates that their relationship with the land was more complicated than 
their initial opposition to the park would suggest. When contesting the inclusion of their fields in 
the park, they highlighted their traditions of independence and their right to manage the land in 
order to maximize their profits, even if that meant abandoning rice farming altogether. When 
decrying the presence of toxic sludge, rotting animal carcasses, and suspicious foams in their 
                                                
41 Quoted in Garcia and Cabrejas. “Medio Ambiente y conflicto social,” 81. 
42 “Los agricultores arroceros.” 
43 Garcia and Cabrejas. “Medio Ambiente y conflicto social,” 80. 
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fields, however, their arguments were almost indistinguishable from those of scientific 
conservationists, and reflected a dedication to rice farming and to the land itself in a far more 
permanent way. “Without a doubt,” argued one AVA representative, “the great promoters of the 
salvation of the lake are the farmers, through their energetic complaints against polluting actions 
and their precise monitoring thereof.”44 
The image of farmers as the Albufera’s principle caretakers, and their actions as tending 
towards the greater health and sustainability of the ecosystem, permeated farmers’ appeals in the 
press and to their elected officials. They described themselves as “the first ecologists,” compared 
to the “theorists” with a complete “lack of knowledge of reality” who “work for the 
Administration, or…do senior theses for the university” but had no first-hand knowledge of 
“what it is like to walk through the mud of a rice field.”45 “We are not ecologists of books and 
offices,” claimed an AVA representative, “but rather our environmentalism is that of suffering 
day after day, in the heat and the cold, the wind and the rain, and also of defending our way of 
life.”46 
Though it would be easy to write off such statements as mere public relations and an 
attempt to appropriate conservationist vocabulary, this interpretation does not do justice to the 
repeated complaints farmers filed with the Generalitat with regard to specific instances of 
pollution and the lack of enforcement of water quality standards. Farmers who lost crops to the 
industrially polluted water coursing down canals in 1989, for example, demanded stricter 
enforcement of the law and insisted that “the managers of the natural park are the ones who 
                                                
44 “AVA lucha contra la contaminación de los arrozales de la Albufera,” AVA, Anuario 1989, 19. 
45 Quotes from “Los agricultores arroceros; “La forma de imponer el parque;” Minguet interview, Alfafar, March 2, 
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conducted by Garcia and Cabrejas, “Medio Ambiente y Conflicto Social,” 80. 
46 “La forma de imponer el parque.” 
 
 180 
should guard against such incidents.”47 They similarly objected to the idea that their fields could 
be relied upon as the sole means of filtering out the nitrogen and phosphorous from the city’s 
wastewater. “What we rice farmers want,” wrote one, “is clean water for the Albufera, but 
without making our fields serve as a filter and warehouse for so much extremely dangerous 
filth.”48 By 1992, they joined Agró and SEO in criticizing the Generalitat’s failure to enforce 
water quality standards in the harshest terms, bitterly noting that “the Albufera is still dying in 
spite of so many promises over the last decades.”49 
These are not the words of people who oppose environmental preservation. Instead, the 
water quality debate suggests that there was less distance between AVA and Agró than either 
side believed. Even as they protested the park’s limitations on their land use, farmers’ were some 
of the loudest voices calling for enforcement of environmental laws on water pollution. “We 
farmers are harmed first and foremost by the enormous water pollution in the canals with which 
we irrigate; pollution produced by the urban and industrial dumping,” proclaimed a particularly 
eloquent editorial in AVA’s newsletter.50 “The fields are irrigated with polluted waters that are 
poisoning the lands and the crops….Are we farmers the guilty ones, when it is we who are the 
first to suffer the negative consequences?”51 The bubbling, stinking water in many of the canals 
carried dangerous levels of urban waste that rendered it hazardous not only to wildlife and 
farmers, but even to those humans who consumed the irrigated crops.52 “Nobody would want to 
get into that water and work, not even for double pay,” noted one farmer, “but we have to do it. 
                                                
47 “AVA lucha contra la contaminación;” “La forma de imponer el parque.” 
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If it isn’t good for the toothcarp and the ducks, it’s not good for us either.”53 Still reluctant to 
accept the park’s limitations, the farmers argued that “no park would be needed if the 
Administration enforced the laws” with regard to water pollution.54 Though such statements 
were perhaps hyperbolic, insofar as the park’s regulations provided significant additional 
protections, this statement is not entirely inaccurate as it highlights severe deficiencies in park 
management during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and reflects a consensus among the 
progressive press and scientific conservationists alike that the park’s management, not the 
farmers themselves, were responsible for the area’s greatest problems. 
AVA’s rhetorical reliance on the trope of farmers as the “traditional” guardians of 
Valencian lands, while an effective tool in their protests against poor water quality, failed to 
serve their purposes with regard to the park itself. Public Works Minister Blasco’s declaration 
that conservation of the ecosystem was “absolutely compatible with safeguarding agricultural 
interests, especially in their traditional exploitation,” goes to the heart of the matter.55 
“Traditional” exploitation, as defined both by the park regulations and by popular romanticized 
notions of Valencian farming, meant farming rice and only rice, without chemical additives or 
major machinery, as they had done fifty years earlier, and indeed was entirely permissible under 
the park law. But this was a static, romanticized, and thoroughly impractical version of farming 
in the modern economic environment, which denied Albufera farmers the flexibility to adapt to 
the changed conditions of the world around them.  
When farmers embraced new methods, technologies, and economic connections to meet 
demands needs of the shifting agricultural market, they risked losing their “traditional” 
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55 Rafael Blasco, quoted in “Sobre la polémica.” 
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credentials and thus their claims to the land. Many of the farmers protested the park not to 
preserve their right to farm rice as their grandfathers had done, but to assert their property rights 
more generally: to develop their lands for residences, industry, or tourism; to increase their use 
of machinery and pesticides; or to transform their rice paddies into orange groves or another 
more profitable agricultural use. Conservationists cited this as evidence that the farmers were not, 
in fact, upholding Valencian traditions. Instead, the conservationists themselves were the primary 
advocates for the low-tech, labor-intensive agriculture that had long defined the region, and 
successfully portrayed the farmers as straying from those traditions and therefore failing to care 
for the land as they had in the past. Rice farmers were faced with an insurmountable rhetorical 
contradiction: their claims to Valencian “authenticity” rested heavily on economically 
unsustainable farming methods that they themselves wished to abandon. This allowed urban 
ecologists to take up the mantle of protectors of the iconic Valencian landscape and the promise 
to preserve it for Valencian and European heritage. 
 
The declaration of the Albufera Natural Park embodied a direct conflict between rural 
and urban worldviews in the Franco era, and the outcome of this conflict reflected a national 
cultural trend towards a distinctly European version of modernization. The conservationist vision 
of the Dehesa-Albufera area triumphed over that of the farmers for three principle reasons. First, 
the conservationists – university-trained scientists and intellectuals with close personal ties and 
common cultural ground with countless members of local government – possessed skills and 
knowledge that the farmers did not. AVA formed as an institution largely in response to the park 
itself, and by the late 1980s still lacked the infrastructure and institutional connections enjoyed 
by more sophisticated progressive activists. This situation would change radically over the 
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coming years, as the Valencian government grew steadily more conservative and an interest in 
economic productivity came to outweigh the progressive concerns of the early post-Franco 
period, but throughout the 1980s the farmers’ inherently conservative politics and lack of facility 
with the bureaucratic and legal norms of the young democracy substantially hampered their 
efforts. 
Second, supporters of the park couched their arguments in terms borrowed directly from 
European norms and regulations, offering a way for Valencians to directly ally themselves with a 
modern and cosmopolitan value system. Despite the Spanish “economic miracle” of the 1970s 
and 1980s, a sense of cultural and political backwardness still weighed heavily on many 
educated Spaniards who saw increased ties to northern Europe as a means of obtaining economic 
and scientific assistance to bring Spain up to modern standards. While the Agró and SEO 
activists were indisputably earnest in their desire to protect local landscapes and ecosystems, in 
general the adoption of increased environmental reforms across Spain resulted in a great 
proliferation of protections on paper and very little progress in practice. Instead, environmental 
protections served largely as a demonstration of good will, intended to convince other Europeans 
that Spain was ready and willing to become more “European.” To some extent, then, the 
declaration of the Albufera Park was a calculated measure taken by the Valencian government in 
order to gain international prestige and support. Against such enticements, the farmers, whose 
arguments were firmly rooted in the local sphere, had no ready counteroffers. 
The third and perhaps most compelling reason that the conservationists won the initial 
battle over the Albufera Natural Park has to do with the changing demographics and identity of 
the Valencian community. Popular anti-centralist sentiments, part of the immediate backlash of 
the Franco era, coincided with the increasing alienation of the Valencian population from the 
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countryside. By providing a way for urban Valencians to see themselves as authentic defenders 
of local traditions and landscapes, environmental conservation took advantage of these 
circumstances. Whereas the farmers’ appeals to historic land stewardship and local identity 
emerged from personal experience and a tangible sense of the land, the scientists of Agró, SEO, 
and the OTDA used tactics far more recognizable to the urban majority. Environmental 
protection, as part of a modernist European agenda, was a form of Valencian authenticity in 
which anyone could share. In the end, policies emphasizing the region’s modern aspirations won 
out over those tying it to a fading agrarian past. 
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Chapter Seven. “The Park is a Complete Disaster”: Crisis and 
Compromise in the 1990s 
 
By 1990, even a casual observer could tell that all was not well in the Albufera. While the 
scientists at the Devesa-Albufera Technical Office (OTDA) made significant gains on the 
Dehesa with regard to restoring natural habitats, educating the public, and improving patterns of 
public use, conditions in the areas of the park under the Generalitat’s exclusive jurisdiction – the 
rice fields – continued to deteriorate.1 Agró members called the park “a complete disaster”2 and 
one national newspaper described it as “a landscape in which garbage dumps, filled-in sections 
of the lake, and canals of putrid water abound.”3 Despite laws prohibiting such activities, farmers 
on the outskirts of the park trucked soil and rubble into their fields to plant more profitable crops, 
or paved the fields over to allow for unlicensed warehouses, nightclubs, garages, factories, and 
other businesses to operate on protected lands. Towering mountains of garbage collected 
alongside the canals and internal paths of the fields.4 Drainage ditches running through the park 
remained “open to the sky and unchanneled. They give off foul odors and are a potential site of 
                                                
1 Guillermo de Felipe and Antonio Vizcaíno, “Espacios naturales: el caso de la Devesa de l’Albufera,” in El Medio 
Ambiente en la Comunidad Valenciana (Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, 1987), 144-49; Juanjo Garcia del Moral, 
“Grupos ecologistas denuncian la degradación de la Albufera,” El País, July 8, 1987; Demand from the Grupo 
Esquerra Unida of the city of Valencia to the Comission of Urbanism and Environment, May 18, 1988, SP; José 
Sierra, “No existe gran diferencia entre el desarrollismo de los 60 y el actual,” Levante February 12, 1989; “Acció 
Ecologista-Agró denuncia que la junta de l’Albufera no se reúne desde septiembre de 1991,” Levante, May 7, 1992; 
L. M. Notario, “Agró denuncia la degradación de la Albufera,” Las Provincias, July 16, 1992. 
2 AEA representative, quoted in Garcia and Cabrejas, “Medio Ambiente y Conflicto Social,” 76. 
3 Ana Chapa, “Un basurero ‘protegido,’” El País, April 27, 1991. 
4 See, e.g., José Sierra, “Agró denuncia a fiscalía un vertido de escombros en el parquet de la Albufera,” Levante, 
December 20, 1992; Joan-Miquel Llops, “El Saler, vertedero de incívicos,” Levante, December 29, 1992; Juan 
Miguel Benavent and Alberto Solana Lopez, Proyecto de eliminación y restauración de vertederos incontrolados 
dentro del Parque Natural de la Albufera (Valencia), Generalitat Valenciana, February 1993, OTDA. 
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infection and danger.”5 Arsonists destroyed several of the park’s most valuable nesting areas, 
including most of the Mata del Fang, where hundreds of recently-hatched herons and ducks were 
burned alive in their nests.6 Hunters “systematically violated” laws regarding permissible seasons, 
location, and species, prompting Agró members to stage a series of protests culminating in a 
dramatic march through the streets of Valencia carrying the bodies of illegally-shot birds 
gathered from around the lake (Figure 23).7 
Worst of all was the water. The canals in the rice fields ran black and rust-brown, clogged 
with toxic sediments, dead animals, pesticide containers, bottles of detergent, rusted cans, and 
plastic of all sorts.8 Joan Miquel Benavent and other park employees walked through the Dehesa 
and along the canals, returning with shocking photographs of fire damage and untreated waste 
(Figure 23). In 1991 and 1994, Victor Navarro led members of the government and the media on 
tours of the “black points” around the ostensibly protected area, and although disgusted reporters 
wrote disparagingly of the mountains of trash scattered throughout the rice fields and the 
“hundreds of cartridges” that belied hunting restrictions, by far their strongest responses came 
from the state of the water. The resulting articles described a dead pig floating at a popular 
boating port; canals filled with “completely black water” or covered with ten centimeters of oil, 
                                                
5Servicio del Ciclo Integral del Agua, Proyecto: Saneamiento y cubridion de acequias de la Comisaria de Francos, 
Marjales y Otros, December 1989, OTDA. 
6 José Sierra, “Un incendio provocado destruye 20 hectáreas de uno de los principales ecosistemas de El Saler,” 
Levante, April 18, 1992; “Quemar el Saler,” Las Provincias, April 18, 1992. 
7 AEA representative, quoted in Garcia and Cabrejas. “Medio Ambiente y Conflicto Social,” 76; see also P. M., “El 
alcalde encajó la bronca contra la caza,” Levante, November 8, 1986; “Agró considera insuficientes las medidas de 
protección de las aves,” Levante, November 25, 1987; B. Castro, “Agró criticó el calendario de la casa de las 
avefrías,” Levante January 25 1987; “Los ecologistas llevaron ante Lerma las Garzas abatidas,” Levante, October 12, 
1987; “Los ecologistas denuncian la caza ilegal de especies en la Albufera,” El País, October 19, 1987; “Los 
ecologistas llevaron a la Generalidad cadáveres de garzas reales abatidas en la Albufera,” Las Provincias, October 
21, 1987; “Presidentes de 8 sociedades de cazadores condenan la matanza de garzas,” Las Provincias, October 22, 
1987; Lagardera, “Los arroceros colapsan el centro;” Acció Ecologista-Agró, Press release, “Acció Ecologista-Agró 
presenta sus quejas al Presidente Lerma,” October 1987, FDMA; City of Valencia Council motion, October 20, 
1987, AHMV; José Sierra, “Los ecologistas aseguran que continúa cazándose furtivamente en la Albufera,” Levante 
January 10, 1990. 
8 J. C. Martí, “Cien voluntarios limpian la Albufera,” Levante, May 8, 1994. 
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where motion could be discerned only when “the plastic bottles move once in a while;” and 
leaking containers of toxic waste – all accompanied by “pestilential” and “nauseating” odors that 
made at least one city counselor physically ill.9 
Figure 23: Problems in the park, 1986-1995. 
From top left: OTDA scientists surveying the damage after a fire on the Dehesa, 1986;10 Agró protestors carrying 
dead grey herons, killed by poachers in the Albufera, through the streets of Valencia, 1987;11 two photos of 
industrial water pollution in the Barranco de Chiva, one of the Albufera’s main water supplies, 1993;12 aerial view 
of solid waste lining canals in the Albufera, ca. 1995.13 
      
      
 
                                                
9Javier Obregón, “Agró denuncia a la prensa los ‘puntos negros’ de la Albufera,” Las Provincias, April 27, 1991; 
Javier Núñez de Murga, “La Albufera, inundada, como siempre, de inmundicia,” Las Provincias, January 23, 
199455; Chapa, “Un basurero.” 
10 Photo by Enric Martinez, from AMV. 
11 Photo by Carles Francesc, Carteleria Turia. 
12 Photos by Joan Miquel Benavent, from OTDA. 




Even at the height of anti-park protests in the 1980s, the farmers loudly denounced the 
appalling state of the waters of the Albufera and called for enforcement of water quality 
measures for the municipal and industrial sources surrounding the lake. United in their disgust 
for the Generalitat’s lax enforcement, both groups turned to a higher authority – the European 
Union – for support. This chapter outlines the shifting alliances of scientists, farmers, and 
politicians during the 1990s surrounding the ongoing issues of park management, within the 
European climate of increasing environmental consciousness and regulation. Through the 
creative application of European law and funding opportunities, conservationists and farmers 
would form an uneasy truce that enabled rice farmers and environmentalists to work, if not 
together, at least in tandem on the critical water issues threatening the park. In particular, the 
advent of a major shift in EU agricultural policy offered the perfect opportunity for the park to 
make peace with the farmers, finding common ground and helping the farmers to accept a 
redefinition of their role as stewards of the land. 
 
In the decades preceding park declaration, inputs of agricultural chemicals had 
contributed to the lake’s degradation into the most hypertrophic body of water in Spain and one 
of the worst in the world, with pollution levels in every major canal significantly exceeding the 
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(unenforced) national legal standards.14 Throughout the 1960s, farmers applied pesticides via 
crop-dusters and spread fertilizers in their fields that dumped enormous quantities of toxins and 
nitrogen into the lake, repeatedly producing massive fish die-offs in the canals nearby. One 
particular pesticide application has been widely blamed for the disappearance, almost overnight, 
of the last of the rooted vegetation in the lake in the summer of 1972. But by the 1980s, as 
farmers learned to moderate the amount of chemicals they added to their crops and the most 
dangerous toxins were banned, this problem had been dramatically curtailed. The 
organochlorides contained in agricultural chemicals, while potent, tended to dissipate quickly 
and leave little lasting effect, so by the time the park was declared in 1986, agricultural pollutants 
played a relatively minor role in the lake’s contamination. 
Despite these changes, in the post-Franco period the water quality in the Albufera 
continued to decline as a result of new sources and types of pollution.15 In part, this pollution 
originated with urban and industrial sources across the 917-square kilometer drainage basin of 
the Albufera Lake (Figure 24). Though Spanish law required water collection and treatment 
facilities for all new urban and industrial construction, in practice construction was slow and 
halting, and developers across the Community simply used preexisting canals and rivers to 
dispose of their untreated waste. The year the Generalitat declared the park, more than 70% of 
the population of the Autonomous Community of Valencia still had no water treatment 
whatsoever. Seventy percent of the treatment facilities that did exist were functioning incorrectly 
                                                
14 Benet Granell, “La Albufera de Valencia,” 175; Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Estudios Previos Lago, 162; Antonio 
Camacho Gonzáles, Informe sobre la situación de contaminación de las aguas del Parque Natural de la Albufera, 
(2005), OGPA. 
15 Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Estudios Previos Lago, 161. New limits on the types and quantities of agricultural 
chemicals that could be used in the lake’s immediate surroundings had successfully stabilized organochloride levels 
in the late 1970s. Sanmartín Arce, La Albufera y sus Hombres, 249; Benet Granell, “La Albufera de Valencia,” 175; 
Generalitat Valenciana, “Estudio sobre la Contaminacion,” 3-4. 
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or not at all.16 A plan for the Western Collector, a subterranean drain that would collect more 
than 80% of the wastewater from the areas west and north of the Albufera was approved in 1974, 
but political debates over financing, expropriation of land under which to bury the pipes, 
jurisdiction, and feasibility of water treatment and collection programs throughout the province 
would delay construction for almost twenty years. Consequently, in 1981, when a water 
treatment plant designed to handle the city’s waste opened at Pinedo, a hamlet on the extreme 
north of the Dehesa, none of the industries and municipalities around the lake diverted their 
wastewater there.17 Instead, contaminated water poured down canals and drainage ditches from 
across the basin, including sewage and runoff from almost three dozen separate municipalities 
with more than a million inhabitants, and waste from thousands of industries. 
Figure 24: The Albufera hydrological basin.18 
 
                                                
16 Dirección General de Obras Públicas, Libro blanco del agua en la Comunidad Valenciana: situación actual y 
bases para una nueva política hidraúlica (Valencia: Dirección General de Obras Públicas, 1985). 
17 “Comenzaron las obras del colector que evitará que la Albufera sea una cloaca,” Levante, June 15, 19884; 
Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Estudios Previos Lago, 163; Miguel de la Guardia Cirugeda, Amparo Salvador Carreño 
and Joan Serra Folguero, “Contaminación por materia orgánica de las acequias que vierten a la Albufera de 
Valencia,” in El Medio Ambiente en la Comunidad Valenciana (Generalitat Valenciana 1987), 238-43; Valencian 
Public Works department, quoted in Garcia and Cabrejas, “Medio Ambiente y conflicto social,” 84; “Los 
Agricultores, primeros perjudicados,” 14; EPYPSA, Saneamiento del Parque Natural de la Albufera (Valencia: 
Generalitat Valenciana, 1993); Taléns Mollá, “Descontaminación;” Dirección General de Obras Hidraulicas, Plan 
de infraestructura sanitaria de la zona costera de la provincia de Valencia, January 25 1974; Carlos Dafauce Ruiz, 
Inginiero de Montes. La Albufera de Valencia: Un Estudio Piloto (Madrid: ICONA, 1975), 110-114. 
18 Map from Momblanch, Historia de la Albufera de Valencia. 
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Dozens of heavily polluting point sources within the park limits contributed some of the 
deadliest and most noxious contaminants to the lake’s waters, and threatened the park’s very 
existence. In the years surrounding the park’s declaration, a handful of enterprising speculators 
had purchased land in the rice fields at bargain prices owing to its rural zoning, thinking to take 
advantage of the touristic potential offered by its proximity to the beach. Once the Generalitat 
rezoned the land as urban, which Franco-era development politics had shown was only a matter 
of time, they would make a killing either by building on the land or by re-selling it to developers. 
They were so convinced of the inevitability of rezoning that many of them went ahead and built 
on the land illegally, relying on the laxity of local law enforcement with regard to land use 
planning. By the mid-1990s, dozens of hotels, restaurants, nightclubs, slaughterhouses, garages, 
warehouses, and factories operated within the park boundaries, discharging enormous quantities 
of toxic waste, animal cadavers, and other refuse directly into the canals; endangering wildlife by 
increasing traffic on the Dehesa’s roads; and creating a tremendous racket that disrupted bird 
nesting. 
As impractical as their moneymaking strategy may sound, such practices had been 
common and highly successful throughout the economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s, and had 
in fact given rise to many of the complaints of unplanned land use described in previous chapters. 
The Dehesa development from 1964 to 1974 had come about as a result of the 1958 proposal by 
city councilor José Barberá (father of the current mayor, Rita Barberá) to create a comprehensive 
urbanization plan in order to prevent the area from becoming a “a true chaos” as a result of 
illegal and unregulated construction already in progress. Even today, the issue remains a 
contentious one. In 2004, park director José Segarra approved a management plan that would 
retroactively legalize the construction that speculators carried out in the years after the park’s 
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declaration and would rezone large portions of land within the park boundaries as urban and 
commercial. Agró has sued to block this action in Spanish courts and filed several complaints 
with the EU, which are pending at the time of writing.19 
The declaration of the Albufera Natural Park, and its attendant permanent designation of 
all land as un-urbanizable, came as a nasty shock to these speculators, though they soon went 
back to building and operating their businesses with impunity when they realized they had little 
to fear from the park’s administrators. Carlos Auernheimer, the head of the Generalitat’s 
environmental agency between 1986 and 1991 and the de facto director of all protected spaces in 
the Valencian Community, embodied the Generalitat’s ambivalent attitude towards 
environmental protection.20 While the Generalitat had hired a handful of biologists to direct its 
environmental efforts, it had also inherited the employees, infrastructures, and duties of the 
famously inept Nature Conservation Institute (ICONA), which had done so much damage to the 
Dehesa via such projects as pine planting, road building, and carp farming. Insisting that his 
agency’s function was “not to sanction, but rather to correct,” Auernheimer gave polluters and 
illegal business operators within the Albufera Park virtually endless opportunities and time to 
voluntarily stop their illegal activities. Dozens of fines issued by his guards remained suspended 
for years while the infractions – most prominently waste dumping, illegal construction, and 
industrial activity – continued. Victor Navarro, Agró’s founder and spokesman, furiously 
denounced this refusal to meet their legal responsibilities, accusing the Generalitat and 
Auernheimer in particular of a “lack of planning, ineffectiveness, indolence, and indifference.”21 
Auernheimer, noted Navarro bitterly, “would be a magnificent Minister of Industry, because at 
                                                
19 Bárbera, “Moción sobre urbanizacion en Saler.” 
20 This apathy was not unique to Valencia, but rather reflected a national trend. See Fernández, El Ecologismo 
Español, 255-258. 
21 “Acció Ecologista critica la gestión política en materia medioambiental,” Levante, April 2, 1991. 
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least his management is completely respectful of all the orders of that Ministry.”22  
Critics in the liberal press likewise described Auernheimer as “the perfect person to direct 
the dungheap that they are allowing the Albufera natural park to become.”23 His subordinates, 
overwhelmingly composed of former ICONA engineers, seemed happy enough to continue on in 
the same pattern. In the early 1990s, therefore, the farmers were entirely correct when they noted 
that the Generalitat had essentially failed to “take any repressive actions against certain local 
governments that violate the law, dumping sewage water within the limits of the Park.”24 In the 
spring of 1994, Las Provincias reflected the general consensus that the park’s regulations had 
“turned out to be nothing more than wet paper,” leaving the park to deteriorate “from bad to 
worse” while “nobody does anything to save this rich treasure of Valencian landscape from total 
death.”25  
Some of the blame for the park’s continued deterioration can be laid on a systematic lack 
of coordination between the various public administrations that shared jurisdiction over the 
territory.26 Natural parks administration fell under the jurisdiction of the Generalitat, the 
bureaucratic structures of which changed frequently in that era, and within the Albufera Park in 
particular, multiple municipal and individual properties overlapped. The single largest property 
                                                
22 Vicente Aupi, “‘Siempre dije que Auernheimer sería una magnífico ministro de Industria,’” Hoja de Lunes, 
December 17, 1990. Administrative restructuring within the Generalitat did away with Auernheimer’s position 
altogether and replaced it with the cabinet-level position of regional Minister for the Environment after 1991. The 
first Minister, Antoní Escarré Esteve (1991-1993), achieved similarly little with regard to the Albufera. His 
successor, and Emerít Bono i Martinez (1993-1995), oversaw the “golden age” of Albufera management from a 
conservation perspective, as described in the following chapters. 
23 Vicente Aupi, “Zonas de la Albufera, desecadas ilegalmente,” Hoja de Lunes, January 5, 198811. 
24 “AVA justifica los aterramientos en el parque de la Albufera,” Levante, April 30, 1995. During the bureaucratic 
restructuring of the Generalitat in 1991 and the replacement of the Environmental Agency with the regional Ministry 
for the Environment, Auernheimer was replaced with the new Environmental Minister, Antioni Escarré, under 
whose jurisdiction the office issued an increased number of sanctions but again failed largely to enforce them. 
25 Teresa Laguna, “El Saler se está muriendo,” Las Provincias, March 7, 1994. Similar sentiments were reflected in 
other regional papers, notably “Las verdades del barquero,” Levante, November 8, 1986 and Letter from AEA to 
Joan Lerma and Carlos Auernheimer, June 1989, printed in part in Sierra, “Agró: ‘La junta del parque.’” 
26 Victor Navarro, “Sostenido, aunque insostenible,” Levante, June 13, 1992; Junta Rectora del Parque Natural de 
l’Albufera, Actas, December 19, 1989, Correspondencia, 3/931-7, AHGV. 
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owner within the park was the city of Valencia itself, which retained possession of the lake and 
Dehesa and assigned their environmental management to the scientists and technicians of the 
OTDA. In the rice fields, the Generalitat shared jurisdiction with not only the private property 
owners of each plot but also with the city councils of thirteen separate municipalities, among 
which support for the park and enforcement of its rules varied widely. Most of the water 
pollution, meanwhile, flowed into the park from outside of its boundaries, invoking the 
jurisdictions of still more individuals, corporations, and municipal entities, over which the 
Generalitat had legal jurisdiction but attempted to balance issues of economic growth and 
business interests with those of the environment. 
The result was a morass of regulations and authorizations that industrial and development 
interests routinely used to their advantage. Municipal governments of some of the rice towns, in 
particular, disputed the Generalitat’s right to impose the park in the first place and used 
jurisdictional issues to complicate its implementation. Some city councils issued building or 
business permits to residents that directly violated park regulations, but the most common tactic 
was simply to refuse to enforce environmental laws. Even after the completion of the Westerrn 
Collector, local mayors refused to spend their own funds to connect municipal sewers to the 
water treatment system or to prosecute individual infractions within their city limits. The mayor 
of Sollana, for instance, told investigators that protecting the park “should be the responsibility 
of the governing board of the park. They have to be the ones to guard it, because that’s not the 
local governments’ mission.” Auernheimer, meanwhile, insisted that preventing and punishing 
such infractions was “the responsibility of each local government, which must communicate any 
environmental crimes to the governing board of the park.” The result of such attitudes was a 
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deadlock that left the Albufera Natural Park almost entirely unprotected for the first decade of its 
existence.27 
As rice farmer José Ramón Pascual Monzó noted, if the Generalitat had really cared 
about protecting the ecosystem rather than simply making a show of its modern sensibilities, 
“they would have made the park with a real budget and resources.”28 Instead, in 1989 the 
Environmental Agency designated just 19.5 million pesetas for the entire park (later increased to 
39 million), while the OTDA and the city government spent 535 million pesetas on the Dehesa 
alone.29 This reflected a lack of effort on the part of the Generalitat towards the environment as a 
whole: the Environmental Agency employed only two guards to monitor compliance with the 
law over the entire Valencian territory, increased to four in 1989, a laughably insufficient force.30 
Until 1990, the sole dedicated Albufera Park employee, biologist Ignacio Lacomba, was forced 
to work out of a tiny office in the middle of the city, far from the lake and the people who lived 
there.31 
                                                
27 Aupi, “Zonas de la Albufera,” 11. 
28 Pascual Monzó interview, El Palmar, May 4, 2012. 
29 Junta Rectora, December 19, 1989. 
30 Conselleria de Medi Ambient, “Informe de Gestion del Parque Natural de L’Albufera, Año 1991,” FDMA. 
31 Ignacio Lacomba, interview with the author, Valencia, April 26 2012. For specific complaints regarding the 
Generalitat’s ineffective enforcement, see “Grupos pro naturaleza denuncian la política medioambiental de la 
Generalitat,” Levante, July 13, 1988; “Denuncia a la Consellería de Agricultura al incumplir la normativa europea de 
caza de aves,” Las Provincias, March 9, 1989; José Sierra, “Agró: ‘La junta del parque natural de la Albufera es 
meramente decorativa,’” Levante, June 5, 1989; “La Generalitat autorizó ayer la caza, incumpliendo un decreto del 
Gobierno,” Hoja del Lunes, October 2, 1989; Aupi, “‘Siempre dije que Auernheimer sería una magnífico ministro 
de Industria:’” Conselleria de Medi Ambient, Generalitat Valenciana, “Informe de Gestion del Parque Natural de 
L’Albufera, Año 1991,” FDMA; “Acció Ecologista critica la gestión del conceller Emèrit Bono,” Levante, April 5 
1991; José Sierra, “Acció Ecologista-Agró presentará el próximo lunes al fiscal jefe varias denuncias sobre 
agresiones al medio ambiente,” Levante, May 5 1991; “La Albufera, hoy como ayer,” Levante, May 18, 1991; 
“Acció Ecologista-Agró denuncia;” Notario, “Agró denuncia la degradación de la Albufera;” Rafael Pardo and 
Victor Navarro, “Año y medio de Conselleria de Medio Ambiente,” Levante, November 29, 1992; “Los expedientes 
por aterramientos en la Albufera cayeron un 84% en 1993,” Levante, February 3, 1994; Pablo Salazar, “Parque de la 
Albufera: El Ayuntamiento ha ordenado el cierre de catorce locales por no tener licencia,” Las Provincias, March 6, 
1994; Maria Consuelo Reyna, “El Saler, en total abandono,” Las Provincias, March 7, 1994; “Orden de derribo de 
una nave ilegal en la Albufera,” Las Provincias, April 22, 1994; “Medio Ambiente cierra por primera vez dos firmas 
por incumplir el plan de la Albufera,” Levante, May 30, 1992; “El Consell advierte a Gascó que en Pinedo hay 11 




Valencia joined other Mediterranean regions in blaming its failure to enforce 
environmental standards largely on a lack of money. Partly in response to such complaints, in 
1992 the EC inaugurated the LIFE program for the environment, which provided cofinancing for 
projects of sustainable development, habitat protection, education and administration in member 
states. Nearly half of the available funds were devoted to protecting the spaces that made up the 
newly formed “Natura 2000” network of habitats “of European importance,” including all the 
sites listed in the Birds Directive, further entrenching the notion of such sites as inherently 
“European” properties and distancing them from traditional local, regional, or national ways of 
seeing the land.32 
But while funding problems in the late 1980s certainly had hindered Valencian efforts to 
improve the Albufera’s ecological health, equally significant was a general disinterest among the 
responsible administrators and a pervasive wariness of environmental regulation as a potential 
brake on economic growth. In the words of Susana Aguilar Fernández, the preeminent scholar of 
contemporary Spanish environmental policy, upon accession to the EU, Spain “more or less 
literally, and uncritically, transposed environmental directives into Spanish national law.”33 
Paloma Mateache, ICONA’s first environmental biologist, echoes this claim in the local context 
of Valencia, noting that “all the ideas arrived from Europe, not from internal convictions,” and 
the national government did not look critically at or negotiate its acceptance of environmental 
laws even when they made no sense in a Spanish context.34 Over the following decades, Spain 
continued this pattern, adopting increasingly onerous obligations with only minimal requests for 
                                                                                                                                                       
Laguna, “La Generalitat no ha cobrado 60 millones en multas por aterramientos en la Albufera,” Las Provincias, 
December 15 1994; J. C. Martí, “El 84.2% de los valencianos cree que la Albufera recuperará si las empresas pagan 
por verter,” Levante, January 15, 199539. 
32 This process was eloquently described in Heatherington, Wild Sardinia, 143. 
33 Susana Aguilar Fernández, “Spain: Old Habits Die Hard,” in Jordan and Liefferink, Environmental Policy in 
Europe, 186. 
34 Mateache interview, Valencia, May 9, 2011. 
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additional time for implementation. Regional governments across the country varied widely in 
their enthusiasm for such measures, and in many cases local administrators shared Valencia’s 
reluctance to enact and enforce a body of law for which they had no precedent, no infrastructure, 
and little popular support or understanding.35 
Many of the landowners within the park, including some farmers, took the Generalitat’s 
obvious lack of interest as a tacit license to continue using park lands as if the protections did not 
exist. Over the first six years of the park’s existence, farmers in the towns of Pinedo, Sollana, 
Sueca and Cullera, among others, took “advantage of the lack of vigilance in the natural park of 
the Albufera” to fill, pave, or re-plant their rice fields to obtain more lucrative use of the land.36 
Local governments, such as those of Cullera in the south and Sollana in the west, officially 
authorized their citizens to build in defiance of park regulations, leading to protracted legal 
battles as the courts tried to sort out the confused territorial jurisdictions.37 Between 1986 and 
1990, around 500 hectares (1,235.5 acres) of rice paddies around the edges of the park were 
transformed into onion fields, citrus groves, and warehouses.38 As local officials had worried at 
the turn of the century when the city had originally purchased the lake to protect it from further 
drainage, the gradual disappearance of the rice fields was a major threat to the long-term stability 
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of the aesthetic and scientific value of the lake itself, reducing the habitat and food available to 
birds and decreasing the “green filter” that was the lake’s only protection from toxic runoff. 
While scientists evinced genuine concerns about the farmers’ failure to comply with park 
regulations, the farmers had legitimate objections to the disproportionate pressure and blame 
placed on them for the park’s situation. When Auernheimer’s guards were stirred to action, 
rather than enter into the maze of jurisdictions and complex infrastructural debates presented by 
water pollution, they went primarily for the relatively simple and easily-addressed infractions by 
hunters, farmers, and landowners within the park’s boundaries. Local people received citations 
for poaching, dumping solid waste along roadsides, filling in their rice fields, and constructing 
without authorization, and saw themselves depicted by the government and the press as “the bad 
guys of the park” while being forced to bear “all the burden.”39 José Luís Mateses described how 
prohibitions on routine daily tasks necessary to the maintenance of the rice fields, from fixing 
dikes to clearing canals to improving roads, made the farmers’ lives impossible. “They paralyzed 
our canal construction, they forbid us from widening a road, we can’t build anything,” 
complained another farmer; “they don’t let us grow and modernize.”40 Unsurprisingly, this 
amplified existing resentment among farmers towards the park. While water of increasingly 
alarming colors and odors ran through their fields from municipal and industrial sources, AVA 
representatives complained that “if a farmer lays a single brick the entire bureaucracy falls on top 
of him.”41 Miguel Minguet, who served at the time as the co-president of AVA’s rice-growers’ 
division, articulately summarized the farmers’ position with regards to the Generalitat’s 
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enforcement, saying that “if we rice farmers have seen environmentalism as an enemy, it is 
because the attitude of those gentlemen has forced us to present it that way.”42 
But while it augmented the farmers’ sense of persecution by conservationists, it also 
pushed them to be more vocal about the other, far more significant infractions going on within 
the park. Municipal authorities, they claimed, blamed farmers in an attempt to “divert public 
attention and responsibility towards more dispersed and defenseless sectors” while they “did 
nothing to clean the beaches or purify the wastewater of the town.”43 As one farmer scoffed in 
1989, “any reasonable person can see that the substances and objects that pollute the beach and 
the water do not derive from agricultural activity.”44 Indeed, the farmers’ ongoing violations of 
park law paled in comparison to the devastation wrought upon the local environment by the 
small number of speculators and developers who continued to illegally operate their heavily 
polluting industries within the park. Throughout the late 1980s, these individuals had remained 
largely behind the scenes in the battle against the park, allowing the farmers to take the lead in 
legal challenges and encouraging municipal governments to act on their behalf. When Agró and 
OTDA scientists claimed that the farmers’ had been “manipulated” into opposing the park, it was 
these speculators who they blamed for spreading misinformation and unrest. But by the early 
1990s, as the farmers increasingly called for enforcement of pollution laws, the landowners 
finally formed their own interest group, which they called the Association of Landowners and 
Businessmen of the Albufera Natural Park (Asociación de Propietarios y Empresarios del 
Parque Natural de la Albufera, hereafter Apepna). 
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The case of Apepna highlights the difference between the farmers’ cries for 
“conservation with common sense” and a truly anti-conservationist stance. While Apepna and 
the farmers both asked the Generalitat to exclude private property from the park’s boundaries, 
any similarity between the two groups ended there. Whereas the farmers’ objections derived 
from a combination of cultural traditions, personal identity, and concern for their economic 
survival, Apepna members’ claims derived solely from the principles of the free market, and 
their plans were completely incompatible with the park’s ecological and cultural goals.45 When 
Apepna members came forward in the early 1990s to defend their interests, unlike the farmers 
they did so in terms that left no room for negotiation or compromise. Asserting simply that “the 
right to private property still exists,” Apepna filed suit in 1991 to demand that the Generalitat 
either eliminate the park’s restrictions, legalize their businesses and operations, or purchase their 
lands outright at exorbitant prices.46 
Apepna’s appearance had much to do with the speculators’ inability, by the early 1990s, 
to rely on farmers to fight their anti-park battles for them. The farmers’ fundamental objection to 
the park had always been that environmental regulations prevented them from responding to 
market pressures in a way that would make their existence financially viable. But by the early 
1990s, prices for almost all Spanish crops had dropped so low that Valencian farmers lost the 
incentive to transform their rice fields.47 While Valencians and other farmers called for higher 
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price supports, non-European competitors pressured the EEC to drop CAP supports altogether. 
Concern over market stability and agricultural prices brought parties to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, the predecessor to the World Trade Organization) to place 
agriculture on the bargaining table for the first time. During the Uruguay Round of negotiations 
(1986-1994) the United States, supported by the Cairns Group of non-European agricultural 
exporters including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, much of southeast Asia, and most of South 
America, demanded that the EEC substantially reduce both price supports and export subsidies to 
allow for the free movement of agricultural goods on the international market. Though 
reluctantly willing to do so, the EEC insisted it be permitted to proceed moderately and on a 
product-by-product basis. Carlos Romero, the Spanish Agriculture representative for GATT, 
asked in particular that negotiators exclude “Mediterranean products” as a group from the new 
subsidy reductions. Additionally, Ministers of Agriculture from all the EEC member states with 
the exception of Holland and the UK agreed that the EEC could not cut the existing subsidy 
system without providing some form of direct payments to compensate farmers for their lost 
income.48 
Spanish farmers saw the Uruguay Round as yet another attack by the international market 
on their livelihoods, compounding the competition they already faced from Italian and, 
increasingly, North African producers. AVA staunchly opposed the GATT negotiations, calling 
European willingness to consider reforms “a major concession by the agrarian sector to the 
multinational pressure groups” that “once again demonstrates the inability of the Ministers of 
Agriculture to defend the survival of a sector that is restructuring in the EEC and especially in 
Spain.” With regard to the notion of compensatory subsidies, Spanish farmers’ unions argued 
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that direct payments could not compensate for reduced price supports because they might “offer 
results in the medium-term but do not help the farmer in the moment when he confronts a fall in 
prices.”49 Succumbing to international pressures on this issue, AVA predicted, would result in 
“the disappearance of four hundred thousand producers in the space of seven years; the total 
transformation of the basis of the CAP; and the appearance of an absolutely free market, with 
which we cannot cope.”50 
Similar statements from farm lobbies across Europe could not counteract the CAP’s 
spiraling costs and growing pressure from environmental interest groups, which contributed to 
the general conclusion among negotiators that the policy was overdue for reforms. Several 
northern and central European states, especially Germany, were more interested in obtaining 
favorable terms of trade for intellectual and industrial exports, and pressured the Council of 
Agricultural Ministers to offer a compromise in exchange. Such connections lent credibility to 
Spanish accusations that the “ambiguous and nonstop modifications of the CAP have clearly 
benefitted the strategies of the North and the center of the EEC, while always trapping the 
Spanish interests.” Rural people nationwide expressed their resentment that they were once again 
being asked to sacrifice, without compensation, for the greater good of the country.51 
This agricultural crisis contributed to ongoing trends of urbanization and occupational 
changes among many rural families. While José Luís Mateses’ generation had grown up without 
educational opportunities, rarely imagining careers outside of agriculture, many of their children 
had earned college degrees or found work in the booming construction business. Others, 
pressured by falling crop prices over the past decades, had been forced to work second jobs in 
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tourism or industry. Over the course of the decade, the Valencian Community saw a sharp 
decline in professional farming and the rise of “part-time farmers,” defined by the Spanish 
government as anyone who received less than half their income from agricultural production. 
The numbers of part-time farmers steadily increased, especially in areas close to cities where 
other employment was readily available. By 1995, within the Valencian community generally, 
more than 80% of farmers worked only part-time.52 
The new generation of farmers was a far cry from the stereotypical image of the 
uneducated, salt-of-the earth Valencian peasant working his fields. Frequently, part-time farmers 
in the mid-1990s were either retirees using their fields to supplement their pensions or highly 
educated professionals who worked in the cities as doctors, lawyers, journalists, or civil servants, 
but who maintained their inherited family lands and continued to sell produce as a hobby or 
supplemental income. To them, rice cultivation was a way to connect with their family histories 
and traditions and to make a bit of extra cash for a special vacation or luxury item, rather than a 
means of economic survival for their families.  
This shift from farming as a livelihood to farming as a supplementary economic activity 
freed Albufera rice farmers from the need, if not the desire, to make significant profits on their 
land. Part-time farmers continued to grow rice, either for the supplemental income or for 
pleasure, so long as the price of production did not outweigh the price they could get for their 
crops. All they asked, by and large, was to do a bit better than break even. But crop prices had 
fallen so low by the early 1990s, even with CAP subsidies, that the farmers found themselves 
putting more money into production than they received from sales.53 The result was massive land 
abandonment nationwide, and rapid conversion of fields to more lucrative crops for those who 
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wanted to continue farming. In the Albufera, the second option was prohibited and the first 
would lead to ecological disaster for the park. Caught between the Scylla of economic pressures 
and the Charybdis of environmental regulations, the farmers grew increasingly frustrated with 
their powerlessness in the face of global pressures. 
As a result of these changes, the farmers’ redirected their frustrations from the park to the 
CAP itself and their general reliance on transnational economies. Beginning around 1990, 
farmers from across Valencia marched through downtown Valencia to “demonstrate our total 
rejection of the agricultural policy being carried out by the European Community.”54 In one 
headline-grabbing episode, more than one hundred farmers drove their tractors through the city 
center. Echoing their complaints about the unilateral imposition of environmental regulations, 
farmers demanded a voice in the decision-making processes that affected them so profoundly. “It 
is the farmers themselves and the other people who live in the rural environment, represented by 
their professional organizations, who know better than anyone what is in their interests and what 
is good for them,” argued one AVA representative. “And therefore, their participation is essential 
at the hour of drafting the lines of any agricultural or rural policy at any level: local, regional, 
national, Community, and international.”55 
Against a chorus of similar demands from across Europe, in the summer of 1992, the 
Council of Europe approved reforms to the CAP based on a proposal by Commissioner of 
Agriculture Ray MacSharry, the EEC’s chief negotiator in the Uruguay Round. As expected, the 
plan proposed dramatic cuts to intervention prices for various crops and introduced a system of 
direct payments for farmers who voluntarily agreed to reduce their production through such 
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measures as early retirement, withdrawing their land from cultivation, or adhering to “agri-
environmental” practices such as reducing chemical use. These subsidies were intended to 
“safeguard[] the position of the vast majority of farmers,…improve the standard of land use and 
land conservation and ensure a balanced development of the countryside.”56  
Valencian farmers met the news of the reforms with apprehension and distrust, a feeling 
shared by farmers across Europe, and a natural response given their repeated disappointments 
from European laws in the past. “We want to continue being farmers,” wrote one, which required 
“minimum conditions that permit the development of our profession with dignity and quality of 
life.”57 The new subsidies, they feared, might not suffice. “If we tighten our belts another notch, 
we will suffocate,” wrote an AVA editorialist. “We have already exceeded our capacity for 
resistance. All that is left is to flee the countryside, entering a different economic sector, or 
staying with mere subsistence farming.”58 As one farmer warned, apocalyptically but not 
inaccurately, “if agriculture collapses, the entire rural world will fall.”59 Nowhere was this 
warning more accurate than in the Albufera, where the struggling ecosystems depended on the 
continued existence of the rice fields. Fortunately for the park, the CAP reforms did not directly 
affect price supports for rice, leaving local farmers at least no worse off than they had been 
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before with regard to the markets for their crops.60 And despite the farmers’ initial skepticism, 
the environmental aspects of the MacSharry reforms would prove their economic salvation. 
The implementation of the MacSharry reforms roughly coincided with regional elections 
in Valencia, and the environmental administrators who replaced Auernheimer signaled a major 
shift in the Generalitat’s attitude towards the park. The biologist María Angeles Ull took over as 
General Director for Nature Conservation in the Valencian Community and promptly put to rest 
any lingering hope among farmers and landowners that the park might be overturned, stating 
firmly that the inclusion of private property within the protected area was “non-negotiable.”61 
Beyond this hardline stance, however, Ull’s early statements made it clear that her administration 
would seek to improve relations with those who still opposed the park insofar as their demands 
were compatible with environmental protection. “While AVA shows a willingness to arrive at a 
legal solution,” she told reporters in 1994, “the hunters and Apepna do not want the natural park 
at all.”62 
The legal solution both sides pursued would come through the MacSharry reforms, which 
offered economic and ideological incentives for farmers to reimagine their role as active 
participants in local conservation efforts. Ull appointed local biologist Joan Miquel Benavent as 
the first dedicated director of the Albufera Natural Park. Born in the Albufera rice town of 
Massanassa, Benavent made his first trip across it by boat in 1967, at the age of nine. Today, he 
animatedly describes leaning over the side and seeing a forest of lush vegetation growing on the 
bottom, fish darting below the prow of the boat, while “hundreds” of birds floated and dove 
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around him. The Albufera of the late 1960s was, he says, “the first truly wild place” he had ever 
visited, and it left a permanent impression.63 The memory led him to volunteer with Felipe’s 
scientific team in 1979 while studying biology at the university, and he continued to work off 
and on as a volunteer with the OTDA over the coming years, among other tasks as a translator of 
environmental education materials into Valencian.  
Miguel Minguet, co-president of AVA’s rice-growers’ division, and other AVA members 
hoped Benavent’s appointment signaled a new approach, “more open to dialog and opposed to 
taking unilateral decisions.”64 At first, the new director’s determination to enforce regulations 
that Auernheimer had long ignored sent farmers into a rage. Against the vehement protests of the 
owners, for instance, Benavent finally sent the Generalitat’s backhoes to dig out some of the 
converted rice fields, and AVA representatives accused him of having “broken the climate of 
understanding” that had existed between the park and the farmers.65 Returning to their old 
arguments about the infringement of property rights, AVA insisted that the illegal conversion of 
the rice fields had been “justified given that the Administration has not compensated the losses 
created by the limitations of rights inherent to the declaration of the natural park, nor has it made 
any economic effort towards making organic farming or environmental protection possible, nor 
has it offered viable alternatives for the necessary modernization of cultivation.”66 
But Benavent soon addressed these concerns with a slate of policies he and park biologist 
Ignacio Lacomba developed at lightning speed. The two drafted and submitted a formal 
regulatory plan for the park that would protect the boundaries and basic regulations of the area 
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for the next several decades, even against hostile administrators and politicians. Although their 
budget remained limited, Benavent encouraged the Generalitat’s acquisition of land within the 
park as a means of preserving it, freeing it from the complaints of private landowners and 
enabling its disposition for purely ecological, educational, and scientific purposes.67 He worked 
closely with former colleagues at the OTDA on research projects and management strategies, 
incorporating their technical expertise with the Generalitat’s legal jurisdiction and, for the first 
time, managing the entire park as the single integrated ecosystem it was meant to be. He moved 
the park’s administrative offices into a farmhouse in the fishing village of El Palmar, where it 
would be closer to the park itself and more easily accessible to those who lived and worked 
there.68 
Most importantly, Benavent’s tenure as park director emphasized the integration of those 
who lived and worked within the park boundaries in its environmental mission.69 The crashing 
agricultural market provided a unique opportunity to make farmers an integral part of the park’s 
maintenance, turning enemies into reluctant allies and defusing the principal social opposition 
the park had endured since its founding. After a decade of hostility to environmental protection, 
Valencian rice farmers in the mid-1990s found that the Albufera’s protected status offered them 
relief from their economic and political problems through the CAP’s new direct subsidy 
program.70 
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In addition to horizontal subsidies available across the national territory,71 the MacSharry 
reforms also provided special payments available to farmers in environmentally sensitive areas 
including Ramsar wetlands and internationally protected bird habitats.72 Benavent and Lacomba 
promptly went to work developing a set of specific measures for the Albufera, establishing a 
handful of sound environmental practices that farmers could voluntarily adopt in order to receive 
per-hectare payments on their lands.73 Using a “carrot-and-stick” approach, they offered 
subsidies for activities that directly complemented existing regulations and did not require 
farmers to substantially modify the practices already mandated by the law. For example, the 
ecological objective of providing winter bird habitat was met through a combination of 
restrictions (park regulations forbade farmers from growing anything other than rice, from 
growing a winter crop, and from constructing anything not directly related to the rice fields) and 
rewards (subsidies for farmers who promised to maintain their rice crops, avoid winter 
cultivation, and flood their fields between November and March). Likewise, the objective of 
reducing chemical inputs to the ecosystem was achieved through complementary limitations (the 
park prohibition on aggressive chemicals) and incentives (payments for weeding fields 
mechanically rather than using herbicides).74 
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The resulting “Agri-Environmental Program for the Albufera Natural Park” was the first 
major step by representatives of the Valencian environmental movement towards reconciliation 
with the farmers. For committing to three major actions – maintaining their rice fields, flooding 
the fields in the fall and winter, and mechanically removing weeds rather than using herbicides – 
participating farmers would receive 95,000 pesetas per hectare per year, calculated as “sufficient 
economic aid to compensate for the decline in profitability implied by the maintenance of 40,000 
hectares (98,842 acres) of rice in its traditional mode of cultivation.”75 In essence, the subsidies 
offered an opportunity for farmers to boost their incomes enough to enable them to continue rice 
farming despite exceptionally low market prices, thus helping themselves and the Albufera’s 
birds at one go. 
Following their plan’s approval by the national government, Benavent and Lacomba 
arranged a series of informal meetings with Miguel Minguet. Minguet was a big, friendly man, 
passionately devoted to the rights of the farmers, quick to anger at perceived offenses but equally 
quick to trust those willing to listen to his side of the story. For several weeks in 1994, the three 
men met in local bars after work to talk about what the farmers and the environment needed. 
Benavent’s deep personal roots in the Albufera area, including the fact that Valencian was his 
mother tongue, earned him far more respect from the farmers than Felipe’s and Navarro’s 
university degrees and political support. Even years after falling out with Benavent and Lacomba 
in a dispute over farmers’ practices, Minguet still described both scientists as “more intelligent” 
and “less theoretical” than the city employees with whom AVA had so often found itself in 
conflict.76 In part, this favorable impression arose from the willingness of both men to literally 
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meet Minguet on his own turf, to listen to his complaints, and to discuss the ways the subsidy 
program would enable park managers to work with, rather than against, the farmers. Benavent’s 
obvious personal ties to the land also lent him legitimacy in the eyes of the farmers that went 
well beyond that of urban activists like Felipe and Navarro. But the single most important factor 
in Minguet’s willingness to listen was the simple fact that Benavent and Lacomba offered the 
farmers a way to make money off the park, making their cooperation worthwhile. 
The farmers understood clearly that the subsidies were primarily an effort to “quiet the 
voices” they had raised in protest against the park; a way to raise the farmers’ profits “so that 
everyone would be content with the park.”77 At first, many did not want to accept the subsidies 
because they worried that doing so would signal their tacit acceptance of the park’s authority. 
But Minguet, at least, also saw the subsidies as an effort by the Generalitat to compromise with 
the farmers. He felt that his talks with the biologists were a sort of “negotiation” designed to 
solicit his input and contributions in a collaborative process. In his words, it was clear after Ull’s 
repeated declarations that “the park is here to stay,” and the best they could hope for was to 
receive indemnification for their contributions and a greater voice in the way it was run.78 As 
such, the farmers came to see the new subsidy program as a product of their own protest efforts, 
and a measure of their success at convincing the Generalitat to “work with the farmers, not 
impose regulations without consulting us.”79 From this time forward, farmers generally stopped 
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calling for the park’s dissolution, asking instead for a rational regulatory structure that provided 
adequate compensation to the farmers and took their practical needs and expertise into account.80 
During the first subsidy year, only thirty-three people requested and received the 
subsidies, a total of just 61 million pesetas (approximately $427,000 at 1994 exchange rates).81 
To convince farmers to participate, park employees had to fill out all the paperwork themselves, 
at times a herculean task given the extreme disarray of local land records, where fields remained 
registered in the names of long-dead grandfathers and sales or transfers went unrecorded for 
decades.82 Such confusion is in itself indicative of the fundamental disconnect between the top-
down management favored by regional and European officials and the older models of 
customary law and family inheritance followed by Valencian farmers. Distrust of central 
authorities had long been a feature of rural Valencian culture, and one that the subsidy program 
had to overcome. Even with bureaucratic assistance, many part-time farmers who owned only a 
few hectares of land deemed the per-hectare subsidies too small and uncertain to be worth the 
effort. Larger landowners such as Minguet and Mateses, who had more to gain, were more likely 
to participate. But by the second round of the program, in 1995, more than a thousand farmers 
including small landowners requested subsidy payments, of which 898 were approved, 
representing a third of all the rice fields in the park and a total of 242 million pesetas ($1.84 
million at 1995 exchange rates).83 Word-of-mouth from these successful applicants encouraged 
                                                
80 Mario Beltrán, “El parque de La Albufera nace sin equilibrio entre el interés ecológico y el económico,” ABC 
Valencia, March 29, 1994; EFE, “Los arroceros piden dialogar con el Parque de La Albufera,” Diario 16, March 26, 
1994. 
81 Generalitat Valenciana, Memoria sobre la Gestion 1995. 
82 Mateses interview, Sueca, April 25, 2012; Lacomba interview, Valencia, April 26, 2012. 
83 Generalitat Valenciana, Memoria sobre la Gestion 1995. 
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further participation and by 1998, nearly 3500 different farmers collected agri-environmental 
subsidies, representing more than 80% of the rice fields within the park.84 
The subsidies quickly became essential to the farmers’ economic survival. Market prices, 
not only for rice but also for citrus and other Valencian crops, had dropped so low that anyone 
who did not receive the agri-environmental payments could not recoup production costs. Outside 
the park, farmers who had previously converted their fields to other crops again found 
themselves faced with financial ruin, while the rice farmers inside the park received reliable 
incomes independent of market fluctuations.85 
In addition to the substantial economic benefits, farmers saw the agri-environmental 
program as the park administration’s first step towards taking their concerns seriously and 
making an effort to help them coexist with environmental protection. Other changes soon 
followed. In spring 1994, for instance, regional authorities approved further subsidies for the 
maintenance of the tancats, including reinforcing and repairing walls and maintaining water 
levels, which Benavent’s annual report noted “without a doubt…substantially contributed to 
spread a spirit of getting along” between the farmers and park management.86 The park also gave 
the town of Sueca, historically one of its staunchest opponents, 4 billion pesetas ($30.4 at 1995 
exchange rates) in “compensation” for the exceptionally high burdens that it had borne on behalf 
of the park, most notably the infrastructural reforms (including highways and sewage networks) 
that were to be undertaken within the city limits.87 These actions met with widespread approval 
from the farmers’ representatives on the board, and farmers’ infractions of park regulations 
                                                
84 Vallés Planells, An analysis of the Effects of Agri-environmental Policy. 
85 Joan Miquel Benavent, interview with the author, El Saler, May 5 2011. 
86 Generalitat Valenciana, Informe sobre la Gestion del Parque Natural de L’Albufera durante el Año 1994, OGPA. 
87 Carles Galletero, “La junta del parque destina 4,000 millones a Sueca como compensación por la Albufera,” 
Levante, May 21, 1995. 
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declined measurably as a result.88 In 2000, in response to farmers’ complaints, the Generalitat 
also began offering partial indemnifications for damages to crops incurred by the park’s 
increasing bird populations. Together, these measures removed farmers’ financial incentives to 
oppose the park regulations while providing a new way for them to continue farming within the 
park’s boundaries, thereby contributing to the ecological, cultural, and productive value of the 
land. 
While the park’s regulations did not soften, such conciliatory measures led to a 
significant change in farmers’ attitudes. Rather than opposing the environmental restrictions 
themselves, AVA focused its efforts on obtaining compensation “for the loss of competitiveness 
caused by producing within a protected natural space.”89 Thus, when the EU cut price supports 
for Spanish rice in 1998 (in response to the appearance of new rice-growing areas in Aragon and 
Extremadura that sought to take advantage of EU subsidies and state-sponsored free water), for 
example, AVA promptly asked the regional and national Ministers of Agriculture to make an 
exception for rice fields within protected ecosystems, where farmers were not permitted to 
change their crops.90 Likewise, when further reforms to the CAP took effect in 2000 and 
extended the agri-environmental subsidies to rice farmers outside of protected spaces, AVA 
asked the Generalitat to provide additional payments to Albufera farmers for the damages caused 
                                                
88 Generalitat Valenciana, Informe sobre la Gestion 1994. 
89 “Cae un 67% la rentabilidad de los arroceros valencianos en la campaña 2000-2001,” Agricultores y Ganaderos, 
August 2001, 15. 
90 Tempted by the EU subsidy program and the ready provision of water by the state, many farmers in Aragon and 
Extremadura converted their lands to rice fields. As a result, though the area of rice cultivation in Valencia had 
remained largely static, by 1998 Spain had exceeded the national limits set by the EU to discourage overproduction, 
resulting in the punitive decrease of price supports. Combined with simultaneous increases in Valencian production 
costs, one AVA study reported that Valencian rice farmers’ profits decreased 67% from the previous year. Maria 
Angels Ramón-Llin, the Valencian Minister of Agriculture, agreed with these complaints, describing the farmers’ 
“discomfort and rejection” as “completely justifiable.” On her urging, the national minister took AVA’s request to 
take the special circumstances of the park into account when calculating the subsidies to Brussels. “Fuerte caída de 
los precios del Arroz,” Agricultores y Ganaderos, October 1998, 4; “Las ayudas agroambiental discriminan a los 
arroceros,” Agricultores y Ganaderos, July 2001, 14. 
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by the protected waterfowl population that lived in their fields, in order to place them on even 
footing with competitors who did not have to deal with such “pests.”91 In the spirit of 
compromise, the Generalitat agreed, and began to offer direct subsidies for damage caused by 
wildlife in 2002. 
Through these and other agreements, the Albufera’s farmers increasingly came to see 
their interests as compatible with those of the conservationists. Beginning in 1993, AVA 
sponsored a series of environmental education programs, including a workshop on “Agriculture 
and the Environment,” essays and editorials about organic and traditional farming, and tips for 
farmers to supplement their incomes by renting rooms or houses for rural tourism.92 In order “to 
make it known that agriculture is absolutely not opposed to the environment” and that farmers, 
too, were concerned with slowing environmental degradation, AVA also hosted a booth at 
Valencia’s first environmental fair, offering visitors fresh-squeezed orange juice and showing off 
a variety of fruits and vegetables produced in protected Valencian wetlands.93 And in direct 
response to the opening of European markets to inexpensive North African short-grain rice, with 
which they could not compete for price, by 1999 AVA had begun to market Denominación de 
Origen (DO) “rice from the Albufera” as a high quality, sustainably farmed boutique item, 
describing environmental stewardship and the marketing of Albufera rice as a “quality product” 
                                                
91 These damages could be substantial, especially in light of the slim profit margins for most rice farmers: Purple 
swamphens, for example, were estimated to have caused more than 36,000 euros of damage in 2002 alone. “Las 
ayudas agroambientales discriminan;” “La Conselleria….los gastos de los daños ocasionados por el calamón,” 
Agricultores y Ganaderos, September 2003, 16. 
92 “La agricultura debe compatibilizar el rendimiento económico con el respeto al medio ambiente,” Agricultores y 
Ganaderos, January 1993, 22; “Agricultura biológica, ¿Ilusión o realidad?” Agricultores y Ganaderos, April-May 
1992, 16; “La Comunidad Europea debate el futuro del cultivo del arroz,” Agricultores y Ganaderos, November-
December 1993, 6; “Hay que presionar en Bruselas para obtener resultados favorables para nuestra agricultura,” 
Agricultores y Ganaderos, May-June 1994, 10; “Turismo rural, una alternativa con futuro,” Agricultores y 
Ganaderos, February-March 1995, 20. 
93 “AVA participó en ECOFIRA,” Agricultores y Ganaderos May-June 1995, 20. 
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as “the only instruments with which to confront the prolonged rice price crisis.”94 Marketing 
materials emphasized not only the rice’s origins “within the Natural Park of the Albufera” but 
the “traditional methods” and historic roots of the farmers.95 As a result of these adaptations, the 
news that the European Council of Agricultural Ministers had agreed to dedicate 80% of CAP 
subsidies to environmental protection in the first years of the new century failed to raise an 
outcry among Valencian rice farmers.96 
The shift from production to economic stewardship was not without its complications: 
many farmers resented their new role to some extent, and as late as 2011 Minguet described EU 
subsidies as “humiliating” and longed for the old days when he could earn a living selling his 
products at market. Nor did their acceptance of the Albufera park signal a broader shift towards 
the sort of scientific conservationism espoused in the park’s educational programs. Today, the 
relationship between farmers and scientists in the Albufera remains fraught with tensions, 
misunderstandings, and disagreements with regard to the proper management of the park. 
Farmers resent the restrictions on building and maintaining their fields, feel they are 
undercompensated for the damages wildlife routinely inflicts on their crops, and openly scoff at 
the scientists’ formal knowledge of the landscape. The Generalitat’s construction of naturalized 
wetlands on the boundaries of the lake draws special ire: farmers consider these areas a “waste of 
money” because the rice fields can perform the same function of green filters, while the native 
                                                
94 Agricultores y Ganaderos, April 1999, 9. 
95 Francesc Martínez, “Los arroceros de la Albufera pedirán una denominación de origen para sus productos,” 
Levante, October 24, 1994; Francesc Martínez, “L’arròs valencià prepara la denominació d’origen,” El Temps, 
January 30, 1995. 
96 José Antonio Claver, president of the DO Rice collective of Valencia, in Agricultores y Ganaderos, April 1999, 8. 
 
 217 
species cultivated in the new wetlands spread into the rice fields and create more “weeding” 
work for the farmers.97  
The scientists’ technical failures to recreate the ecosystems of the area, some of which are 
described in the epilogue to this dissertation, are the subject of much amusement and 
schadenfreude in the surrounding villages, where people tend to see the EU’s financial support as 
“wasted” on such fripperies when it could be better applied to additional agricultural support. 
But despite the cool interpersonal relations between farmers and scientists, the farmers 
understand that the ecosystem’s health, both as a biological system of which their fields are a 
part and as the basis for the park’s institutional protections, is central to their own interests. In an 
article describing AVA’s formal complaint against the new Catalog of Wetlands in the Valencian 
Community, for instance, the writer specifically cited the Albufera Natural Park as evidence that 
“the development of agrarian activity is totally compatible, and even interdependent, with 
environmental conservation.”98 As the President of AVA cautioned in 2002, “the relation 
between the environment and the rice farmers that cultivate in that environment is so close that 
there will always be details to be worked out.”99 
In the words of José Ramón Pascual, leader of the late-1980s protests, beginning with the 
agri-environmental subsidies “the people became more enthusiastic, and began to believe in the 
park,” while the financial assistance and the increased emphasis on the farmers’ collaborative 
role in conservation contributed to a sense of increased “sovereignty over their lands” (sobernia 
                                                
97 For example, AVA has complained about the Generalitat’s purchase of lands immediately surrounding the lake 
and their maintenance as naturalized wetlands, from which “weeds” spread into the rice fields and create additional 
work for the farmers. “Cae un 67%.” For opposition to the declaration of additional wetlands, see “AVA presenta 
alegaciones a la totalidad del Catálogo de Zonas Húmedas,” Agricultores y Ganaderos, May 1998, 19; “AVA 
rechaza el Catálogo de Zonas Húmedas por limitar la Modernización del Sector Agrario,” Agricultores y Ganaderos, 
October 2000, 4. 
98 “AVA rechaza el Catálogo.” 
99 Quoted in “AVA logra ayudas que indemnizan a los arroceros de la Albufera,” Agricultores y Ganaderos 
December 2002, 16. 
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sobre su parcela).100 Benavent, likewise, noted that “now we see that the idea spreading among 
the farmers [is] that traditional activities such as rice cultivation have a future in the park.”101 By 
2012, Pascual told me that he had “the sense that seventy to 80% of the prohibitions that we had 
in the early days are gone,” a factually inaccurate impression that reflects the extent to which 
farmers had learned to live within the environmental regulations.102 Minguet and other farmers 
repeatedly insisted that “without the rice fields, there would be no park,” but as the Spanish 
agricultural crisis showed no signs of abating, farmers grudgingly accepted that without the park, 
there would be no rice fields.103 
 
                                                
100 Pascual Monzó interview, El Palmar, May 4, 2012. 
101JM Benavent, quoted in Sierra, “Las multas de 10 millones.” 
102 Pascual Monzó interview, El Palmar, May 4, 2012. Farmers’ positive view of the park at the time of writing is 
undoubtedly also influenced by the appointment of Sueca attorney José Segarra as Park director in 1999. A popular 
and charismatic figure, Segarra’s lack of environmental training, relatively permissive attitude towards economic 
activity within the park, and dedication to “maintaining peace in the park” have led to his universal condemnation 
among conservationists and scientists. José Segarra, interview with the author, El Palmar, April 24, 2012. 





Chapter Eight. Spanish Water Policy, the European Union, and 
Resource Conflicts on the Júcar River 
 
On a hot evening in July of 1994, Pepe Caballer, a fisherman from El Palmar, noticed 
fish behaving strangely in the Albufera, “gasping” for air on the surface. The following morning, 
he and his colleagues found an estimated fifty metric tons of fish, mostly tench, along with some 
mullets and a few eels, floating belly-up near the protected islet of the Mata de Fang.1 The mayor 
of El Palmar blamed industrial pollution,2 and the fishermen angrily accused “someone who 
doesn’t like the fishermen” of having carried out “a premeditated action in the lake itself.”3 A 
decade earlier, indeed, such an occurrence could easily have been attributed to a particularly 
toxic chemical application or spill in one of the canals, where such die-offs had been relatively 
common. But this time the fish appeared in the middle of the lake, far from areas where 
pesticides or other chemicals were applied and well outside of the canals that carried in urban 
and industrial waste. Park technicians called to the scene were mystified. 
Post-mortem analysis revealed that the fish had died not from an excess of toxins, but 
                                                
1José Sierra, “Miles de pesces mueren en la Albufera,” Levante, July 22, 1994; Paco Moreno, “Situación crítica: 
Técnicos de Medio Ambiente esperan una nueva mortandad masiva de fauna en la Albufera,” Las Provincias, July 
27, 199420. 
2 José Sierra, “Una bateria de pozos bombeará agua para sanear la Albufera,” Levante, July 28, 199428. 
3 Sierra, “Miles de pesces.” 
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from a lack of oxygen.4 As a result of the gradual implementation of the Western Collector after 
1992, contaminant levels in the lake had declined notably since the previous decade, and park 
biologists reported occasional “clear periods” where the algae faded from view in certain areas of 
the lake and allowed subaquatic vegetation to briefly reemerge.5 Moreover, the continuous 
circulation of water through the lake via the seasonal opening of the canal gates to the sea had 
played an essential role in controlling the already high levels of eutrophication in the lake.6 
When the gates closed to flood the rice fields each spring, the nutrient-rich water inside stagnated, 
algae flourished and the overall biomass skyrocketed, exhausting the water’s oxygen supply. At 
the end of the growing season, even during the years of heaviest pollution, the eutrophic water 
flowed out into the sea and relatively clean water flowed out of the fields into the lake, allowing 
algal populations to decline, fresh water to replenish the lake’s oxygen supply, and patches of 
clear water to emerge, temporarily permitting old trophic chains to restart.7 
The summer of 1994, however, had been particularly dry and followed several years of 
worsening hydraulic conditions in the Júcar river basin. Since the eighteenth century, water from 
the Júcar had flowed into the fields west and south of the Albufera through a series of canals, 
most notably the Júcar Royal Canal, and from there into the Albufera at a rate of around 800 
cubic hectares each year, renewing the lake’s water dozens of times, diluting and washing out 
contaminants and algae into the Mediterranean (Figure 25). Even after upstream damming and 
                                                
4 Claudia Navarro, “Bono rectifica y dice que el agua de Pinedo no es apta para l’Albufera, El País, July 28, 19942. 
5 Juan Antonio Gómez, quoted in Paco Moreno, “Este será el verano más duro para la fauna de la Albufera, por 
culpa de la gran sequía,” Las Provincias, May 17, 199534; José Sierra, “La Confederación del Júcar da 6 meses de 
plazo a 120 empresas y ayuntamientos de La Albufera para que connected al colector,” Levante, March 3, 1992. 
6 Eutrophication is the process by which the addition of high volumes of nitrogen and phosphates to an aquatic 
ecosystem results in an overabundance of algae growth, which in turn exhausts the oxygen supply in the water, 
starving out other organisms. 
7 Susana Romo et al., “Tendencias del fitoplancton en el lago de la Albufera de Valencia e implicaciones para su 
ecología, gestión y recuperación,” Limnetica, 27 (2008): 22; Rafael Oltra et al., “Increase of rotifer diversity after 
sewage diversion in the hypertrophic lagoon, Albufera of Valencia, Spain,” Hydrobiologia 446/447 (2001): 214. 
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diversions on the river began in the mid-twentieth century, the Albufera had reliably received 
around 300 Hm3 until at least 1980.8 But in the hot dry summer of 1994, after more than a 
decade of declining streamflow, the Júcar had slowed to a trickle. Soaked up by thirsty fields 
along the canals, only 124 hm3 reached the Albufera in the entire hydrologic year (Figure 26).9 
As a result, the water level in the lake dropped significantly. The only recourse for 
farmers was to keep the gates connecting the lake to the sea sealed to keep out the salt water. 
This bottled up the contaminated, algae-filled water and allowed it to stagnate. Without fresh 
water from the Júcar to dilute and circulate it, the respiration of the thick algae blooms that 
choked the surface used up the dissolved oxygen in the lake, while a lack of wind and high 
temperatures prevented oxygenation from the air. The tench deaths were the first obvious signal 
that the lake was suffocating.10 
  
                                                
8 Collado Rosigue, “Water Management”; F. González Bernáldez, “Ecological Aspects of Wetland/Groundwater 
Relationships in Spain,” Limnetica 8 (1992): 12; Maria Rosa Miracle et al., “Rotifers of Spring Pools in the Coastal 
Marshland of Albufera of Valencia Natural Park.” Limnetica 11 (1995), 39-47; Benet Granell, “La Albufera de 
Valencia,” 172; Servicio del Ciclo Integral del Agua, Protección de Margenes y Reposición de Mojones en el Lago 
de la Albufera y otros Cauces Municipales (Valencia: Ayuntamiento de Valencia, 1989), 9. 
9 Técnicos y Proyectos, S.A. (independent subcontractors hired by the Dirección General de Obras Hidráulicas y 
Calidad de las Aguas of the Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, hereafter, TYPSA), “Análisis de Batimetrías Históricas,” 
Estudio para el Desarrollo Sostenible de l’Albufera de Valencia (2004), 119. 
10 Allowing the sea to flood into the lake would have catastrophic results: an accidental spillover of seawater into the 
Pujol canal during the final summer of the drought, in 1995, led to a massive fish die-off when the salt water sank to 
the bottom of the lake and mixed with the toxins released by decomposing algaes, creating an anoxic layer that 
killed everything in the area. Moreno, “Situación crítica;” Paco Moreno, “Medio Ambiente utilizará cuarenta pozos 
para bombear agua al lago de la Albufera,” Las Provincias, July 28, 199418; Sierra, “Una bateria de pozos;” 
Benavent, interview with the author, El Saler, May 5, 2011; Paco Moreno, “Gran mortandad de pesces en la gola del 
Puchol,” Las Provincias, June 11, 199534; V. Lladró, “Se teme por la Albufera cuando se corte el riego de los 
arrozales,” Las Provincias, August 5, 199418. 
 
 222 
Figure 25: Water sources for the Albufera.11 
Solid colors represent irrigation zones, with both the light pink (Sueca) and tan (Royal Canal) derived from the Júcar 
River. 
 
Figure 26: Amount of water (hm3/year) reaching the Albufera, 1980-2010.12 
Data shows an especially notable decrease in the amount of water from the Júcar and a significantly increased 
reliance on Pinedo and other water treatment plants. 
 
Above the oyster shells, silt, construction detritus and algal residue that carpet the bottom 
of the Albufera lies the water, a final layer in our sedimentary history. This chapter traces the 
                                                
11 Map from CHJ. 
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declining water quality in the Albufera to a century-long national policy of water management 
that encouraged overexploitation, unrestrained demand, and economically and environmentally 
incoherent use of one of Spain’s most endangered natural resources. The belief, at the turn of the 
last century, that state-sponsored irrigation projects provided the key to both local and national 
social, economic, and cultural progress resulted in pharaonic, transformative hydraulic projects 
around the country. The Júcar river basin, of which the Albufera is a part, offers a particularly 
vivid example of the social, economic, and environmental consequences of that process. While 
technocrats and ideologues throughout the twentieth century emphasized the need to force the 
peninsula’s natural resources into compliance with their political and economic goals, the story 
of the Júcar serves as a case-in-point of Richard White’s observation that “rivers have lives of 
their own that escape our control.”13  
 
For more than thirty years, the Franco regime imposed a series of engineered “solutions” 
to Spain’s climatological and environmental conditions, outlined in the hydraulic plans of 1933 
and 1939, which permanently altered the character of the land. In terms of improving the quality 
of life for Spanish people, however, or even in terms of improving the national balance of trade 
as Joaquín Costa, Manuel Lorenzo Pardo, and other fin-de-siècle reformers had dreamed, the 
hydraulic transformation of the country accomplished remarkably little. These projects were 
plagued with technical problems. The actual amount of water contained in the country’s vast 
reservoirs, for instance, never approached their total capacity, while the famed Tajo-Segura 
transfer, the centerpiece of Lorenzo Pardo’s 1933 plan, was plagued by controversy and did not 
                                                
13 White, The Organic Machine, 109. 
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carry anywhere near the projected amounts of water at any point during the twentieth century.14 
Far more importantly, the relevance of irrigated agriculture to the Spanish economy and to most 
Spaniards’ lives declined dramatically over the late Franco period, but it continued to use a 
disproportionate amount of the country’s increasingly scarce hydraulic resources. 
In the second half of the century the state’s support for hydraulic construction, and for 
heavy subsidies to private-sector users, contributed to increasing agricultural market distortion. 
Relying on the continued availability of water, large producers abandoned traditional 
Mediterranean crops such as olives and wheat in favor of thirsty ones such as corn and alfalfa, 
which remained profitable only through massive crop subsidies and almost-free water. The 
government allotted water rights and issued free permits to water users, charging a heavily 
subsidized (up to 90%) per-cubic hectare fee based solely on the price of the state’s initial 
investment in the relevant hydraulic infrastructure. Water users where the state had not invested 
in any infrastructure, such as the privately owned hydroelectric power generators in the north or 
areas where farmers drilled their own wells into subterranean aquifers, paid nothing at all. To 
take advantage of these subsidies, landowners converted ever-greater areas of land to irrigation, 
often in the driest regions of the country, which in turn increased demand for water and the 
hydraulic infrastructure to bring it to the fields.15 Far from ending with the dictatorship, this 
hydraulic program only accelerated as more funding became available after 1975.16 
New technologies in the late twentieth century facilitated a new wave of hydraulic 
development, exploiting the previously untapped subterranean aquifers that underlay much of the 
                                                
14 Melgarejo Moreno, “De la Política Hidráulica,” 311, reproducing a graph from El agua en España (1991), 
Instituto de la ingeniería en España, Madrid59. 
15 David Saurí and Leandro del Moral, “Recent developments in Spanish wáter policy. Alternatives and conflicts at 
the end of the hydraulic age,” Geoforum 32 (2001): 358-60; Juan Maestre and Teresa Rojo, “División de la opinión 
pública española sobre las estrategias sostenibles del agua,” Observatorio Medioambiental 5 (2002): 199.  
16 Arrojo Agudo, “España-California,” 370-71; Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, Libro Blanco del Agua, 62; 
Melgarejo Moreno, “De la Política Hidráulica,” 309. 
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peninsula, including large sections of the central plains. As early as the mid-40s, Franco had 
urged the development of groundwater for irrigation, but technology and investment capital only 
enabled large-scale exploitation beginning in the 1960s.17 New extraction techniques offered 
even small farmers the opportunity to irrigate previously dry fields far from any surface water, 
and the state was slow to implement any regulatory measures on such projects. By the 1980s, as 
increased demand pumped water out of the aquifers faster than precipitation and percolation 
could refill them, the land over and around them dried out and local water tables declined 
noticeably, prompting new, deeper wells. Ongoing efforts to expand irrigation, with no central 
coordination, rapidly ran up against the hard limits of resource availability, and traditional 
irrigators downstream from the aquifers began to notice that rivers and reservoirs were lower 
than they should have been.  
The Tablas de Daimiel National Park in arid Castilla-La Mancha provides a cautionary 
tale of Spanish hydraulic management, frequently cited by conservationists as the possible 
outcome for wetlands around the country. For centuries the Tablas, a floodplain fed by the 
Guadiana and Cigüela Rivers and lying above a large subterranean aquifer, were home to a rich 
wetlands ecosystem similar to that of the Albufera.18 In 1956, Franco’s hydraulic engineers 
began efforts to drain and canalize the marshes, diverting surface waters into local fields of rice, 
corn, and alfalfa, and further west into one of the regime’s flagship irrigation projects.19 This 
dramatically reduced river volume, and thus indirectly reduced the amount of water reaching the 
subterranean aquifer underlying the Tablas, to such an extent that in the summer of 1971 they 
                                                
17 Morales Antequera 1946.  
18 Naredo, “La Modernización de la Agricultura,” 71. 
19 Joaquín Fernández and others have claimed that widespread irrigation in the area was first introduced in 1948 by 
“Valencian businessmen” who transplanted the techniques used around the Albufera to this new wetland landscape. 
Fernández, El Ecologismo Español, 171. 
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dried out completely for the first time.20 By 1978, in addition to ongoing divergence of surface 
water, 325 separate wells were registered drawing irrigation water from the aquifer under the 
marshes, most of them illegal, and the number continued to climb.21 Alarm among the 
international scientific and conservation communities pushed the regime to declare the area a 
park in 1973 despite resistance from local farmers, and in 1980 Unesco made the Tablas the core 
of its World Biosphere Reserve of the Mancha Húmeda. Further international recognition 
quickly followed, and the Tablas were soon listed under the Ramsar convention on wetlands 
(1982) and the EU Birds Directive (1987). But these protections, like those of the Albufera, 
existed almost entirely on paper: water extraction from the rivers continued even as private wells 
into the aquifer proliferated, and the wetlands continued to shrink.22 Conservationists turned in 
desperation to the EU, hoping that the threat of a fine and international condemnation would 
force the state into action, but the Spanish government responded with a proposal for yet another 
hydraulic engineering project, consisting of a lengthy water transfer from another river basin that 
would pump water directly into the wetland. Conservationists at home and abroad decried this 
wholly technological solution for its complete failure to address the underlying issues of water 
use, namely the state’s economic and political support for over-extraction and continually 
increasing demand, but no substantive changes were forthcoming. By the first decade of the new 
millennium, while smoldering peat fires burned in the heat within the once-humid park, such 
complaints had prompted Unesco to threaten Spain with the withdrawal of Biosphere Reserve 
status if it failed to reverse the damage within the Guadiana basin.23 
                                                
20 Morales Gil 2001400.  
21 Fernández, El Ecologismo Español, 171. 
22 Morales Gil 2001399. 
23 Gregorio López Sanz, Irrigation agriculture at the Guadiana River High Basin (Castilla-La Mancha, SPAIN): 




As conservationists pointed out, the situation at the Tablas de Daimiel was an extreme 
example of a relatively common phenomenon. Wetlands across the peninsula continued a slow 
regression throughout the 1990s, and seasonal desiccation grew common.24 In addition to this 
recurring ecological catastrophe, water overextraction posed an existential threat to downstream 
farmers who relied on river water that was fed by the aquifers. In the Albufera, where water-
hungry rice was the only permissible crop, this led Valencian farmers to firmly ally themselves 
with the conservationists calling for an end to water mining and for a coherent water policy on 
the national level. 
The Albufera lies within the watershed controlled by the Júcar Hydrographic 
Confederation (Confederación Hidrográfica del Júcar, hereafter, CHJ), one of the most highly 
contested battlegrounds in the national “water wars.” The watershed consists of 43,000 square 
kilometers of land that includes almost all of the Autonomous Community of Valencia, the 
provinces of Albacete and Cuenca in eastern Castile-La Mancha, and small portions of southern 
Aragon and Catalonia.25 Almost 90% of the population within this area resides in Valencia, 
which also hosts nearly all of the area’s tourism.26 In addition to the urban centers of Valencia, 
Albacete, and Alicante, the CHJ’s jurisdiction also includes 243,521 hectares (602,000 acres) of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Agriculture, 2-4 June 1997, Albacete), accessed May 13, 2013, 
http://www.uclm.es/profesorado/glopez/pdf/cv/XI.1.2.2.pdf; Elena Lopez-Gunn, Pedro Zorrilla Miras, and Ramon 
Llamas, “The impossible dream? The upper Guadiana system: aligning changes in ecological systems with changes 
in social systems” in On the Water Front vol. 2, ed. Jan Lundquist (Stockholm: World Water Week, 2010): 115-126; 
Rafael Méndez, “La Unesco da a España tres años de plazo para recuperar Daimiel,” El País (June 14 2008). 
24 Fernández, El Ecologismo Español, 163-165. 
25 CHJ, Plan Hidrológico de Cuenca del Júcar, August 1997, http://www.chj.es/es-
es/medioambiente/planificacionhidrologica/Paginas/PlanHidrol%C3%B3gicodeCuenca(RD16641998).aspx, 
Memoria 6 and 9; Javier Ferrer Polo and Javier Paredes, “Water management in Mediterranean regions prone to 
drought: The Júcar Basin experience,” in Andreu et al., Drought Management and Planning, 4. 
26 CHJ, Plan Hidrológico, Memoria 13-14; Teodoro Estrela, Aránzazu Fidalgo, and Miguel Ángel Pérez, “Droughts 
and the European water framework directive: Implications on Spanish river basin districts,” in Andreu et al., 
Drought Management and Planning, 174. The 1991 census reported that 89.84% of the basin’s population lived in 
Valencia, compared to 8.56% in La Mancha, and that Valencia received 94.5% of the region’s tourism. The 2001 
census reported similar distributions. 
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irrigated land,27 which absorb around 80% of the total water demands.28 The entire basin, along 
with major hydrological features and infrastructure, is shown in  
  
                                                
27 CHJ, Estudio de utilización conjunta de los recursos hídricos superficiales y subterráneos de las cuencas media y 
baja de los ríos Júcar y Turia, created 2002, http://www.chj.es/es-
es/medioambiente/planificacionhidrologica/Documents/Mejora%20del%20Conocimiento/SintUsoconVersPubl.pdf. 
28 CHJ, Plan Hidrologico de Cuenca del Júcar, Memoria 19. 
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Figure 27. The black line (green on the inset map) surrounds the territory controlled by 
the CHJ, while the brown line surrounds the hydrological basin of the Júcar River itself, 
graphically illustrating the disconnect between political authority and geological features 
inherent to Lorenzo Pardo’s 1926 delineation of the Hydrographic Confederations. 
The Júcar River, for which the CHJ is named, is the largest of several rivers within the 
agency’s territory and served since the eighteenth century as the principal source of water for the 
Albufera and the farmlands surrounding it to the east and south. Originating in the mountains 
near Cuenca, in Castile-La Mancha, the Júcar passes through the dry Manchegan province of 
Albacete before crossing into Valencia and heading east towards Cullera, south of the Albufera 
Park. Even before farmers in La Mancha began to mine the aquifer that underlay the river, the 
construction of more than a dozen large dams for flood control and water storage, all in the 
interest of irrigators and residents downstream in Valencia, had already substantially altered the 
river’s course.29 Additional canals built during the Franco regime, including one just west of the 
Royal Canal, expanded the area of irrigated land in the historical Ribera area, and just as Pardo 
had imagined, Valencian agriculture flourished under the intensification of hydraulic works, 
producing high-value crops in greater volume than ever before. 
  
                                                
29 Collado Rosigue, “Water Management”. 
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Figure 27: Hydrological features and infrastructure in the Júcar River basin.30 
 
Upstream, meanwhile, the Manchegan provinces of Cuenca and Albacete had remained 
dry and increasingly depopulated throughout the Franco era, causing substantial land 
abandonment and impoverishment among rural people. But farmers in La Mancha knew that 
their lands lay above significant groundwater reserves. Since the Middle Ages, in fact, 
Manchegan landowners had tapped into the subterranean reserves.31 Those early wells extracted 
water either by gravity or hand drawing, and were usually very shallow and suitable only for 
household use or, at most, the irrigation of small kitchen gardens or orchards.32 In the 1970s, 
                                                
30 Map by author, using Google Earth. 
31 Lemeunier, “Hidráulica Agrícola,” 58. 
32 N. Hernández-Mora, L. Martínez Cortina, and J. Fornés, “Intensive Groundwater Use in Spain,” in Intensive Use 
of Groundwater: Challenges and Opportunities, ed. Ramón Llamas and Emilio Custodio (Lisse, Netherlands: Swets 
and Zeitlinger B.V., 2003), 406. 
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however, a combination of new water-mining technologies and the discovery of the Mancha 
Oriental aquifer, the largest on the Iberian Peninsula, beneath the province of Albacete, 
transformed the prospects of Manchegan agriculture.33 Farmers in Albacete promptly accelerated 
their exploitation of the water resources that lay beneath their soil, digging hundreds of private 
wells without oversight from the CHJ and demanding state investments in infrastructure to pump 
the water into their fields. Water extraction from the aquifer skyrocketed (Figure 28). 
Figure 28: Water removed from the Mancha Oriental subterranean aquifer, 1963-2000.34 
 
But the Mancha Oriental was not an isolated body of water, and extractions by the 
Manchegans would have serious impacts on users elsewhere within the Júcar hydrological basin. 
The aquifer, as it turned out, had historically been the principal source of the Júcar River’s water 
(Figure 29). As it flowed over the Mancha Oriental, the Júcar’s volume nearly doubled.35 So long 
                                                
33 José Luis Pimental Equihua, “Los límites a la autogestión y cogestión del regadío: el caso de la Unidad Sindical 
de Usuarios del Júcar,” Boletín del Archivo Histórico del Agua 39 (2008): 22-31, 29; Antonio Gil-Olcina, “Régimen 
natural y artifical del río Júcar,” Investigaciones Geográficas 40 (2006), 9. 
34 Data from CHJ, Estudio de utilización, 48. 
35 Gil-Olcina, “Régimen natural y artifical,” 9-10; F.J. Martín de Santa Olalla et al., “Integrated water resources 
management of the Hydrogeological Unit ‘‘Eastern Mancha’’ using Bayesian Belief Networks,” Agricultural Water 
Management 77 (2005), 24. 
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as the wells in La Mancha extracted less water than could percolate back into the aquifer through 
natural water cycles, the Júcar’s flow remained essentially unaltered even in years of drought. 
But in the 1970s and especially 1980s, as Manchegan water-mining accelerated and the water 
table dropped by an average of one meter each year, Valencian farmers downstream noticed a 
significant change in the amount of water reaching their fields.36 
Figure 29: Volume of water contributed to the Júcar River by the Mancha Oriental and precipitation, 1942-
1990.37 
 
Figure 28Figure 30 offer a clear statistical demonstration of this process, revealing the 
parallel trends in water extraction from the Mancha Oriental and the declining amount of water 
reaching the Júcar, which itself translated directly into declining water entering the Júcar Royal 
Canal beside the Albufera. Figure 29 was produced by the CHJ as part of a lengthy report to the 
                                                
36 Elena López-Gunn, “The Role of Collective Action in Water Governance: A Comparative Study of Groundwater 
User Associations in La Mancha Aquifers in Spain,” Water International 28 (September 2003), 370; Martín de 
Santa Olalla et al., “Integrated water resources management; CHJ, “Estudio de utilización,” 44, 51, and 283; CHJ, 
Plan Hidrológico, Memoria 35; Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Medio Rural y Marino, Programa de Acción 
Nacional Contra la Desertificación, August 2008, 29, accessed May 13 2013, 
http://www.unccd.int/ActionProgrammes/spain-spa2008.pdf; David Sanz et al., “Modeling aquifer–river interactions 
under the influence of groundwater abstraction in the Mancha Oriental System (SE Spain),” Hydrogeology Journal 
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Figura 28. Comparación entre la aportación Alarcón – Molinar sin restituir y el volumen de lluvia 
en hm3
Todo esto h e necesario, para la evalu ción de los recursos en régimen natural, 
considerar los efectos que producen las extracciones del acuífero sobre los drenajes del 
mismo al río Júcar. 
 correspondiente a la cuenca del Júcar entre Alarcón y Molinar 
Para considerar los efectos de la disminución de drenajes al río Júcar se ha realizado un 
modelo, para la obtención de las aportaciones naturales en este tramo, que incluye la 
simulación del acuífero con las extracciones históricas producidas en la Mancha 
Oriental. El modelo planteado se basa en la utilización, como datos de partida, de los 
result dos de la simula ión lluvia escorrentía (Modelo SIMPA) obtenidos para este 
tramo, y a su vez ha sido calibrado con los datos de aportaciones aforadas en el tramo 
intermedio Alarcón – Molinar, presentando un acuerdo muy satisfactorio entre los 
resultados del modelo y los datos aforados. 
Finalmente, los resultados del modelo han sido validados con los datos de evolución de 
los niveles piezométricos en puntos de control próximos al río Júcar. 
 
Se han planteado varios modelos, de forma progresiva de menor a mayor complejidad 
en su formulación, en los que se considera el acuífero de la Mancha Oriental como un 
acuífero unicelular y como un acuífero pluricelular englobado con dos celdas, sometido 
Descripción del modelo planteado 
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national Environmental Ministry and General Direction of Hydraulic Works, for the purpose of 
aiding in the creation of a national plan of water use and management. The graph shows changes 
in the two principal water sources for irrigators along the lower Júcar River, namely precipitation 
(green bars) and the Mancha Oriental (pink line). A decline in either of these two sources results 
in significant declines in the river’s total volume, and declines in precipitation eventually 
produce decreased contributions from the Mancha. In an extended period of drought, such as that 
of the mid-1990s, the river all but vanishes (Figure 30). Figure 31 offers a visual representation 
of the impacts of these combined stresses.  
Figure 30: Water inputs to the Júcar Royal Canal, 1963-200838 
 
Figure 31: Comparative images of the Júcar River in years of low and average rainfall.39 
Left: the Júcar at the end of the 1993-1995 drought. Right: The Júcar ca. 2007. 
 
                                                
38 Graph represents average annual values with Lowess-smoothed trend. Statistical analysis by Lawrence Hamilton. 
39 Photos by Javier Ferrer, CHJ. 
Júcar river in Summer 1995
Objective:
Flow maintenance downstream of the Alarcón Reservoir
Júcar river during Summers 
2007 and 2008





In 1989, responding to continued demands from Manchegan landowners, the Spanish 
government passed a Royal Decree expressing a “national interest” in the irrigation of 
approximately 68,000 additional hectares (168,000 acres) in the provinces of Cuenca and 
Albacete using water from the Mancha Oriental.40 Though sufficient water had remained in the 
river throughout the 1980s to meet the demands of both Manchegans and Valencians, members 
of the Júcar Users’ Union (Unidad Sindical de Usuarios del Júcar, hereafter USUJ) expressed 
growing alarm that the river would be unable to sustain all claimants’ needs in times of 
drought.41 As one Valencian farmer wrote in AVA’s newsletter, “in every period of drought the 
consequences, the problems, are worse than in the previous one, because, logically, the 
necessities are higher. The population grows, domestic and urban uses grow, industrial 
necessities increase, and above all the demand rises for agricultural irrigation.”42 The national 
Ministry of Agriculture echoed these concerns, warning that future dry spells would be far more 
devastating than ever before as a finite water supply was stretched to meet the demand.43 
If the plans for La Mancha were carried out, Valencian irrigators would almost certainly 
be forced to reduce their water use to accommodate new upstream users. Reduced water use 
could be accomplished, in many cases, by transforming fields to more efficient irrigation via 
sprinklers and “drip” systems, but such transformations would be costly and require not only a 
methodological adaptation by Valencians but also a substantial investment, only partially 
                                                
40 Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación, “Real Decreto 950/1989, de 28 de julio, por el que se declara de 
interés general de la Nación la transformación económica y social de las zonas regables de Manchuela-Centro y 
Canal de Albacete en Castilla-La Mancha,” Boletín Oficial del Estado 180 (July 29, 1989); “Vamos a impedir que 
nos quiten el agua,” Agricultura Valenciana, September 1989; “Se ortoga una concesión de Aguas del Júcar para 
regar tierras en las provincias de Albacete y Cuenca: AVA pide la nulidad del Decreto,” Agricultura Valenciana, 
September 1989, 7; “Indignación por la concesión de agua del Júcar a Castilla-La Mancha,” Agricultura Valenciana, 
September 1989, 1.  
41 Collado Rosigue, “Water Management;” Saurí and Moral, “Recent developments,” 357. 
42 “El agua, ese bien escaso,” Agricultores y Ganaderos, February 1991, 12. 
43 Teresa Albendín, “Agricultura proyecta reutilizar el agua de la Albufera para garantizar el cultivo del arroz,” 
Levante, December 15 199441. 
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covered by government subsidies. Environmentally, the modernization of irrigation along the 
Royal Canal would also mean less runoff from the fields reaching the Albufera each year, and 
commensurate declines in the health of the ecosystem. Setting aside for the moment the 
impossibility of growing rice on a drip irrigation system, the conversion of irrigation in fruit and 
vegetable fields along the Royal Canal alone would have resulted in a 30 hm3 annual loss to the 
Albufera.44 
With such concerns in mind, Valencian farmers took to the streets in the thousands, 
demanding that the Júcar Hydrological Confederation intervene to “prevent La Mancha from 
taking our water.”45 Echoing Pardo’s arguments of half a century before, the USUJ argued that 
Valencia was fundamentally better suited for irrigation than La Mancha, and should not be made 
to sacrifice its historical water rights for the benefit of its neighbor.46 In Valencia, they argued, 
irrigation kept more than 50,000 small famers on their land, working an average of one hectare 
apiece of high-value fruits and vegetables.47 In La Mancha, conversely, latifundia-style 
agriculture meant that only about 9000 landowners held 117,000 hectares (289,000 acres) of 
irrigated land, most of which was planted with low-value onions, garlic, alfalfa, corn, and 
sunflowers, or increased the productivity of traditional dry crops such as wheat, barley, and 
grapes. Many of those crops were profitable only under the subsidy system of the Common 
Agricultural Policy, and were in fact “surplus crops” for which no non-subsidized market existed. 
Because the river could not supply enough water for everyone, Valencians argued, the state 
                                                
44 CHJ, Informe sobre la Conducción Júcar-Vinalopó, 78. 
45 “Vamos a impedir que nos quiten el agua.” 
46 “Se ortoga una concesión; “Indignación;” “Sin garantías de que los regadíos Manchegos no perjudiquen a los 
Valencianos: Continúa pendiente la ‘guerra del agua,’” Agricultura Valenciana, March 19904; “Vamos a impedir 
que nos quiten el agua;” Mario Gaviria, “Inundaciones, sequía y polución (IV): Valencia es imprescindible e 
insustituible,” Levante, December 30, 1987; Pimental Equihua, “Los límites a la autogestión,” 26. 
47 Marta Agujetas et al., “Representing the conflict: The representation of farmers’ opinions on the water conflict by 
regional Water Users’ Associations in the Júcar river basin” (Sustainable Land and Water Management, 
Wageningen University (June 2011), 5. 
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should protect older, more profitable irrigation systems against the attempted incursions of “new 
agriculture based solely on the policy of continuous subsidies.”48 
Simultaneously, farmers and developers in the province of Alicante in the south of the 
Autonomous Community of Valencia also clamored for additional water allocations from the 
Júcar, having reached the limits of the aquifers and surface water of their own river basins. As 
early as 1985, some had asserted that any water still left in the Júcar river when it reached the sea 
was obviously “surplus” that would otherwise be “wasted,” and lobbied the state to build a new 
canal diverting this “excess” water to the south.49 The petitioners even volunteered to help 
Valencian farmers convert their fields from blanket irrigation to drip so as to “save” water, 
leaving more in the riverbed for diversion to the south. Ecologists rolled their eyes at this 
wordplay, noting, “If there is water saved from irrigation, it is not ‘surplus’” but rather could be 
used for any number of other purposes locally, first and foremost in the Albufera.50 Farmers 
agreed, touting their role in environmental conservation as yet another argument in favor of their 
own irrigation and opposing the new claims from Alicante.51 
Jurisdiction over the allocation of water among the users of Alicante, Albacete, and 
Valencia lay with the CHJ, which at last took up the problem during the drought of 1993-1995. 
The resulting Integral Hydrological Plan for the Júcar Basin, published in 1997, offered a 
compromise of sorts, giving the Valencian farmers first priority with regards to the Júcar’s water 
but acceding to the demands of all new claimants, including the expansion of irrigation in La 
Mancha and the proposed transfer of water to Alicante for irrigation and tourism development 
                                                
48 Salvador Alfonso, president of the Real Acequia de Moncada and of the National Federation of Irrigation 
Communities, quoted in “La cosa está ya muy clara: tarde o pronto, nos van a cobrar el agua,” Agricultores y 
Ganaderos, February 1992, 19. 
49 C. Esteve, “El Júcar enviará a Alicante 150 millones de metros cúbicos al año,” Información (Benidorm), 
December 12, 1985. 
50 Joan Miquel Benavent, interview with the author, El Saler, May 10 2011. 
51 Agujetas et al., “Representing the Conflict,” 17. 
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via a new Júcar-Vinalopó Transfer. It also allotted water to meet the “ecological needs” of 
wetlands and riparian ecosystems in the basin, of which the Albufera was by far the largest. In so 
doing, it parceled out all but 23.8 hm3/year of the Júcar river basin’s entire water resources.52 
The CHJ’s Plan represented a myopic embodiment of the early-twentieth-century 
Hydraulic Paradigm profoundly out of step with late-twentieth-century physical realities in the 
basin. In particular, its reliance on fifty-year averages for the prediction of future water 
availability in the basin ignored the increasing frequency and intensity of meteorological 
droughts, which had ever-more serious economic and social impacts given the heavy reliance of 
water users. Over the fifteen years prior to the Plan’s drafting, the Júcar basin had undergone two 
major periods of drought, from 1980-1985 and again from 1991-1995. When factored into the 
previous forty years’ worth of data in calculating the average water availability for the basin, 
these dry spells all but disappeared. “Statistically speaking,” they wrote, “the inclusion of the last 
fifteen years (in which the two periods of drought aforementioned lay) is not very significant in 
light of the 1940-1980 series (it produces a reduction of only 5% in the average of the series with 
which the Guidelines of the Plan deals).” Thus, while noting the recent droughts as “cause for 
reflection as to whether we are settling into a period of extended drought, due either to an 
uncontrolled expansion of demand or to a deficit of infrastructure with which to meet it,” they 
made no allowances for the possibility of such a trend in their calculations of the expected future 
                                                
52 The CHJ calculated the total amount of water in the Júcar river basin as 2383.9 hm3, including non-renewable 
groundwater and surface water that was not controlled by dams. Out of this, only 1733.69 hm3 was considered 
“usable,” consisting of water contained in reservoirs and the amount of annual renewal to subterranean aquifers. The 
Plan called for significantly increased interbasin transfers out of the Júcar to other areas within the CHJ’s territory, 
which over the course of the twenty-year plan would reduce the amount of water available to 1633 hm3 per year. 
Over the same period, the expansion of irrigation in La Mancha and elsewhere would increase the total demand to 
1609.5 hm3. The difference of these two figures left only 23.8 hm3 of “surplus” water in the river basin. CHJ, Plan 
Hidrológico, Memoria 46-49. 
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resources for the basin.53 
Indeed, the mention of a “deficit of infrastructure” as the root cause of drought, rather 
than simply the lack of water in a dry region, emphasizes the CHJ’s continued embrace of the 
Hydraulic Paradigm and its reliance on technofixes to meet the increasing demand even in 
worsening meteorological circumstances. In the Ribera region, for instance, the CHJ would 
permit farmers around the lake to open a series of “drought wells” that had been drilled into local 
aquifers in the mid-1990s, to allow them access to emergency water resources that would 
presumably be refilled in the next wet years. Like the planned increase of water transfers, 
however, this measure would not be sustainable in the event of a prolonged or widespread 
meteorological drought.54 
As the scientific community reached a growing consensus on the subject of climate 
change over the course of the 1990s, many experts emphasized the Mediterranean as a point of 
particular concern, with strong indications of increasingly hot and dry summers in the area 
endangering agricultural production. The Iberian Peninsula has extremely complicated weather 
patterns, with immense local variability that defies overarching predictions and generalizations 
about temperature and precipitation.55 On a regional basis, however, precipitation had generally 
declined along the Spanish Mediterranean coast since the 1960s, while variability from month to 
month had increased.56 The month of March grew significantly drier, for instance, while 
                                                
53 CHJ, Plan Hidrologico de Cuenca del Júcar, Memoria 87-88.  
54 CHJ, Plan Hidrologico de Cuenca del Júcar, Memoria 87-88; Estrela, Fidalgo, and Pérez, “Droughts and the 
European Water Framework Directive,” 182; Ferrer Polo and Paredes, “Water management in Mediterranean 
regions,” 13. 
55S. M. Vicente-Serrano 2006: “Differences in spatial patterns of drought on different time scales: An analysis of the 
Iberian Peninsula,” Water Resource Management, vol. 20, 37–60. 
56 M. de Luis, J. Raventós et al., “Spatial analysis of rainfall trends in the region of Valencia (East Spain),” 
International Journal of Climatology 20 (2000): 1452 and 1461; R. Romero, J. A. Guijarro, and S. Alonso, “A 30-
year (1964–1993) daily rainfall data base for the Spanish Mediterranean regions: first exploratory study,” 




November grew dramatically wetter. Simultaneously, numerous studies of temperatures recorded 
in the province of Valencia show a clear increase in annual averages between 1910 and 1994, 
with changes especially pronounced in the summer. In conjunction, this meant that there was less 
water available in the Júcar basin precisely during those summer months when demand for water 
peaked, and that torrential autumn rains were more likely to cause damage from erosion and 
flooding on the parched soil. 
Changing weather patterns in the Júcar basin obviously did not occur in a vacuum, but 
rather were direct repercussions of larger trends and events. Several long-term global weather 
patterns, including La Niña, El Niño, and most significantly the North Atlantic Oscillation 
(NAO), influence winter precipitation on the Iberian Peninsula, as do sporadic events that 
interfere with these larger trends to block or enhance storms.57 Valencia’s declining rainfall is 
almost certainly related to recent changes in the NAO, the influence of which is particularly 
strong in southern Spain. Though precipitation and associated surface water has decreased across 
the Iberian Peninsula, the trend is most pronounced in the south, in direct relation to the area of 
the NAO’s greatest influence.58 In the Mediterranean area, this change was also most 
pronounced in the summer, which has increased the likelihood and severity of summer 
droughts.59 
It is impossible to ascribe direct causality to global climate change for specific weather 
                                                                                                                                                       
Longares, “Precipitation concentration changes in Spain 1946-2005,” Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences 
11 (May 2011): 1260; José Carlos González-Hidalgo, Michele Brunetti, and Martin de Luis, “Precipitation trends in 
Spanish hydrological divisions, 1946-2005,” Climate Research 43 (November 2010): 216-218; S.M. Vicente-
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circulation,” Journal of Hydrometeorology 8 (2007): 495. 
58 J. Lorenzo-Lacruz et al., “Recent trends in Iberian streamflows (1945-2005),” Journal of Hydrology 414-415 
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59 J. Luterbacher et al., “European Seasonal and Annual Temperature Variability, Trends, and Extremes Since 1500,” 
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events or even multiyear trends such as those observed in the Júcar basin. That being said, the 
scientific evidence clearly supports a conclusion that Mediterranean temperatures rose and 
precipitation declined more than the global average after at least 1980. Based on multiproxy data, 
by the early 2000s climate scientists established with greater than 95% certainty that the 
European climate as a whole was warmer than at any time during the past 500 years, and that it 
continued to warm at a faster rate than the global average.60 This trend was consistent despite the 
extreme variability of Iberian precipitation patterns.61 
Even if the CHJ’s scientists were somehow unaware of the ongoing research on long-
term climate change, the temperature and precipitation trends of the past several decades should 
have given them some indication that the Júcar’s future was not necessarily mirrored by its long-
term past. By their own admission, the spate of recent droughts had led them to wonder if the 
region was entering into an extended dry period that could affect its water resources, which 
would intensify the problems raised by altered water use practices and contribute to greater 
resource uncertainty. Nonetheless, they made the conscious decision to ignore this prediction 
when allocating the basin’s resources, promising increased hydraulic infrastructure, and declined 
to encourage or incentivize water users to conserve their resources. In so doing, they created a 
situation that all but ensured ongoing deficits and conflicts between water users.  
                                                
60 Luterbacher et al., “European Seasonal and Annual Temperature Variability;” A. Nicault et al., “Mediterranean 
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The CHJ’s Plan essentially gave farmers in La Mancha and Alicante free reign to 
continue their demands for new, increasingly expensive hydraulic projects to permit the 
expansion of irrigation. Between 1980 and 2010 the area of irrigated land in eastern La Mancha 
tripled, watered almost entirely by extractions from the Mancha Oriental.62 To the east, the 
Júcar-Vinalopó transfer was completed in 2010, carrying Júcar water from Cullera, just south of 
the Albufera, to Alicante against the protests of environmentalists.63 Even with these projects, 
ongoing demands led to increasingly expensive technological innovations: Valencia led the 
nation in recycling wastewater for agricultural use, and even brackish water extracted from 
overexploited aquifers and desalinized at enormous expense was used in Valencian regions 
where “agriculture is profitable enough so as to assume the costs of desalinated or reused water 
and still obtain benefits.”64 A national plan, published in 2001, continued to emphasize the need 
to increase water resources and availability, both through expanded desalination facilities and the 
development of further water transfers.65  
In addition to forcing Valencian farmers to look for new water sources at a time of 
special social and economic vulnerability, the declining flow of the Júcar River as a result of 
                                                
62 Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, Programa de Acción Nacional Contra la Desertificación, 29. 
63 One of the most vocal opponents of the plan was María Sornosa Martínez, a native of the Valencian AC and 
member of the European Parliament, who submitted several complaints about the transfer to the European 
Commission. Maria Sornosa Martínez, Written Question E-2650/00, “New data on the environmental risks of the 
Júcar-Vinalopó water diversion project (Valencia),” Official Journal of the European Communities 136 E (May 8, 
2001); María Sornosa Martínez, Written Question E-3668/01, “New data concerning the Júcar-Vinalopó case,” 
Official Journal of the European Communities 172 E (July 18 2002); María Sornosa Martínez, Written Question E-
1549/02, “Impact of the Júcar-Vinolopó water diversion on the Parque de la Albufera in Valencia,” Official Journal 
of the European Communities 301 E (December 5, 2002): 175. 
64 Vicente Serrano-Orts, Javier Paredes, and Joaquín Andreu, “Water reuse and desalination at Comunitat-
Valenciana region, Spain,” in Andreu et al., Drought Management and Planning, 193-201, 195-200. 
65 Consejo Nacional del Agua, Informe sobre la tramitación como proyecto de ley del Real-Decreto Ley 2/2004, 29 
September 2004, cited in GHK, Roland Blomeyer, and Jason Anderson, Strategic evaluation on environment and 
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programa A.G.U.A en las cuencas mediterraneas,” Fundación Nueva Cultura del Agua, 18 May 2005, FDMA. 
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Manchegan irrigation resulted directly in the catastrophic environmental consequences described 
in the introduction to this chapter. In setting water allocations in the river basin, the CHJ’s Plan 
made special reservations for the “ecological needs” of protected habitats and species in the 
Júcar river basin, ostensibly to prevent such crises as that of the tench die-off of 1994, and gave 
these environmental reservations even higher priority than the irrigation rights of Valencian 
farmers. In the absence of a specific study, the Plan stated that ecological needs for a given body 
of water were to be calculated by multiplying “the area occupied by water by 12.500 
m3/ha/year.”66 In the case of the Albufera Lake, occupying a surface area of around 24 square 
kilometers, this formula should have guaranteed a reservation of around 300 hm3 of clean, Júcar 
water each year, which conforms to the amount received by the lake circa-1980. A few years 
after the Plan was published, further calculations by the CHJ and by independent experts 
concluded that the lake would in fact need to receive a minimum of 253 cubic hectares of 
extremely clean water each year in order to achieve “levels of chlorophyll close to those that 
could offer good conditions for the reversal of the dominance of phytoplankton.”67 
                                                
66 CHJ, Plan Hidrológico, Normativa Art. 18.2 – 18.4 
67 Environmental water needs consisted of the amount of water necessary for each body of water to maintain its 
biological and geological functions, and to reach the water quality standards set by national law and, after 2000, by 
the European Water Framework Directive. The figures cited came from a series of modeled predictions for the state 
of the Albufera’s waters between the period of 1995 to 2015, with a variety of quantities and sources of water, based 
on current realities and on plans to improve the quality of water reaching the lake by eliminating untreated waste and 
increasing treatment at Pinedo. In the 2000-2001 hydrologic year, the Albufera received 170.94 hm3 of water with 
an average phosphorous concentration of 0.601 mgP/l, producing a chlorophyll concentration in the lake of 180ug/l, 
compared to an acceptable upper limit of 20 ug/l set by national and international environmental standards. Analysts 
calculated that the direct transfer of 121 hm3 of water directly from the Júcar, in addition to high-quality water from 
other sources including runoff from the Royal Canal for a total of 253 hm3, “would produce levels of chlorophyll 
close to those that could provide good conditions for the reversion of the dominant state of the phytoplankton.” 
TYPSA, “Simulaciones preliminaries de diferentes escenarios simplificados con los modelos de calidad de aguas,” 
Estudio para el Desarrollo Sostenible de l’Albufera de Valencia (2004); CHJ, Informe para la Comisión Europea 
sobre la Conducción Júcar-Vinalopó, Comunidad Valenciana (December 2004), 75-82. See also “Se aprueba el 
Plan Hidrológico del Júcar,” Agricultores y Ganaderos, September 1997, 6; José Sierra, “Agró asegura que el caudal 
ecológico que fija el plan del Júcar no garantiza el futuro de los ecosistemas,” Levante, July 20, 1992, 16; European 
Council, “Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a 
framework for Community action in the field of water policy,” Official Journal of the European Communities L 327 
(December 22, 2000). 
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However, rather than set the lake’s ecological minimum and guaranteed water allocation 
at either of these amounts, the CHJ’s Plan allocated only 100 hm3 for the entire Albufera Natural 
Park, asserting that “with the assignment of the traditional irrigation in the Ribera del Júcar, and 
considering its runoff and surplus, as well as the unregulated intermediate contributions, this 
hydric need is considered correctly satisfied.”68 The shockingly low and suspiciously round 
estimate of the Albufera’s water needs immediately raised eyebrows among the environmentally-
minded Valencian scientists. Agró activist Victor Navarro bluntly called the 100 hm3 reservation 
“a joke,” in direct violation of national, regional, and international laws requiring the CHJ to 
protect the park’s ecosystems.69 Scientists working within the park suspected that the number 
had been chosen arbitrarily and purposely set low so as not to interfere with existing or future 
agricultural, urban, and industrial demands. 
Indeed, while documentation within the Plan provided statistics and sources to support its 
calculations of all the allocations for urban, industrial, and agricultural use, it offered no such 
information for the ecological estimates.70 The Plan did not even specify whether the 100 hm3 
allotment referred solely to the water reaching the lake or to that in the entire park area; nor did it 
make clear whether the 100 hm3 constituted only the contribution from the Júcar River or rather 
the amount of water reaching the lake from all sources.71 Instead, the CHJ appeared to have 
treated the environmental needs of the river basin merely as an afterthought, prioritizing not only 
the maintenance of existing irrigation but also the unlimited expansion of agricultural water use 
over the conservation of the watershed’s most valuable natural site. 
Without further allocations from the Júcar, the Albufera’s water quality remained 
                                                
68 CHJ, Plan Hidrológico, Normativa Art. 24. 
69 Sierra, “Agró asegura,” 16. 
70 CHJ, Plan Hidrologico Memoria, Memoria 40-41. 
71 Acció Ecologista-Agró, Documento Fundación Recurso Albufera. 
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abysmal. Attempted techno-fixes, which sought to work around the problem of declining 
contributions from the Júcar, failed to produce the desired results. Immediately after the 1994 
tench die-off, an agreement with the Valencian Farmers’ Association allowed the Ministry of 
Public Works to begin pumping water out of local drought wells directly into the lake, hoping to 
raise the lake’s water enough to permit the canal gates to open briefly and allow water to 
circulate. The next summer, when the same wells were fully engaged pumping water into dry 
fields, suggestions from park administrators included diverting water directly from the already-
strained Royal Canal; installing a floating water purifier in the lake; dredging the lake to allow 
subterranean springs to replenish the water; and dredging the northern canals to permit more 
water to flow in from the Turia.72 The EU even financed the installation of an experimental 
“oxygenation system” consisting of one hundred solar-powered machines that would generate 
bubbles in the lake.73 
In the end, none of these measures proved sufficient, and park officials reluctantly 
opened a canal to carry in partially-treated water from the treatment plant at Pinedo. Pinedo’s 
effluents carried nitrates and phosphates that would intensify eutrophication and, in the words of 
officials at the local Ministry of Public Works, “could set back the Albufera’s recovery by 
years.”74 Despite these warnings, even after the 1993-1995 crisis, heavily polluted, partially 
treated water from Pinedo and other treatment plants came to play an increasing role in the 
Albufera’s water supply (Figure 26). By 1998, more than seventy hm3 of the water reaching the 
                                                
72Paco Moreno, “Bono no adopta medidas de urgencia para la Albufera, pese a que los pescadores denuncian su 
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park was wastewater, of which 97% failed to meet pollution standards set by the European Union 
for fragile wetlands habitats.75 
Consequently, despite dramatically improved local water treatment, by the new 
millennium the best that biologists could say about the lake was that it was “less eutrophic than 
during the 1980s” and that its plankton diversity and general health was “a more diverse 
assemblage reminiscent of the 1970s,” which was of course a far cry from the halcyon pre-
industrial landscape of the 1960s.76 Less optimistic observers reported that “regardless of the 
efforts carried out by National, Regional and Municipal administration to preserve and improve 
the environmental state of La Albufera, after 20 years of investment and struggle, the eutrophy of 
the system has been scarcely reduced.”77 Continued urbanization outside the park boundaries, 
poor waste management, and most importantly the reduction of clean waters draining in from the 
southern rice fields had overwhelmed the few reforms that had been attempted. 
Analysts for the EU also agreed with Spanish experts that national water policies and 
laws failed to comply with the 2000 European Water Framework Directive on water quality, 
which required member states to protect, improve and regenerate natural bodies of water, and 
would instead continue to worsen the overexploitation of peninsular resources.78 The ongoing 
subsidy of water prices to irrigators by the Spanish government, moreover, clearly violated the 
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Directive’s mandate that all users pay the actual value of the water, a measure designed to 
promote responsible use and reduce demand.79 By the end of the twentieth century, Spain had the 
highest per capita rate of water use in the European Union, and water use was highest in the 
driest areas of the country, where demand already outpaced supply, and where farmers continued 
to file applications for new wells and interbasin transfers to further expand irrigation. EU 
analysts saw a clear need to “review…agricultural practices” in Spain with the objective of 
reducing water use, halting the expansion of irrigation, and controlling demand.80 
But the European Union’s role in the continued overexploitation of the Júcar basin water 
resources, which in turn was directly responsible for the poor water quality in the Albufera, was 
a complicated one. New water transfers constructed with European Structural Funds, for instance, 
co-financed with the state as part of various structural and rural development projects, had direct 
adverse environmental impacts on wetlands and aquatic ecosystems. The EU required an 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) to determine the extent to which the proposed project 
would alter protected habitats and Natura 2000 areas prior to approving funds for such projects, 
and in several Spanish cases, EIAs resulted in cancellation of new dams and canals.81 In other 
cases, however, this safeguard failed. Analysts for the European Commission cited the Júcar-
Vinalopó transfer, in particular, as among the most problematic in Europe in terms of “technical, 
environmental and economical weaknesses,” even though the EIA had originally convinced 
European analysts that the water to be transferred was “surplus” not needed by any Valencian 
ecosystems.82 
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Simultaneously, the CAP subsidy system served as a further incentive for farmers in La 
Mancha and Alicante to expand irrigation to still more crops of corn and alfalfa despite the lack 
of any market for their products, overdrawing reservoirs in the process. New reforms introduced 
in 1999 replaced price supports with a flat per-hectare payment, calculated on the basis of the 
average yields of a given area between 1986 and 1991.83 Though this was intended to reduce 
ongoing environmental damage by decoupling the subsidies from production, in practice it meant 
that farmers who had engaged in intensive irrigation and chemical-heavy agriculture that 
produced high yields during the late 1980s remained eligible for higher payments from the EU 
than farmers in areas that had produced less during the same period. As a result, practitioners of 
the most environmentally damaging agricultural practices, and especially those who continued to 
overdraw subterranean aquifers, received disproportionately high CAP payments relative to 
pasture lands and environmentally-sensitive farms located within protected natural locations such 
as the Albufera.84 Rural development and agri-environmental payments, constituting around 35% 
of the total CAP budget for Spain, only partially compensate for this discrepancy, leading 
Birdlife International to conclude that “current CAP payments are supporting the expansion and 
maintenance of environmentally harmful farming systems at the expense of wetlands and other 
aquatic ecosystems.”85 
There appeared to be no easy solution for these problems. Spain’s agricultural sector, so 
inextricably dependent on the continued provision of free water and subsidized crops, continued 
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to occupy an important role in local economies as well as national cultures and landscapes. As 
the farmers’ protests of the 1980s and 1990s show, changes to the CAP subsidy system would 
bring significant stresses to an already struggling sector of the population. Moreover, if water 
costs increased to their actual value, Spanish geographers calculated that CAP surplus crops such 
as cereals and fodder would become unprofitable. Such crops constituted 65% of Spain’s total 
irrigated land, which meant that their collapse would lead not only to local unemployment and 
the disappearance of 300,000 Spanish farms, but to massive land abandonment that could worsen 
the environmental situation still further through lost habitat and ground cover.86 
By way of comparison, a parallel case of hydraulic management suggests that the Spanish 
adherence to the Hydraulic Paradigm was not the only way to maintain a healthy agricultural 
sector in the late twentieth century. California, which possesses similar hydrological resources, 
distributions, and demands to those of Spain as a whole, has addressed the environmental and 
economic problems they pose very differently. Whereas increased social interest in the 
environment and the projected decline of agricultural commerce in the US led to a policy shift in 
the 1970s that favored resource conservation and reuse, in Spain environmental concerns only 
appeared in major legislation in the 1990s. By the early 1990s, while the Spanish government 
planned the transformation of an additional 600,000 hectares of land to irrigation, Californian 
water use for irrigation had fallen sharply as a result of water-saving practices and the 
withdrawal of land from irrigation, and was predicted to decline still more. Conversely, 44% of 
Californian water use went to the maintenance and improvement of aquatic ecosystems, slightly 
more (in an average year) than went towards agriculture, compared to less than 7% for Spain. In 
                                                
86 Saurí and Moral, “Recent developments,” 359. 
 
 249 
terms of water quality, meanwhile, Pedro Arrojo Agudo, a top Spanish expert on water policy, 
has described Spanish plans as “light years away” from those of California.87 
The story of water in Spain over the longue durée is one of patently unsustainable logic: 
of humid gardens in the desert; of urban development unchecked by natural resources; of an 
endless cycle of supply and demand that forces the state to continue to manipulate the hydraulic 
and geological landscape in the interest of a rapidly dwindling sector of the population. Changes 
in human behavior brought about as a result of the national water policy over the past century 
have created worse “droughts” than ever before, as the chronic mismanagement of water 
becomes evident when existing systems are pressed to their breaking point during periods of 
lower rainfall.88 As critical observers have noted, a drought such as the one that devastated crops 
in the 1990s is 
not an unforeseen catastrophe, a sort of divine curse that comes to test our mortal 
strength....It is, simply, something normal, linked to the climate of our country. Blaming 
Nature for what happens is not new; but in a dry country, for drought to be considered 
something exceptional and therefore unpredictable and the creator of irremediable ills…is 
close to sarcasm.89 
 
This, in a nutshell, is the paradox of Spanish environmental policy over the twentieth century. 
The government systematically encouraged and facilitated increased exploitation of the 
peninsula’s water resources, increasing the volume of water consumed annually through 
hydroelectric centers, urban expansion, touristic development, and irrigation. Consequently, 
farmers and developers changed their ways of life, abandoning old, drought-resistant traditions 
for heavily water-dependent, more profitable ones, rendering them vulnerable to even a slight 
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reduction in the available water. The government’s continued provision of ever-greater transfers 
of water to the driest parts of the country provided Spaniards with a false sense of security, even 
in dry years, that made conservation measures difficult or impossible to impose.90 At the 
dawning of the twenty-first century, as evidence mounts that Iberia has been and will continue to 
be particularly severely affected by global climate trends, the ideological legacy of the Hydraulic 
Paradigm will continue to create conflict and dissonance in Spanish resource management. 
  
                                                





Epilogue. Rebuilding the Albufera in a Changed World 
 
Despite its extreme degradation the Albufera’s biological value – especially with regard 
to birds – remained exceptional at the close of the twentieth century. Since the 1990s, as the 
presence of occasional “clear periods” in the lake has shown (during which the pervasive algae 
blooms died back enough to temporarily improve the water’s transparency), the lake’s aquatic 
ecosystems continue to respond swiftly to any improvement in water quality, indicating a high 
capacity for regeneration. The Albufera’s prospects, in fact, may best be summarized in the 
words of one of the park’s most dedicated advocates, Joan Miquel Benavent, who commented in 
his capacity as Park Director at the height of the 1995 drought that “there’s no need to be 
dramatic” about the lake’s imminent demise. Noting that wetlands in the Mediterranean 
frequently undergo natural cycles of drying and refilling, he told reporters that although the 
present situation appeared dire, “we are not dealing with an irreversible situation.”1 
The Albufera’s ecological tenacity notwithstanding, however, natural rates of recovery 
were slow and in some cases could not complete the regeneration of preexisting ecosystems. 
Erosion from the beaches, accelerated by the blockage of sand caused by the industrial port to 
the north, meant that the sand dunes, for instance, could not naturally reform. Likewise, so long 
as the lake’s water quality remained low, native species such as shrimp and toothcarp could not 
                                                
1 J. M. Benavent, quoted in “El director del parque de la Albufera teme que la disminución de oxígeno haga peligrar 
la fauna del lago,” Levante, June 3, 1995, 35. 
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return, and the water’s opacity prevented new rooted vegetation. It was not enough, local 
conservationists believed, to simply protect what remained of the landscape: nature needed some 
help. 
This idea of “helping nature” to restore or recreate lost or damaged landscapes permeates 
conservationist discourse in the twenty-first century. The very concept of restoration, however, is 
heavily loaded with political and historical implications. One OTDA employee involved in the 
effort to restore the Dehesa eloquently summarized one of the recurring questions of 
contemporary conservation efforts: 
We knew the components of the ecosystem, we knew the dominant actions, we had 
scientific information at our disposal; nonetheless, what was, in the end, the reconstructed 
form of that nature? Should we copy the images of old photographs and topographical 
maps? Imitate similar formations in other places? Perhaps invent a random picturesque 
place and call it a day?2 
 
Answering this question required park managers to define the park’s primary function. Making 
the park into a wildlife reserve, a public space, or a historical recreation, to list just a few of the 
possibilities, would each require very different measures. The landscape of the 1960s, which 
most experts agreed offered the ideal model for contemporary reconstructions, was moreover 
itself the product of centuries of interactions between humans and their environment, from the 
loss of Avienius’ “oysters’ lagoon” in the Middle Ages to the tancat construction of the 
eighteenth century.3 The designation of the 1960s as the restoration “baseline” was thus based 
largely on feasibility and politics, rather than a desire to erase evidence of human involvement in 
                                                
2 A. Fernandez de la Reguera, “Ordenación del frente litoral de la Albufera. Sector Dehesa de El Saler, Valencia,” 
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the park. To the contrary, as a natural park the coexistence of economic activity with biological 
value remained one of the principal goals. 
The Albufera, moreover, did not exist independent from the surrounding countryside, 
which had also undergone transformative changes over the past decades and centuries. Even if 
technicians could recreate the landscape of the 1960s within the park, changes to currents, water 
use, and other factors well outside the park boundaries meant that constant maintenance would 
be needed to keep that landscape intact. The loss of clean water from the Júcar forced engineers 
to divert recycled water from nearby waste treatment plants to clean up the lake, but the most 
sensitive areas of the restored ecosystem required special filtration systems to further improve 
their water quality. Severe beach erosion caused by construction to the north meant that the 
dunes could not naturally reform, and that additional sand needed to be periodically trucked in to 
prevent them from blowing away completely. Even with these precautions, the beach continues 
to recede rapidly, and OTDA engineers told me they wish they had built the dunes an additional 
five meters inland to give themselves more time before they wash away completely. The matas, 
the reed islands in the lake, proved especially problematic, subject to constant erosion from water 
currents that are no longer blocked by rooted vegetation, and city engineers build and rebuild the 
islands in an arduous and labor-intensive process every few years (Figure 32).4 
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Figure 32: Rebuilding matas and dunes.5 
       
City employees at the OTDA, now run by Antonio Vizcaino, took on a disproportionate 
share of the park management following a political shakeup that removed Benavent from office 
in the late 1990s.6 Scientists and technicians there achieved remarkable transformations on the 
Dehesa with the help of funding from the European Union via the LIFE Program, an instrument 
designed specifically to finance environmental protection efforts. In addition to dramatically 
expanding their plant nursery for native vegetation, technicians converted the old partridge farm 
into a hospital for injured wildlife and turned the carp farm into a breeding center for endangered 
aquatic species.7 OTDA workers demolished and covered up roads, parking areas, and 
subterranean electric and plumbing lines left by the urbanization, and uprooted stands of 
eucalyptus planted in the first half of the century.8 In 1999, an EU grant paid for city employees 
to tear down the promenade, pull out old roads and parking lots, dig out the dune slacks, and 
replace invasive and introduced vegetation with carefully grown native species.9 In at least some 
cases, their efforts were rewarded by the recolonization of the landscape with birds, snails, 
amphibians, and insects, as well as the fish introduced from their farm.10 
                                                
5 Photos from OTDA. 
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The presentation of the Albufera as a “Natural Park” to a popular audience required 
administrators and scientists to grapple with much of the complex history that has been discussed 
in this dissertation. As in the creation of any museum exhibit, curators made careful choices 
about what to display and what to hide from view; how to contextualize each object or point of 
interest; what take-home message they hoped to convey to their visitors. Through reconstruction 
and appropriate signage, the park could be portrayed as a primitive, undisturbed landscape; as a 
wildlife reserve dedicated to promoting maximum biodiversity; as a public space for the 
enjoyment of all Valencians; or some combination thereof. Each of these choices was heavily 
value-laden, with political implications on the historical memory of the landscape and with 
personal impacts on the farmers, fishermen, and vacationers who used the space. 
The choices made by the OTDA and implemented with EU funding reflect the continued 
politicization of the landscape and the role it has played over the past century with regard to 
Valencian identity. Technicians rebuilt the dunes with sand trucked in from the north, planted 
them with native grasses and plants grown in the OTDA nursery, and dug out the malladas in 
their approximate former location. But they also, in some cases, “improved” on the original 
landscape, increasing diversity and introducing new species. Two deep pools behind the dunes, 
unmarked and deep in the territory that is closed to the public, house some of the largest 
populations of endangered native fish and vegetation in Valencia, but do not resemble anything 
that existed in the area prior to the urbanization.11 A few kilometers away, park technicians call 
the 116-acre Racó de l’Olla, once an unsuccessful horse racing track, the “the jewel of the park,” 
                                                
11 OTDA, La Restauración de las Dunas, 46 and 59. 
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citing the immense bird populations that nest on its wholly manufactured islands and paddle 
through its filtered waters (Figure 33).12 
Figure 33: New landscapes. 
Top: Freshwater pools on the Dehesa, 2012. 
Bottom: Racó de l’Olla before and after reconstruction (1980s and 2012).13 
 
       
        
                                                
12 Felipe interview, April 30 2012; Carmen Arjona, communist city council delegate, quoted in J. S., “El 
Ayuntamiento, contra el festival del Saler,” Diario de Valencia, March 23, 1982; OTDA, La Gestión de L’Albufera, 
10; Generalitat Valenciana, Informe sobre la Gestion 1994; Generalitat Valenciana, Memoria sobre la Gestion 
1995; Junta Rectora del Parque Natural de l’Albufera, Actas, December 20, 1990, Correspondencia, 3/931-8, 
AHGV; OTDA, “Anteproyecto Mallada del Racó de l’Olla” (September 1985), OTDA; OTDA and Generalitat 
Valenciana, “Proyecto de restauración del Racó de l’Olla, 1er Documento de trabajo” (1990), correspondencia, 
9/1756-9, AHGV; P. Varea, “El Saler contará con una laguna artificial en el plazo de un mes,” Levante, March 25 
1990; “Mil seiscientas parejas de charranes vuelven a nidificar en la Albufera,” Levante, April 8, 199726. 
13 Photos of the Dehesa pools by author. Pre-reconstruction Racó de l’Olla from OTDA. Contemporary photo of 
Racó de l’Olla from Google Earth. 
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Like other areas closed to the public, the Racó and the dune pools appear pristine, teem 
with life, and offer some of the greatest ecological and aesthetic value to be found in the 
Valencian Community. But they are also sites of some of the heaviest engineering and ongoing 
human intervention in the entire park. This raises an issue first raised by environmental ethicist 
Robert Elliot, who coined the term “faking nature” and argued that a reconstructed landscape is 
like a forged work of art: though it may be indistinguishable from the original, its intrinsic value 
is diminished.14 The Racó, and indeed the whole park, are in this interpretation mere artifacts that 
do not convey the same aesthetic and moral attributes as an untouched wilderness. 
The Albufera Natural Park, I argue, defies this negative view of restoration. Terms like 
“faking nature” and “forgery” suggest an effort to disguise past environmental damage, but the 
park’s management has opted to highlight the socio-natural coproduction of the area in all of its 
materials, crafting and displaying a certain narrative of environmental morality and political 
history for public consumption.15 Signs and posters all over the park, and especially in the most 
aesthetically pleasing and apparently “natural” areas, draw visitors’ attention to their artificiality, 
and describe the ecosystem’s near-destruction in the 1970s, the continuing threats to its survival, 
and the enormous effort that has gone into its restoration. Javier Jiménez, the OTDA employee 
currently responsible for much of the park’s EU-funded signage and environmental education, 
told me that in many parks, managers would direct a visitor’s attention away from the horse 
stables that still serve as administrative buildings on the Racó, or bury the manhole covers 
                                                
14 Robert Elliot, Faking Nature: The Ethics of Environmental Restoration (London: Routledge, 1997), viii. 
15 Arguing against Elliot, Richard Sylvan suggests that we focus on the “considerable increase of natural features” 
that it can achieve, “albeit of lesser value than formerly,” rather than lament that restoration cannot recreate pristine 
nature. However, Sylvan’s interests lie largely in areas where rehabilitation consists of “helping” or accellerating 
natural healing processes, whereas in the Albufera such efforts have consisted largely of implanting and maintaining 
landscape features that would not have evolved by natural processes in the current environmental conditions. 




scattered throughout the woods. Instead, the Albufera’s park managers opted to draw visitors’ 
attention to these and other unsightly remnants of the past, emphasizing the differences between 
the landscapes that used to exist, the devastation of the 1970s and 1980s, and the progress that 
has been made since then. “Look at it,” he says, with a sweeping gesture meant to encompass the 
blocky high-rises towering over the trees, the dark green waters of the lake, the electrical wires 
and abandoned water depositories dug into the ground. “Look how close it came to 
destruction.”16 The Albufera Park is a cautionary tale, to some extent, and a celebration of the 
redemptive power of the modern, scientific conservation movement. This shifts the purpose of 
restoration away from Elliot’s notion of “faking nature,” which implies an effort to cover up past 
damage and pass off a simulacrum as the original, and towards new functions of both aesthetics 
and education. 
This narrative, moreover, has an explicitly political component closely related to the 
ongoing use of the Albufera as a trope of Valencian authenticity. Jimenez’s colorful signs, along 
with the park’s magazine, pamphlets, and other materials, all emphasize that the urbanization and 
pollution took place under Franco whereas the restoration was carried out by autonomous 
Valencian political authorities with the aid of the European Union. Materials are printed in both 
Valencian and Castilian, and in the signs, Valencian always comes first. There is also a strong 
emphasis in all park materials on the central role of rice farmers in maintaining the wetlands and 
water quality of the ecosystems, which helps to reinforce the area’s historical image as the 
Spanish agricultural area par excellence and to strengthen ties between conservationists and local 
farmers, who continue to contest what they see as overly restrictive environmental laws. 
                                                
16 Javier Jiménez, interview with the author, El Saler, February 15, 2011. 
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The redemption narrative, from industrial Francoist destruction to cooperative Valencian 
restoration, frames the modern park as an example of productive coexistence between humans 
and nature. Restoration efforts sought to approximate the substantially modified environment of 
the 1960s, complete with irrigation canals and intensive agriculture, while adding their own 
flourishes to meet contemporary ideas of scientific value and the intrinsic appeal of biodiversity. 
In so doing, they defined the landscape’s value as derived in equal measure from ongoing human 
actions and its innate natural characteristics. Environmental engineers working on the Dehesa 
over the past thirty years have consistently defined their objective as alleviating the inexorable 
decline and disappearance of landscapes, just as it would be with a historic monument or a work 
of art, to maintain “the cultural wealth of the Albufera, in the broadest sense of the word,” for 
“the generations to come.”17 To this extent, the Albufera represents the “middle ground” William 
Cronon describes in The Trouble with Wilderness, escaping the nature-culture binary and 
providing a productive and honorable role for humans within the natural world. The innovation 
of Albufera management is to redefine contemporary human actions, including the restoration 
efforts themselves, as an intrinsic part of this cultural heritage. 
As hopeful as this narrative is, however, the Albufera remains a heavily contested site 
where farmers, politicians, scientists, and vacationers continue to vie for control. As none holds 
hegemonic control over this middle ground, none are entirely satisfied with their experience 
there. Farmers express frustration and, frequently, mystification at the continued restrictions on 
their use of the land; politicians enforce some conservationist laws while ignoring or subverting 
others; and scientist-activists routinely express disgust with everyone involved, up to and 
including their colleagues in the various environmental administrations. Meanwhile, of the 
                                                
17 Benet Granell, “La Albufera de Valencia,” 179. 
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millions of tourists who arrive in Valencia each year, only a tiny fraction ever visit the park’s 
visitors’ center or read the painstakingly-narrated signs. Those who visit the Dehesa at all do so 
in search of the same thing that attracted Valencians from all walks of life throughout the last 
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